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PREFACE
For several years, as a believer in God, I have 
sought; after the raison d' etre of involuntary frustrations of 
the ideal fulfillment of the lives of innocent and ri-liteous 
Persons. The thesis unich I am submitting herewith, therefore, 
represents the thought v/hich I have given tnis subject over 
a period of years, as ne 11 as the research v/hich I have 
conducted during these past two years in Glasgow University.
The bibliography, consisting of some one hundred and 
fifty volumes, given in detail at the bad, reveals the printed 
sources of my material. host of these boohs are by or about 
persons whose views are treated herein, many of them are general 
studies of the same problem as that on vdiich I have written, 
and several of them mahe only incidental reference to my sub­
ject; but all of them, in varying degrees, have been an enrich­
ment to my life and thought, and have contributed, either 
directly or indirectly to the preparation of this dissertation.
The oripmnality of my work consists in both its approach 
and its conclusion. In approach it is original on two counts: 
first, because it is an attempt to. separate natural evil from 
moral evil and to treat only the former; and second, because 
it contains specialised study of the relation of the Incarnation 
to the problem of involuntary evil. In its conclusion there is 
oriv'inalitv in both types of solution v/hich are there worked
out. In the philosophical, armchair solution to the theoreti­
cal problem of why natural evil exists, it is novel that the 
two causes given--natural laws and a -'fall'' in animate creation- 
shoiild be affirmed by the same writer; and, as a corollary of 
this, it is now to the field to understand that natural laws 
originate the inorganic instruments of frustration, whereas the 
‘‘fall’^ in animate creation is the cause of organic ones. In ihe 
incarnational, life-situâtion solution to the practical problem 
of what to do about the evils as they confront us in our empiri­
cal existence, there is originality in linking the melioristic 
approach to an incarnational emphasis and in affirming that 
just as the Death of Christ is only a provisional redemption 
from moral evil, awaiting as it does man ^ s appropriating faith, 
so the Incarnation is only a provisional redemption of natural 
evil, and av/aits man^s active confrontation of such evil, as 
he becomes a worliman together with his condescended God, v;ho 
is metaphysically and oxpcrientially one-with-him, in the holy 
business of preventing involuntary evils and of transforming 
them into creativity when, not having avoided them, they tend 
to frustrate the ideal fulfillment of his life.
This thesis, in its present form, would have been quite 
impossible aoart from the step-by-step supervision,. both in 
procedure and in actual content, given so genially and so 
painstakingly by the Reverend Professor J. G. Riddell, D.D., 
Professor of Divinity in Trinity College, GJ.asgow 
University. As I have prepared it, also, I have been in
constant awareness of ny debt to Edwin Lewis, Tii.D., Emeritus 
Professor of Systematic Theology and the Philosophy of Religion 
at Drew Theological Seminary, Uadison. Lew Jersey, under whom 
I majored in theological studies from 19^ -7 until 1950. Less 
direct, perhaps, but nevertheless of underlying significance, 
is the contribution made by S. S. VLiito, Ph.D., Professor of 
Systematic Theology at Hazarena Theological Seminary, Kansas 
City, mis souri, under whom I studied from I9I-O until 19g-7^  
first at Olivet Hazarene College, Kankakee, Illinois and later 
at the Kansas City seminary. My w„fe, too, has contributed 
immensely first, by listening patiently as I have read aloud, 
for her reactions, passage after passage; second, by encouraging 
me to study unoil late hours month after month even although 
it has meant that she has had to move about our one room 
quietly and speechless ; and third, by typing most of the 
second and final drafts.
1313 Oxford Street 
Pasadena, California 
August 21, 1952
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liWROniCTORY
CHAPTER I 
IITTRODUOTORY
Evil may bo defined as whatever frustrates the fulfill­
ment of ideal human existence. When the frustration of such 
existence is volitional, on man^s part, it may be called moral 
evil. Examples of such evil are disobedience to God’s laws, 
selfishness, and the will to disregard an acknowledged ideal. 
When the frustration of ideal human existence is unrelated to 
man’s volition, it may be called natural evil. liiis type 
manifests itself in such occurrences as earthquakes, volcanoes, 
tornadoes, tidal waves, floods, famines, fires, accidents, pain, 
disease, and imbecility, and in such aspects of creation as 
poisonous reptiles, ferocious'beasts, flies, mosquitoes and 
disease germs.
Whether moral or natural, evil may be either intrinsic 
or instrumental. It is intrinsic when in and of itself a frus­
tration of ideal human existence, and instrumental when it con­
tributes to such frustration. A theft of money would be an 
example of intrinsic moral evil, whereas an automobile used 
in a theft would be an instrumental moral evil. A disease would 
be an example of intrinsic natural evil, and germs of disease 
would be a type of instrumental natural evil.
As moral and as natural, and whother instrumental or
1
2intrinsic, evil is a problem to man. In its instrumental 
manifestations, however, both moral and natural, it produces 
a less serious problem than when it is intrinsic. 'This is 
because it is only contributory to frustration when it is 
instrumental, but frustration wliich is actual when it is in­
trinsic. Similarly, in its moral aspect, evil is less serious 
a problem than when in its natural form. This is because the 
responsible agent of moral evil is more easily located than 
is that of natural evil. moral evil, just because of its 
volitional character, is quite readily seen to arise from 
man’s prostituted use of freedom; he himself, of his own 
choosing, brings it upon himself. In natural evil, however, 
man’s volition is not involved at all. Frustrations of his 
ideal existence come to him quite apart from his ovm choosing; 
he neither selects the instruments of them, nor chooses v;ithin 
the sphere of their realised character.
Natural evil, then, more than moral evil, and par­
ticularly when in its intrinsic form, is a problem to man. 
Indeed, it constitutes one of the gravest of all the problems 
v/hich he has pondered. Of natural evil Alfred lioernle says,
■’It is undoubtedly one of the gravest problems which the po.ilo­
se phy of religion has to face"(Eoernle, Matter, Life, Mind and 
God, p. 9)* Leslie Weatherhead writes, "The subject of pain 
has haunted my thinking ever since I began to think for myself 
at all"(Why Do hen Suffer, P*9)* Kadoslav Tsanoff speaks of 
it as man’s "...overwhelming problem"(Tsanoff, The Nature of
3Evil, p. viii). John S* Ehale calls it "...this notorious prob­
lem which has vexed thought and tried faith in every age of 
human history"(whale, Iho Christian Answer to the Problem of 
Evil, p. 13). John Fiske declares, "Ever since human intelli­
gence became enlightened enough to grope for a meaning and 
purpose in human life, this problem of the existence of 
(natural) evil has been the burden of man"(Fiske, Through 
Nature to God, p. 11).
The problem reaches its most acute form in the 
suffering of innocent and righteous persons. If natural evil 
should come only to mature persons, and solely to the wicked 
among them, its raison d’etre would not be difficult-to under­
stand. Such persons would be receiving their just desert.
But natural evils affect the v/aLl-being of infants and children, 
and also of twice-born men.
A person wonders why five of his twelve brothers died 
during infancy or childhood. He v/onders, further, why one of 
the spared brothers has come by far more natural frustration 
than have all the others combined, in December of l^pl adding 
to fifteen years of illness an arm amputation, and in 
February of 1952 u dread disease, l¥hy should an intimate 
college friend, twice-born on any reclming, be viewed as a 
lifeless form two days after leaving lectures? hhy should 
two other college intimates, also twice-born, have been blown 
to bits in a powder plant explosion? One’s mind traverses 
%rears spent in the pastorate, too, and lingers now v/ith the 
innocent child who has met death by accident and now with the
suffering saint--and one wonders why.
In a wider range of experience, why do righteous and 
innocent persons suffer from earthquakes in California, 
volcanoes in Japan, tidal waves in Hawaii? IVhy do torrents 
of water, in ma.ny places of the world, unchecked by the best 
that man can do, rush down from mountains into the valleys 
and ravage whole cities? \Vhy do many innocent and righteous 
persons in Cliina suffer from famine, due to weather conditions 
over which they have no control? v-Ihj do fires, caused by 
spontaneous combustion or unforseen explosion, and not by 
willfilness, work havoc to v/hole families? VJiy did fifty-one 
Roman Catholics, on a pilgrimage to Rome, die (November l6, 
1950) iu an Alpine plane crash? why do survivors of accidents, 
regardless of their innocence or guilt, suffer pain even for 
years? Idiy do children, innocent because unaccountable, and 
mature persons, righteous--as human righteousness goes--because 
twice-born, suffer from incurable disease? why are some 
persons imbeciles tlirough unavoidable accident or other 
non-volltiono.l causes, as opposed to such causes as alcliohol- 
isni and syphilis? VJiy do poisonous reptiles lie in wait for 
human victims? Why are there, in our forests, ferocious beasts 
which wait to pounce upon men? Thy are there flies to spoil 
a good man’s ointment? why mosquitoes to carry germs? hhy 
germs ?
5The modern counterparts of the Psalmist’s problem 
are no less real than the stones against which he pictured men 
dashing their feet, or the lions and adders v/hich beset their 
v/ay. A. C. T/elch writes, "Ilany good men, whose trust in God 
was very real, have stumbled heavily over the rough stones of 
life. The lion, before it springs, and the adder, before it 
strikes, do not stop to consider whether their prey fears God 
or not"(welch. The Psalter, in Life, Worship, and history,
p. 111).
Such frustrations of ideal human existence befalling, 
as they do, the just as well as the unjust, are not a philosophica] 
problem to the consistent atheist. He can only maintain the 
placid attitude of the Stoic, and bear things as best he can.
Minot J. Savage rightly declares.
If we are the product of mere blind, unthinking, 
unintelligent force, then v/hat is the use of our 
fretting? Tliere is nobody to complain to: there is 
nobody to get angry with; there is nobody to charge 
with injustice. There is no court of appeal, there 
is no hope of redress ( Savage, Life’s Dark Problems, p. ![.) .
Rado5lav Tsanoff affirms, "...a problem of evil, the judgment
of anything as good or bad, evaluation of any sort, cannot
be an integral part of a mechanistic system" ( Tsanoff, Tlie
Nature of Evil, p. 3)* Frank Ballard gives the same insight
v/hen he writes, "Plainly, if chance and luck rule the universe,
there can be no shock nor difficulty concerning anything that
happens"(Ballard, why Does Not God Intervene?, p . 6).
John S. hhale says, "Give up this pathetic belief in God, 
v/hich is causing all the trouble, and there is no longer 
any problem" (Ghale, The Christian Answer to the Problem of 
Evil, p. 28).
Nor should the involuntary frustration of ideal 
human life be a problem for the agnostic. Not knowing whether 
or not God exists, the agnostic would not have any positive 
reason for rebuff. On this point John S. whale asserts, "The 
problem of evil, which is very acute for theism, does not 
arise for agnosticism"(Ibid., p. 28).
The problem is particularly acute for the theist. It 
arises from his endeavor to reconcile the undesirable, 
non-volitional human experiences with belief in a God who, 
either from Eis v/ill or His nature, evidently causes or per­
mits the evil. And it is, for him, a most baffling problem.
Frank Ballard writes, "It is, almost everywhere, an ever-troubling 
perplexity to thoughtful believers"(Ballard, why Does Not God 
Intervene?, p. 31). Preston Bradley says, "The greatest 
problem v/hich T and all other Claristian leaders face is: why 
do the good suffer"(Stated Friday, January 31» IÇk?  ^ on the 
radio program "Hymns of All Churches ", originating in Chicago).
E. S. Brightman affirms, "Tne quantity and distribution of 
evils make difficult the belief in a good God.... No objection 
to religious faith compares in seriousness with that arising 
from the fact of evil"(Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, 
p. 2l]-0). Harris Franklin Rail asserts, "The fact of evil has
always been the greatest single obstacle to faith"(Hall, 
Christianity, p. 313)* Daniel Tnompson declares, "Religiously 
considered, the problem of evil is the most perplexing and seem­
ingly the most insoluble of any that pertain to theism" 
(Tiiompson, The Problem of Evil, p. 3llp) • Nels Ferre, v/riting 
as a theist, says: "Evil has always been my centra.1 problem" 
(Ferre, Evil and the Christian Faith, p. ix). Floyd Hiatt Ross 
insists, "The problem of evil must be faced squarely by the 
theist"(Ross, Personalism and the Problem of Evil, p . ix).
And he asks, "Can one continue to think badly of evil without 
thinking badly of Cod"(Ibid., p. ix)?
Attempts to solve this problem, so significant for 
theism, have taken--and indeed, can only take--three general 
forms: a few attempts have been pessimistic; many have been 
optimistic; and some, particularly in modern times, have been 
melioriStic. A chapter devoted to each of these three general 
attitudes comprises Part One of this thesis. Part Two consists 
of a specialized study of the ancient and modern emphasis upon 
the doctrine of the Incarnation, in its relation to involuntary 
evil. Both the general and the soecial research is used, in 
the conclusion, in order to show that the Christian doctrine 
of the Incarnation, when properly understood, points toward 
an answer to the abysmal mystery.
PART ONE: GENERAL APPROACH
CHAPITER II 
PESSIMISM
Pessimism, is the theory which "would explain away
both intrinsic and instrumental good and would leave only
intrinsic evil and instruments perfectly adapted to
achieving evil"(E. S. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion,
p. 2lp3)* In its extreme form it holds that evil is "rooted
and dominant in the very heart of ultimate reality..."
(Radoslava Tsanoff, Nature of Evil, p. 7)* In such extreme,
it is a position of "...pandiabolism,..."(Ibid., p. 7). In
Namiet’s soliloquy we find the theory stated practically:
To die: to sleep;
No more ; and by a sleep to say we end 
The heart-ache and the thousand natural 
shocks
That flesh is heir to, ’tis a consummation 
Devoutly to be wish’d (Act III, Scene I).
Othello also stated what pessimists believe when, after
striking deceptive Iago vl th the sword, he exclaimed:
I ’Id have thee live ; for, in my sense, ’tis 
happiness to die(Act V, Scene II).
James Thomson states it blasphemously in his City of Dreadful
Night :
V/ho is most wretched in this dolorous place?
I think myself; yet I would rather be
My miserable self than Ne, than He
VAao formed such creatures to His ovm disgrace.
3
9The vilest thing must be less vile than Thou 
From whom it had its being, God and Lord]
Creator of all woe and sini abhorred.
Malignant and implacable] î vow
That not for all Thy pov/er furled and unfurled.
For all the temples to 'Tliy glory built.
Would I assume the ignominious guilt 
Of having made such men in such a world.
(Quoted in Tsanoff, The Nature of Evil, p.?)
There are at least three principal types of pessimism. 
They are the religious, the philosophical, and the scientific.
Religious Pessimism
Religious pessimism is an embittered despair arising 
from frustrated religious strivings. One of the most con­
spicuous examples of this t~rpe of pessimism is the religion 
of Buddliism.
Gautama, founder of Buddhism, became deeply troubled 
by prevalent evidences of evil in nature. In his Indian 
village,he was touched by the human plight. lie saw the" 
sick, the dying; the lame, the halt. .He saw aged men groping 
about unaided, and aimless. In the face of this situation 
he asked the question, "why?"
At twenty-nine he even left his wife and son, in 
search of the ansv/er. Not in philosophy did he seek the 
solution. Not to the crude science of his day did he turn.
His gropings were in the religious realm.
And for him there were only gropings; t:ere was no 
answer for him. Evil was not justified. Its existence was 
not viewed as purposive. There was no ramson d ’etre of
-LU
natural evil. A religious pessimism was the result.
Gautama propounded "Pour Noble Truths". Different 
writers state the four truths somewhat differently, as they 
put into outline Gautama’s sermon^ viiich was preached at 
Benares to the five companions of his hermit life; but the 
four truths are usually recognizable, whoever has stated 
them. Burnouf: states them briefly. He says that they are 
"Sorrow, the production of sorrow, the extinction of sorrow, 
the path which conducts to the extinction of sorrow"(Intro­
duction to Buddhism, p. o29, quoted by Marcus Dods, in 
Mohammed, Buddha and Christ, p. l65). An authoritative 
rendering is given by A. S. Geden, in an article on "Buddha" 
in The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, edited by James 
Hastings. He writes, "All existence involves suffering; 
suffering is caused by desire, especially desire for con­
tinuance of existence; the suppression of desire therefore 
will lead to the extinction of suffering; this deliverance can 
only be effected by the Noble Eight-fold Path. These are the
^Tne following four paragraphs are from this" sermon, 
and enlarge upon the Pour Noble Truths: "’Now this, 0 recluses, 
is the noble truth concerning suffering. Birth is painful, 
and so is old age; disease is painfu], and so is death. Union 
with the unpleasant is painful, painful is separation from the 
pleasant; and any craving that is unsatisfied, that, too, is 
painful....
Now this, 0 recluses, is the noble truth concerning 
the origin of suffering. Verily it originates in that craving 
thirst which causes the renewal of becomings, is accompanied 
by sensual delight, and seeks satisfaction now here, now there-' 
that is to say, the craving for the gratification of the 
passions, or the craving for a future life, or the craving 
for success in this present life. (Continued, on next wage)
aryasatyani, or Noble Truths, the four terms of which are 
ciuhka, ’pain*; tamuclaya, ’cause’; nirodha, ’ suppression’; 
marga, ’way’ or ’path’"(Vol. II, p. 892). Of these truths 
Alfred Martin writes, "However much Buddhists on
other points, they all are agreed on these"(Martin, Great 
Heli.gious Teachers of the East, p. 50).
For the Buddhist this is not a good world; sorrow 
is universal: "...birth is painful, disease is painful, death 
is painful, contact with the unpleasant is painful"(Ibid., 
p. 60). SorroY/ is everywhere present because men have 
desires, and the path to redemption from having to come 
back to this world of sorrows, after death, is that of 
rooting out of all desires while in this existence.
Existence is looked upon as being unwanted, even in 
the very best kind of a re-embodiment. Buddiiists do not want 
to exist. Extinction in the oblivious state of Nirvana becomes 
the goal of each adherent of the religion. Tnis individual 
extinction is his salvation. It comes by a series of
'^ Now this, 0 recluses, is the noble truth concerning
the destruction of suffering. Veril%r it is the destruction
in which no craving remains over, of this very thirst; the 
laying aside of, the getting rid of, the being free from, the 
harbouring no longer of, this thirst.
"’Now this, 0 recluses, is the noble truth concerning
the way which leads to the destruction of suffering. Verily 
it is this Eight-fold noble path; that is to say: Right Views, 
Right Aspirations, Right Speech, Right Conduct, Right Liveli­
hood, Right Effort, Right Mindfulness, Right Rapture’"(from 
Professor Rhys David’s translation and quoted in Annie H.
Small ’ 8 Buddhism, pp, 2)i-, 25 ) •
12
réincarnations.
Philosophical Pessimism
Philosophical pessimism is a type of embittered 
despair which arises from an exaggerated dependence upon the 
human reason as an instrument of explaining the evils of life. 
Arthur Schopenliauer, the eighteenth century German philosopher, 
is probably the most noted example of this type of pessimism.
He is considered by many to be the arch-pessimist of 
all time. He was an "...antirationalist, pessimist, atheist;
’ tough’ as opposed to ’ tender ’ minded, a v/ild ass in the 
desert of philosophy"(Dev/itt H. Parker (ed. ), Schopenliauer 
Selections, p. ix).
Some philosophers "...tend to look upon themselves 
as apologists for the cosmos, press-agents for the Deity; the 
smell of theology is still strong upon them, and they are 
never quite content until they have justified the ways of 
God to man"(Will Durant (ed.) The Works of Schopenhauer, p.ix). 
Many other philosophers "...dig their heads into the sand at 
the sight or the mention of evil"(Ibid., p. ix). Hot so with 
Schopenhauer; he became the extreme opposite of this type of 
optimism.
One of Schopenhauer’s editors says that for the
philosopher evil is:
...no accidental or incidental fact in the world, 
but inescapable, essential. It is our central 
illusion, he tells us, to suppose that we are 
destined to be happy. Evil is primary; good, 
secondary. Following Hobbes, Schopenhauer
13
defines the good as the objective of desire; but 
desire itself is painful; hence the underlying 
motive in desire is to get rid of desire itself. 
Tne good is therefore negative, not positive; it 
is the erasing of a burden{Schopenhauer, (ed. by 
Parker), Schopenhauer Selections, p. xii).
Tsanoff explains his position thus:
can clearly see, then, that from Schopenhauer’s 
point of view pleasure is the exception; pain, the 
rule in human life. Pain is the fundamental, posi­
tive, and primary; pleasure is negative and secondry, 
the temporary alleviation of pain(Tsanoff, The Nature 
of Evil, p . 286).
Of his own writings, four rather brief essays are 
particularly pessimistic. These are "On Suicide", "On Educa­
tion", "Of Woman", and "On Noise". In the first he says,
"'Ihe inmost kernel of Christianity is the truth that suffer­
ing--the Cross--is the real end and object of life"(Schopen­
hauer, (Ed. by Will Durant), The Works of Schopenhauer, "On 
Suicide", p. Ij.35)-
In his essay captioned "A Dialogue ", he states his 
pessimistic Atheism. He v/rites, "Tieism lies like a mountain 
on all intellectual, and chiefly on all philosophical efforts, 
and arrests or stunts all progress"(Ibid., "A Dialogue", p. IpTO). 
He also affirms, "It is false, that state, justice, law cannot 
be upheld without the assistance of religion and its dogmas; 
and that justice and public order need religion as a necessary 
complement, if legislative enactments are to be carried out"
(Ibid., "A Dialogue", p. k70). A statement wi ich summarizes 
his viev/s as to religion is that it is "a pack of lies " ( Ibid.,
"A Dialogue", p. [1.83). As proof of this he writes, "The
fruits of Christianity were religious wars, butcheries, crusades, 
inquisitions, extermination of the natives in America, and the 
introduction of African slaves in their place"(Ibid., "A 
Dialogue", p. Il90).
Schopenhauer was primarily a philosopher, lie had 
Buddhist leanings, but was not particularly religious. Ho 
was not opposed to science, but it was not his peculiar inter­
est. His interest lay in the realm of rational processes.
Hence, rather than intuition or faith, and in preference to 
observation and experimentation, he chose theoretic reason 
as his instrument of investigating truth. His particular 
use of reason choked out all elements of a vigorous faith, 
and led him to an avowed pessimism regarding life and exis­
tence .
Scientific Pessimism
In scientific pessimism there is disparagement of 
life and existence as a result of the exclusive dependence 
upon the data derived from observation and experimentation 
in the sphere of natural phenomena.
Joseph Wood Krutch is a leading contemporary repre­
sentative of this type of pessimism. He is noted chiefly 
for his book The Modern Temper. The "temper" which he 
describes in this book is his own. It is atheism, despair, 
pessimism, stemming out of the problem of natural evil and 
based upon an implicit dependence upon sense ciata. He calls 
his "temper" the "modern" one because it is scientific as 
opposed to trad.itional and emotional, and because he tnus
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considers it "up to date".
In Mr. Krutch’s view there is no purpose in nature.
He declares, "The universe...was not designed to suit man’s 
needs"(Joseph Wood Krutch, The Modern Temper, p. ?)• He 
further asserts, "Nature’s purpose, if purpose she can be 
said to have, is no purpose of his (man’s) and is not under­
standable in his terms"(Ibid., p. 8). Our author refers to 
nature’s "...ruthless indifference to his (man’s) values, 
and the blindness of her irresistible will, v/hich strike 
terror to his soul"(Ibid., p.3). Mr. Krutch also states 
that nature "...has no ends v/hich the human mind has been 
able to discover or comprehend"(Ibid., p. 39)*
It is probably this assumption, that there is no 
design in nature, which led to Mr. Krutch’s atheism. Speaking 
of the modern temper, in which he includes his ov/n mood, he 
writes: "Tliose who are its victims do not and never can expect 
to believe in God"(Ibid., p. xvi). He also declares, "For 
the cozy bowl of the sky anchored in a protecting curve above 
him he (man) must exchange the cold immensities of space, and, 
for the spiritual order which he has designed, the chaos of 
nature"(Ibid., p. 8 ).
In Krutch’s world, devoid of purpose and without a Fur- 
poser, man is of no more importance than an insect, and far 
more despicable. He writes.
Nature, in her blind thirst for life, has filled 
every possible cranny on the rotting earth v/ith some 
sort of fantastic creature, and among them man is
J_W
but one--perhaps the most miserable of all, because 
he is the only one in v/hoin the instinct of life fal­
ters long enough to enable it to ask the question,
^Why?t(Ibid., p.9 ).
Of man^s unimportance lir. ICrutch also asserts, ”‘Hiere is.no 
reason to suppose that his onn life has any more meaning than 
the life of the humblest insect that crawls from one annihila­
tion to the next'' (Ibid., p . 9 ).
hhen purpose is denied, God disavowed, and man equated 
with "the humblest insect that craavls", a practical, pessimistic 
despair is the logical result. Mr. Krutch took this step. When 
"...v/e survey our world," he declares, "we may permit ourselves 
to exclaim, a little rhetorically perhaps:
Hail, horrors, hail.
Infernal world! and thou profoundest hell.
Receive thy new possessor(Ibid., p. 2lj-o).
The above having been written, it appears that the
author tried to look about him but saw only blaclmess. He
seems to have realized that he had blown the light entirely
out, but did not want it that ivay. On the last page of the
volume, therefore, he writes :
If we cannot feel ourselves great as Shakespeare 
did, if we no longer believe in either our infinite 
capacities or our importanceto the universe, we 
Imow at least that we have discovered the trick which 
has been played upon us and that whatever else we may
be, we are no longer dupes (Ibid., p. 2l\S)) •
Then he looked at what he wrote and called it cowardice.
"Ho," he thought, "I shall be brave." So he wrote--it is ; '
next to the last sentence of the book--"Ours is a lost cause
and there is no place for us" (Ibid., p. 2i}.9)»
Dr. Hdwin Lewis once said, "The best criticism of
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Comte is exposition" (Lecture in "Philosophical hieism,"
Drew Seminary, 19i|-9“50)* That is the way the present writer 
feels about Krutch* s pessimism. Therefore, suffice it to 
say this: hr. Krutch*s intellectual delineation of ma.n*s 
worthlessness, set forth with such admirable keenness of 
thinking, plus the very fact that he gave any time at all 
to the writing of a book for men to read, aggue both against 
the worthlessness of man and against the utter futility of 
his existence.
Criticism of Pessimism
Henry Van Dyke said that pessimism is "...the bitter 
tincture drawn from the twisted, tangled roots of sorrowful 
perversity which underlie the life of man" (Henry Van Dyke,
The Gospel for a World of Sin, p. 17). This is often the 
case; pessimism often comes to be believed when the sorrows 
and perversities of life have battered unrelentingly and 
hard *gainst the human frame. This situation of adversity 
obtained as relates to all three men whose views have been 
studied in the present chapter. Frank Ballard, however, 
cautiously and v/isely declares that "...the darlensss of the 
mystery of suffering ought not to prevent our seeing the 
Divine face with at least sufficient clearness to save us 
from pessimism and despair"(Frank Ballard, hriy Does Hot God 
Intervene, p. 62).
Gautama appealed to religious intuition; Schopenliauer, 
to rational processes; and Krutch, to scientific data. By
the use of these methodologies each went into pessimism. The 
present research is later to take a turn which will be an 
investigation into the question of whether or not the Christian 
doctrine of the Incarnation points a way out of pessimism.
NOTE
Because he gave so much direct attention to the problem o; 
natural evil, and because he has been of wi de influence upon 
modern philosophy, the thought of David Hume should not be 
entirely overlooked in a study of the problem of involuntary 
evil. It has been decided, however, to relegate the treatment 
of his thought to a note only, because, according to one *s 
interpretation of him, he may be understood to represent any 
one of a number of thought types. And it has been decided 
to place the note at the end of this chapter on Pessimism 
because Hume is so often regarded as pessimistic, a reaction 
to him which is certainly valid if it is based upon Hume *s 
oft-stated disregard for what Christians in general believe 
and practise.
Hums was not a religionist; he did not readily bow to 
the gods. He was a combination of philosopher and scientist, 
his equipment being the liumian reason, his methodology being 
observation and experimentation, and his raw material being 
the data of sense experience.
Applying his reason, scientifically, to the empirical 
data derived from the normal functioning of the senses, he 
became, epistemologically, a sceptic, and at least approached 
solipsism or even nihilism. He denied the existence of a 
world external to us, holding that although we have a stream 
of ideas and impressions about an external world, that 
constant flow of data is not caused by an existing external 
world. He even denied that the self or mind which receives 
these ideas and impressions has any permanency so that it is 
continuous wi th itself, the same one instant as the next.
But this epistemological scepticism does not exliaust 
Hume’s teaching. when he anolied his reason to the data of 
sense experience, as that data related to the question of 
God’s existence, he concluded that without question God exists. 
Indeed, this writer inuorprets him as affirming that reason 
can even demonstrate certain qualities of God’s nature.
That Hume believed in God’s existence may be supported 
from numerous 'passages in his works. In tne section entitled
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"Of a Particular Providence and of a Future Life", contained 
in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, even although 
disguising his thought by supposing he is speaking for the 
ancient Epicurus, Hume says that "...the chief or sole argu­
ment for a divine existence (which I never questioned) is 
derived from the order of nature;..."(Hume, Enquiry, ed. by 
L. A. Selby-Bigge, p. 135). what Hume here says may 
reasonably be understood to be his o\'m view; the interjection 
of that parenthetical expression can hardly be interpreted other­
wise than as a personal confession of the wsaiter. In the 
opening of his Natural History of Religion, also, Hume affirms 
his belief in the existence of God. He writes, "The whole frame 
of nature bespeaks an intelligent Author, and no rational 
enquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a 
moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine 
hieism and Religion." In his Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion Hume certainly teaches God’s existence. In that work 
three characters. Dome a, Philo and Cleanthes, discuss naturo.1 
theology, most particularly from the standpoint of the design 
argument for the existence of a Supreme Being. It is disputed 
whi ch character is Hume himself, but all three of them affirm 
God’s existence. Dome a, the defender of orthodoxy, naturally 
susports it, but none consider him to be Hume; his thought, 
therefore, need not be mentioned. Cleanthes says.
Look round the world: contemplate the whole and every 
part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great
machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser 
machines, which again admit of subdivisions, to a degree 
beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and 
explain. All these various machines, and even their 
most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an 
accuracy, which ravishes into admiration all men, who 
have ever contemplated them. The curious adanting of 
means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, 
though it much exceeds, the produetions of human 
contrivance; of human design, thought, wisdom, and 
intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each 
other, v;e are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, 
that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of 
Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man; though 
possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the 
grandeur of the work, which he has executed. By this 
argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we 
prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his 
similarity to human mind and intelligence(Hume, Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion, Introd. by Bruce M ’Ewen,
pp. 30,31).
In another instance we read,
I shall farther add, said Cleanthes, to what you
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have so well urged, that one great advantage of the 
principle of Theism, is, that it is the only system of 
cosmogony, which can be rendered intelligible and 
complete, and yet can throughout preserve a strong 
analogy to what we every day see and experience in 
the world# Trie comparison of the universe to a 
machine of human contrivance is so obvious and natural, 
and is justified by so many instances of order and design 
in Nature, that it must immediately strike all unprejudiced 
apprehensions, and procure universal approbation(Ibid#,
pp. 103,169).
But not only does Cleanthes teach the existence of God;
Philo, the more sceotical of the two, also affirms it vigor­
ously. He says.
But surely, where reasonable men treat these subjects, 
the question can never be concerning the Being, but only 
the Nature of the Deity. The former truth, as you well 
observe, is unquestionable and self-evident. Nothing 
exists without a cause; and the original cause of this 
universe (whatever it be) we call God; and piously 
ascribe to him every species of perfection, hhoevor 
scruples this fundamental truth, deserves every punish­
ment, which can be inflicted among philosophers, to wit, 
the greatest ridicule, contempt and disapprobation(Ibid.,
pp. 28,29).
Again he says, "And it is a pleasure to me .(and I ho00 to 
you too) that just reasoning and sound piety here concur in 
the same conclusion, and both of them establish the adorably 
mysterious and incomprehensible nature of the Supreme Being 
(Ibid., p. 30). After Demea’s departure from the comeany 
Philo, who has, just previously, for the sake of rational 
discussion, pretended to be more of a sceptic than he is, 
confesses :
You, in particular, Cleanthes, with whom I live in 
unreserved intimacy; you are sensible, that, notwithstand­
ing the freedom of my conversation, and my love of 
singular arguments, no one has a deeper sense of religion 
impressed on his mind, or pays more profound adoration 
to the Divine Being, as he discovers himself to reason, 
in the inexplicable contrivance and artifice of Nature.
A purpose, an intention, a design strikes everywhere 
the most careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man 
can be so hardened in absurd systems, as at all times 
to reject it. That Nabure does nothing in vain, is a 
maxim established in all the schools, merely from the 
contemplation of the works of Nature, without any religious 
puroose; and, from a firm conviction of its truth, an 
anatomist, who had observed a new organ or canal, would
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never be satisfied, til he had also discovered its use 
and intention(Ibid., p. I6p).
In this same dissertation he adds: "...and thus all the sci­
ences almost lead us insensibly to acknowledge a first in­
telligent Author; and their authority is often so much the 
greater, as they do not directly profess that intention"
(Ibid., p. 166).
Not only did Hume affirm the existence of God; there 
is some evidence, meager and conflicting though it may be, on 
the basis of whi ch we might suppose that he also believed we 
can justifiably posit certain qualities of God’s nature.
Philo, as Y/ell as Cleanthes, gives some ground for 
beliefs about God’s nature. lie is uaually sceptical about it, 
as wlien he writes : "I am Sceptic enough to allow, that the bad 
appearances, notwithstanding all my reasonings, may bo compat­
ible with such attributes as you suppose: But surely they can 
never* prove t._ese attributes"(Ibid., p. 1^8). However, on 
the last page of the book, when Philo is bringing to a close 
his last discourse, and Y/hen he is therefore giving us the con­
clusion to whi ch he has come, he at least leaves room for 
positive affirmations regarding God’s nature. He says,
A person, seasoned wi th a just sense of the imperfections 
of natural reason, v/ill fly to revealed truth wi th the 
greatest avidity: IThile the haughty Dogmatist, persuaded 
that he can erect a complete system of Theology by the 
mere help of philosophy, disdains any farther aid, and 
rejects this adventitious instructor. To be a philo­
sophical Sceptic is, in a man of letters, the first and 
most essential stop towards being a sound, believing 
Christian;... Ibid., p. I9I).
when one becomes a "believing Christian", he posits, vrith 
certainty, even if only by faith and not by reason, a number 
of qualities as residing in the Divine Being.
Cleanthes more readily affirms qualities in the Divine 
nature; but again, he is not always consistent in the qualities 
which he posits. In one instance, for example, we find that 
Cleanthes gives an explicit statement of theistic finitisrn.
He writes.
If we preserve human analogy, we must for ever find 
it impossible to reconcile any mixture of evil in
 ^ 2 Th is c onelusion of Philo is reminiscent of Pascal, for
Philo’s heart seems to have reasons which his reason knows not 
of; and it reminds us of the conclusions of A. J. Balfour in his 
Defense of Philosophic Doubt (I879). But it reminds one
the universe with infinite attributes; much less can 
we ever prove the latter from the former. . But .suppos­
ing the Author of Nature to be finitely perfect, 
though far exceeding mankind; a satisfactory account 
may then be given of natural and moral evil, and 
every untov/ard phenomenon be explained and adjusted.
A less evil may then be chosen, in order to avoid 
a greater; Inconveniences be submitted to, in order 
to reach a desirable end: And in a word, benevolence, 
regulated by wisdoiu, and limited, by necessity, may 
produce just such a v/orld as the presnnt ( Ibid.,pp♦ 11l2,
lil-3).
In another instance we note that he expresses the vie\? of an 
absolutistic theist. lie affirms.
The most agreeable reflection, which it is possible for 
human imagination to suggest, is that of genuine Tneisn^ 
which represents us as the worlananship of a Being per­
fectly good, wise, and powerful; Y/ho created us for 
happiness, and ivho, having implanted in us immeasurable 
desires of good, v/ill prolong our existence to all 
eternity, and 'will transfer us into an infinite variety 
of scenes, in order to satisfy those desires, and render 
our felicity complete and durable. Next to such a Being 
himself (if the comparison be allowed) the happiest lot 
which Y/e can imagine, is that of being under his guard­
ianship and protection(Ibid., pp. loli, lo5)*
Because the latter view is given after he has stated the 
opposing one above, and because it is given so near to the 
close of Cleanthes’ reasonings, we might suppose it to be his 
reasoned view; but we cannot be certain that it is, because it 
savours more of Demea than of Cleanthes.
'Thus we see that when Hume divorces himself from pure, 
philoso'ohica 1 epistemology, and treats natural theology, someiwhat 
incidentally in the Natural History of Religion and in the Enquiry, 
and in detail in the Dialogues, he departs from absolute scepti­
cism and posits a reasoned belief, if not in certain qualities 
of God’s nature, at least in God’s existence.
particularly of Kant’s conclusion, expressed at the close of 
his Critique of Pure Reason, which was that he had to deny 
knowled,ge in order to make room for faith. One '.wonders if 
Kant, who read the Dialogues just before v/riting his great 
Critique, was directly'Tnfiuenced by the conclusion \which Hume 
put into the mouth of Philo.
CHAPTER III 
OPTIMISM
Because of "...the difficulty of reconciling the 
reality of evil iwith the existence of a creative deity who is 
both beneficent and omnipotent, many writers try to show that 
evil is in some sense unreal, or is an illusion"(C. E. M. Joad, 
Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics, p. q50).
On this view, whatever is, is good; starting 
from tfiis assumption philosophers have endeavored 
to prove that the world is all good. Spinoza, for 
example, says that ’by reality and perfection I 
mean the same thing’( Ibid., p. Il53)*
This theory, called optimism, is the "...antonym 
superlative..."(Radoslava Tsanoff, 'The Nature of Evil, p.l) 
of pessimism. It is the theory "...that everything in the 
present state of existence is for the best"(Joseph DeIvin,
(ed.) Webster’s New Standard Dictionary, p. 638). E. S. 
Brightman defines it in this wise:
A perfectly optimistic solution of the problem, 
for examole, would have to include the judgment 
that all a.pparently intrinsic evils are either 
essential parts of the complete intrinsic good 
or are necessary and perfect means to the porfect 
and of intrinsic good; and it would also include 
the judgment that all apparently instrumental evils 
arc really instruments to good. 'Thus, extreme 
optimism v/ould in the end leave nothing but in­
trinsic good together with instruments perfectly 
adapted to achieving that good(Brightman, A 
Philosophy of Religion, p. 2À! 2).
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Robert Browning gives a classic statement of optimism 
in his dramatic poem "Pippa Passes By". In spite of the hard­
ships that were Pippa’s, as a poor working girl, v/ith only one 
day off during the year, she flitted down the street, on the 
day which Y/as hers, singing:
Trie year’s at the spring.
And day’s at the morn;
Horning’s at seven;
The hill-sido’s dew-pearled:
The lark’s on the wing;
Tie snail’s on the thorn;
God’s in his heaven-- 
All’s right with the world!
_£Br o \ /ni n , Pip pa Passes by and Other 
Poems, "Pippa Passes By", p. 2^), '
The tneory of opoimism was also given poetic expres­
sion in Alexander Pope’s Essay on Man. The entire poem is an
optimistic affirmation in view of the fact of natural evil.
The affirmation reaches a climactic point v/hen Pope declares.
All nature is but art, unknown to thee;
All chance, direction, which thou canst
not see;
All discord, harmony not understood;
All partial evil, universal good.
And, spite of pride, in erring reason’s 
spite.
One truth is clear, ’Whatever is, is right’
(Alexander Pope, Essay on Han, Mark Pattison 
(ed. ), p. 36).
The remainder of this chapter will consist of a treat­
ment of three forms of optimism. They are the religious, the 
philosophical, and the theological.
Religious Optimism
All men are confronted v;ith at least awoarent natural
evil, hiien so confronted they react differently, as has been 
shoY/n, A person whose unthinking attitude is one of dependence, 
and who finds it easy to extend his loyalties to. another, is 
one 'who readily responds to religion. A negative conception 
of evil, v;hen such a conception has as its primary basis 
an unthinking attitude of dependence, may be called "religious 
optimism".
The religion of Christian Science is probably the 
truest and most prevalent expression of what the writer mears 
by religious optimism, as different from philosophical and 
theological forms of the view. Some great individuals of 
history and certain groups of the past have approached 
"religious optimism", but it will suffice to treat specifically 
this modern example.
Since Christian Science was founded by Mary Baker 
Eddy, and since her teachings are au'bhoritative wherever the 
religion functions, this form of religious optimism may be 
studied as it is given in Mrs. Eddy’s principal work. Science 
and Health, With Key to the Scriptures.
Mrs. Eddy defines God as follows: "The great I Am; 
the all-knowing, all-seeing, all-acting, all-wise, all-loving, 
and eternal; Principle; Hind; Soul; Spirit; Life; Truth: Love; 
all substance; intelligence"(Mary Baker Eddy, Science and Health 
with Key to the Scriptures, p. p87)*
Her definition of good is this: "God; Spirit; omnipotence; 
omniscience; omnipresence; omni-action"(Ibid., p.58?)*
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The optimistic Mrs. Eddy is so taken up with the idea 
of the unreality of evil that in her glossary she does not 
define it; this is significant, because she does define some 
things whi ch are unreal to her, as matter, flesh and death. 
But even although she does not define evil, she gives ample 
references to it in the text itself. She v/rites, "If God, or 
good, is real, then evil, the unlikeness of God, is unreal. 
And evil can only seem real by giving reality to the unreal" 
(Ibid., p. I4.7O). And she asserts, "Has evil the reality of 
good? Evil is unreal because it is a lie,--false in every 
statement"(Ibid., p. 527)* Mrs. Eddy also remarks, "We bury 
the sense of infinitude, when we admit that, although God is 
infinite, evil has a place in his infinity, for it could have 
no place, where all space is filled with God"(Ibid., p. l}-69 ) • 
She also states, "Only that is real which reflects God"(Ibid., 
p. I1.78). Lest her understanding of evil not be clearly im­
pressed upon us, she defines it in' another way. She explains, 
"Hence, evil is but an illusion, and it has no real basis.
Evil is a false belief" ( Ibid., p. I|.80 ).
Mrs. Eddy affirms that error, also, is unreal. She 
writes, "Error is unreal because untrue. It is that which 
seerneth to be and is not. If error were true, its truth 
17 ou Id be error" ribid., p. Ip72).
Mrs. Eddy often discusses three unrealities in the 
sane sentence. They are sin, sickness, and death. She
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explains.
That which Eg creates isgood, and He makes all that is 
made. Therefore the only reality of sin, siclmess, or 
death is the awful fact that unrealities seen real to 
human, erring belief, until God strips off their dis- 
quise. They are not true, because they are not of 
God" (Ibid.. p. ij.72).
Our author further explains, "If sin, sickness, and death were 
understood as nothingness, they v/ould disappear. As vapor 
ne Its before the sun, so evil would vanish before the reality 
of good" (Ibid., p. qLuO).
Many just criticisms have been leveled, against 
Giaristian Science. Tsanoff calls it a "...reckless and con­
fused body, of assertions and denials..."(Tsanoff, The Nature 
of Evil, p. 372). Most philosophies contain both assertions 
and denials, but the assertions and denials of Christian 
Science are reckless. They are unreasonable, opposed to the 
empirical facts of existence, and are thus totally unwarranted- 
One of the most forceful of the criticisms of this 
religious optimism was written by E. Stanley Jones. He says 
that Christian Science
has mingled sublimity of conception with subterfuges 
to keep us in pretenses of no pain, no suffering, 
no sin, no death. The movement has been plagued 
v/ithin itself v/ith charges and countercharges of 
fraud and deception. I do not believe that this 
fraud has been deliberate; rather; it is the in­
evitable result of trying to make life square with 
an impossible religious position. For it is an 
impossible position to waive all sickness, all 
suffering, all sin, all death out of existence 
as unrealities. If there is no such thing as 
suffering the the cross of Christ is a travesty.
V/e suspect any solution of the problem of suffer­
ing that leaves us with that result. îTo, the answer 
of Cliristian Science is a surface answer, and its
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steps are dogged by the inevitable nemesis of 
superficiality. It is no chance that it has its 
greatest vogue among the past-middle-age- 
comfortably-well-off, where optimism is easy, 
and yet at the same time v/here men and women 
are in need of assurances against the approach­
ing dissolutionmcnt of old age and death. In it
there are no Wounds whi ch will heal our woulds,
no Death which will heal our deaths"(E. Stanley 
Jones, Christ and Human Suffering, pp. 6^, 66).
Christian Science has come to its error by two re­
lated processes: first, it has employed subterfuge; it 
has evaded what appears to coimaon sense and intelligence 
to be real--pain, suffering, death. Second, it has exag­
gerated the good aspects of life. They exist in abundance,
it is true, but beside them are the evils.
Philosophical Optimism
Philosophical optimism is a negative view of evil 
arising from a predominant dependence upon human reason in 
offering a solution to the "apparent" irrationality of life 
and existence.
This type of optimism was germinated in the thought 
of Plato, Y/ho applied his reasoning powers to "apparent" 
evil and came to consid.er it as mere non-being--a negation of 
the good, but not positively opposed to it.
Origen, the third century Cliristian thinker, at 
times leaned more heavily upon Plato than upon the Hew Testa­
ment. He was prone to use reason at some points on which 
the strictly Cliristian theologian employs faith. And, in 
employing reason, he generally followed the rational processes
of Plato.-. ïliis caused him, in the face of evil, to advo­
cate two theories which, most authorities agree, are not 
Christian but platonic. One of these is the pre-existence 
of the soul. Each human soul, he affirms, is in this ex­
istence as temporary punishment because of unfulfilled 
possibilities of a previous existence. 'The other is the 
final return of all human souls to complete union with 
God. This is a pnatrieistic universalism which stems out of 
Plato.,and whi ch anticipates Spinoza.
Neo-platonism, an attempt to revive the teachings 
of Plato, is a school of thought v/hich may certainly be re­
garded as an example of philosophical optimism. Its method­
ology was reason, and its conclusion: wa.s that evil is 
purely negative. It affirmed that all human souls wmll 
finally receive their fulfillment by completing the cycle 
and reuniting with theT"o ^  , from whence they have come—  
through the Principle of Intellection.
Although this school of thou dit as such died out 
following Justinians’s adverse decree in Â.D. its in­
fluence has been felt ever since. One man who v/as at least in­
directly influenced by it is the modern Jewish philosopher, 
Benedict de Spinoza.
Philosophical optimism generally takes the form of some 
type of pantheism. For this reason, in treating this type of 
optimism, Spinoza, the arch-pantheist of all time, will be 
quite specifically studied as representing the view.
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For Spinoza over y tiling is God. He writes, "Besides 
God no substance can be granted or conceived." And he en­
larges upon this, immediately, by saying: "If any substance 
besides God v/ero granted it v/ould have to be explained by 
some attribute of God, and thus two substances v/ith the same 
attribute would exist, v/hich is absurd; therefore, besides 
God no substance can be granted, or consequently, be con­
ceived" (Benedict Do Spinoza, Philosophy of Benedict De 
Spinoza, p. I|-9 ) ♦
The above quotations state his pantheism. In such 
a view God would of necessity be absolute. Spinoza explains 
his theory of this absoluteness. He declares, "God is not 
only the cause of things coning in to existence, but also 
of their continuing in existence, that is, in scholastic 
phraseology, God is ca.use of the being of things" (Ibid., p.
61). Further, he says that "...God acts solely by the 
laws of his ov/n nature, and is not constrained by anyone"
(Ibid., p. pk). And he adds, "Hence it foilows that God 
is the efficient cause of all that can fall within the sphere 
of an infinite intellect"(Ibid., p. 35)-
The view that all is God and the idea that this God 
is all-powerful are brought together in the following statement
From the sole necessity of the essence of God 
it follows that he is the cause of himself and 
of all things. wherefore the power of God, by 
which he and all things are and act, is identical 
v/ith his essence (Ibid., p. 70).
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Optimism is the logic of belief in pantheistic abso­
lutism. Therefore he can say, "...since whatsoever exists 
expresses God’s nature or essence"(Ibid., p. 70), whatever 
exists would have to be good, since God is good. No evil 
can exist, because ". ..vhatsoover exists expresses God’s pov/er, 
which is the cause of all things"(Ibid., p. 70).
Spinoza’s conception of evil is as that of all opti­
mists; evil, for him, is not positive, but negative. It is 
imperfaction. Ho declares, "Now pain is the transition to 
the lessor perfection, and therefore cannot be understood 
through man’s nature"(Ibid., p. 23Ô). Evil consists only in 
our thinking of a thing or condition as such. He asserts,
"If the human mind possessed only adequate ideas, it would 
form no conception of evil"(Ibid., p. 236).
Although Spinoza is in agreement with most other op­
timists as to what evil is, he is not in agreement wi th them 
relative to what we should do about apparent evil. Most op­
timists advocate submission and resignation to the evils of 
nature because they look upon its every manifestation as the 
result of divine decree. Spinoza, on the other hand, pre­
sented an active method of dealing with what is apparently 
evil. Said he, "whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or 
to be capable of injuring our faculty for existing and en­
joying the rational life, we may endeavor to remove in whatear 
wa,y seems safest to us" (Ibid., p. 2x3 )•
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This is a more acceptable manner of facing natural 
evil than that Taich is adopted by the majority of optimists; 
but in taking this position Spinoza compromised his optimism: 
for if all is good or instrumental to good, why endeavor to 
avoid or remove any apparent evils?
Tne ological Opt ini sm
By theological optimism is meant the negative con­
ception of natural evil as resulting from a primary concern 
for the doctrines of the Cliristian Faith.
Most of the influential theologians of the Church 
have been optimists. Such men as Augustine, John Scotus 
Eriugena (or, Erigena), Thomas Aquinas and Jolin Calvin were 
all optimistic, hov/ever much they disagreed on other points.
The last mentioned will be treated in detail as a representa­
tive of the theological optimists.
Calvin is absolutistic to the extreme, and therefore 
optimistic. He holds that the will of God never faces any 
condition in the universe whi ch that will did not directly 
create or immediately cause. Some absolutists hold that God 
faces conditions which He only permits, but Calvin states 
that He is actually the direct cause of everything. He 
writes, "For Augustine, in expounding this passage, where 
power is connected with patience, justly observes, that God’s 
power is not permissive, but influential"(John Calvin,
Institutes, II, p. l6$). He also says, "How exceedingly 
presumptuous it is only to inquire into the causes of the Divine
Y/ill; v/hich is in fact, and is justly entitled to be, the 
cause of everything that exists " ( Ibid., p. l65)* He con­
tinues, "For the will of God is the highest rule of justice; 
so that what he wills must be considered just, for this very 
reason, because he wills it"(Ibid., p. l68).
For Galvin, therefore, everything which exists is
right because God even "influentially" wills it. He feels
it presumptuous to question the goodness of what comes to
men. He writes.
Do you seek a reason? I will tremble at the 
depth. Do you reason? I will wonder. Do you 
dispute,? I will believe. I see the depth, I
reach not the bottom. Paul rested, because he
found admiration. He calls the judgments of 
God unsearchable; and are you come to scrutin­
ize them. He says, his ways are past finding 
out; and are you come to investigate them? We 
shall do no good by proceeding further(Ibid.,
p. l63).
Also, in defense of his theory that men should not 
question the goodness of what befalls them, he declares,
"When it is inquired, therefore, why the Lord did so, the
answer must be, because he would"(Ibid., p. l63). He con­
cludes, "Faithful ignorance is better than presumptuous 
knowledge"(Ibih., p. l63). He thus affirms that even although 
7/e do not understand why a certain type of suffering cones to 
us or others, it is better to have unreasoned faith that it 
is for the best than to reason to a theory which would charge 
God with injustice.
Calvin’s entire system rests on '
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his emphasis upon the sovereignty of God. He conceives that 
God will have His way, regardless of what man does. God’s 
will is supreme, and man is not free to thwart it. That 
will has even predestined some to eternal life and others 
to eternal death; and no matter what nan does, he cannot 
alter this predestined fate. Calvin asserts.
To say that others obtain by chance, or acquire 
by their own efforts, that which election alone 
confers on a few, will be worse than absurd, 
whom God passes by, therefore, he reprobates, and 
from no other cause than his determination to ex­
clude them from the inheritance whi ch he predestin­
ates for his chi1dren(Ibid., p. 1Ô2).
He also writes, "Hardening proceeds from the Divine power and
will, as much as mercy" (Ibid., p. lylj.). And he declares, "God
Irnows what he has determined to do with us: if he has decreed
our salvation, he will bring it about in his own time: if
he has destined us to death, it will be in vain for us to
strive against it"(Ibid., p. 17k).
How to Calvin’8 explanation of the suffering which 
comes to those who are predestined to eternal life. Prom 
the following quotations it will be noted that in his opinion 
all natural evil is disciplinary and therefore good. He 
affirms that suffering comes in order that the righteous 
might sin less:
But believers, admonished by the Divine cor­
rections, immediately descend to the consideration 
of their sins, and, stricken wi th fear and dread, 
resort to a suppliant depreciation of punishment.
If God did not mitigate these sorrows, with whi ch 
wretched souls torment themselves, they would be
continually fainting, even under slight tokens of 
his wrath(Ibid., I, p.
Some forms of natural evil come to the elect that they 
might be taught thereby to roly upon God. He writes,
...presuming that whatever may happen, it 
Y/ill remain undaunted and invincible ami dat 
all difficulties. This inflates us with a 
foolish, vain, carnal confidence; relying on 
Y/hich, wo become contumacious and proud, in 
opposition to God himself, just as though our 
own powers were sufficient for us v/ithout His 
grace. 'This arrogance He cannot better repress, 
than by proving to us from, experience, not only 
our great imbecility, but also our extreme 
frailty. Therefore He inflicts us v:lth ignominy, 
or poverty, or loss of relatives, or disease, 
or other calamities(Ibid., I, pp. 63O, Ô3I).
Other natural evils attend the predestined in order 
that their patience may be increased. John Calvin, v/rites,
"The Lord has also another end in afflicting his children; 
to try their patience, and teach them obedience"(Ibid., p. 632) 
He adds, "For the scripture applauds the saints for their pa­
tience, when they are afflicted v/ith severe calamities, but 
not broken and overcome by them"(Ibid., I, p. 036).
The optimistic Calvin makes three summarizing state­
ments about the discipline of natural evil. He affirms, "The 
Lord repeatedly chastises his servants, yet does not deliver 
them over to death; v/herefore they confess that the strokes 
of his rod v/e re highly beneficial and instructive to them"
(Ibid., p. 392)• He also says.
It is true, that poverty, considered in itself, 
is misery; and the same may be said of exile.
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contempt, imprisonment, ignominy; finally death 
is of all calamities the last and worst. But 
with the favor of our God, they are conducive 
to our happiness(Ibid., I, p. 63I)*
Of ignominy and calamities he says; "he are chargeable with
extreme ingratitude if we do not receive them from the hand
of the Lord with cheerful resignation"(Ibid., I, p. 63k).
It is plain from this study of the teaching of John
Galvin that he was a true optimist. No trace of pessimism
can be found, nor yet any symptom of meliorism. Evil is not
real, which teaching would be denied by both pessimists and
meliorists. And not being actual, it is not a thing which
needs to be removed, as the meliorist attemnts to do. Calvin
does what all consistent optimists do; he meets natural evil
with resignation, and argues for this way of receiving (not
dealing with) suffering by stating that "...the saints bore
these corrections with resignation of soul"(Ibid., I, p. 592).
Criticism of Optimism 
Tsanoff is correct when he v/rites, "‘The attempted 
reduction of evil to finitudo is a virtual rejection of the 
clear point with which we start, and, as we have seen, leads 
not to the solution but to the abandonment of the problem of 
evil"(Tsanoff, The Nature of Evil, p. 388). The problem is 
abandoned when optimism asks, "who are we that we should try 
to comprehend the ways of God’s omnipotence"(Joad, God and 
Evil, p. 37)? It is also abandoned when optimism states, 
"God’s ways are mvsterious and the faithful will be content
to leave the mystery unresolved, knowing that God acts for 
the best"(Ibid,, v* 37)*
E, Stanley Jones writes, "Any system that takes your 
attention off the .yim facts of life and creates a shallow 
optimism by calling attention to butterflies only, is doomed 
to be sent into an inevitable pessimism as the blows of life 
fall "(Jones, ClTcist and Human Sufferin'::, pp. 66, 67). ‘This 
probably does not occur in the case of every optimist who 
is unfortunate, but undoubtedly it does often happen.
To mold the theory one must overlook reasonable facts 
and keep himself in a forced mental state which reiterates,
"I know all is good. I mow all is good." Christian 
Scientists attempt this.
Van Dyke opposed the view of optimism. He writes,
"If evil is a nothing, it is a strangely active, positive, and 
potent nothing with all the qualities of a something"(Van Dyke, 
The Gospel for a World of Sin, p. 22).
Evil is denied by man because "when most people, 
whether theologians or ordinary citizens, ask for a solution 
of the problem of evil, what they want is some argument to 
convince them that all evil is really good, either intrinsic­
ally or instrument ally" ( Brightman, A Philo sonliy of Religion, 
p. 278). Optimism is seldom, if ever, arrived at by investi­
gation.! Its adherents already have posited a perfectly good 
universe, one whi ch is the handv/ork of God and the object of 
His direction.
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Van Dyke asserts, "The theories which attempt to 
account for its (evil’s) origin by tracing it to a mere 
negation or absence of good, raise a larger question than 
that which they attempt to answer"(Van Dyke, Tne Gospel For
a World of Sin, p . 22). 'This mo re difficult qu estion nay b e
phrased this way, "Since all is good, why does so much of ex­
istence ap]oear to be evil? Since imbecility, for example, 
appears to be evil, why and how is it that it is actually 
good?"
Tsanoff rightly queries, "If the evils of life are 
but illusion, is this illusion aught but evil" ( Tsanoff, 'The 
Nature of Evil, p. 373)? hhy should a good God desire to
put the objects of his affection under such an illusion?
Since evil is so apparently real, it is hardly nan’s fault 
if he thinks it is real, if actually it is not. 'Thus, if 
evil is only apparent, it is the fault of God that nan labors 
under the illusion that it is real; and, if this is so, can 
God be said to be perfectly good?
One of Voltaire’s "...undoubted joys, during the 
latter part of his life, was flaying optimists to disclose 
their unsound substance"(Ibid., p. l50). Voltaire was a 
gifted reasoner. No doubt he showed their arguments to be 
very unsound indeed. This v/riter, however, is convinced 
that a person of very little reasoning ability can prove 
optimism to be unsound. Yet this must be said: it is more 
plausable than pessimism.
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In this chapter three types of optimism, the religious, 
the philosophical and the theological, have been treated. ïlie 
order of their consideration is indicative of the writer’s
* ! /opinion regarding their relative plausability. Tnat is to 
say, the last one dealt with, the theological, is in content 
the richest. Even this one, however, as has been shown, tends 
to abandon the problem rather than solve it* It will be 
pointed out, too, in the concluding chapter, that optimism, 
whatever its form, does, not properly understand the Christian 
doctrine of the Incarnation, as it relates to the problem 
caused by the evil aspects of nature.
CHAPTER IV 
MELIORISM
Meliorism may be defined as "...the philosophical 
theory that evil can be eliminated from the universe by 
moral effort"(R. F. Alfred Eoernle, Idealism as a Philoso­
phy , p. 251). It may also be defined as the theory that 
"...in some sense both good and evil are real, but good is 
dominant in that the state of affairs in the universe is 
always susceptible of improvement"(Brightman, Philosophy 
of Religion, pp. 2?6, 277)* The latter of these two 
definitions approaches more closely to the sense in whi ch 
the term will be used herein.
Tie pessimist takes the attitude that he is defeated 
at the outset; that the nature of existence is such that evil 
is present everywhere, that it alone is real, and that no 
amount of moral effort will improve existing conditions. The 
moliorist calmly says to him, "It is better to light one 
small candle than to curse the darkness." (News Commentator, 
N.G.K.N. of Kansas City, Kansas, February 13, 19k7, 8:12A.M., , 
quoted, as the v/riter has since found, from an early thinker).
The optimist laughs at what "appears" to be evil, 
staunchly avows that only good is real, and sits back leisurely
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to meditate on the good and to keep himself in the state of 
mind necessary for this viev/. There is a sense in v/hich he 
overcomes the present evils in the universe; he improves 
conditions subjectively* In this he is far ahead of the 
pessimist, who grits his teeth and stoically bears his load.
But the consistent optimist, not believing in the real ex­
istence of evil, does nothing objectively to improve con­
ditions. After he has brought himself to the ideal state of 
mind which is supposed to place him above the effects of 
evil, the evil is still there; it has not been objectively 
alleviated any whatever. This position cuts the nerve of 
moral endeavor*
The meliorist, holding that evil, as well as good, is 
real, sets out to bring about the alleviation or extinction 
of evil. And he understands that if evil conditions are 
actually to be improved or eradicated, he will nave to deal 
with the problem objectively rather than merely subjectively.
Harris Franklin Rail reveals a melioristic attitude 
when he asserts, ^^'The floods may destroy, but we can halt 
forest destruction, impound waters, and change the process 
from destruction to service” (Rail, Christianity, p. 33)-!-) •
Clarence Beckwith is speaking of the melioristic 
position when he writes, ^Scientific men, working in dif­
ferent fields of research, are confident that all accidents 
and diseases, and, by v/iscr economic and sanitary administration.
all famines and pestilences will be replaced by healthy, 
who les ome human life” ( Clarence Bee lawi th, Tiie Idea of God, 
p. 183).
Mr. Daniel 'Thompson enlarges upon the view as it 
relates to our neighbor. lie asserts.
Our concluding v;ord is, that in all the 
relations of life, business as well as social, 
men must bo taught, and must learn to regard 
their fellows, not as inorganic nature to be 
used, but as independent personalities, with 
aims like their own, whose development and 
realization is a thing which it is the duty 
and the pleasure of every other to favor and assist 
rather than neglect, blight, and defeat(Daniel 
G-reenleaf Thompson, The Problem of Evil, p. 28o).
John Fiske gives the future possibilities of 
meliorism. He writes.
From the general analogies furnished in the 
process of evolution, we are entitled to hope 
that, as it approaches its goal and man comes 
nearer to God, the fact of evil v/ill lapse 
into a more memory, in which the shadowed past 
shall serve as a background for the realised 
glory of the oresent(John Fiske, Through Nature 
to God, p. 55).
Tne study of meliorism will be made with a somev/hat 
different approach than that which was followed in the 
chapters on pessimism and optimism. Pessimists, as was 
found, tend toward atheism; optimists, toward absolutism.
The treatments of pessimism and optimism were therefore divi­
ded according to approach rather than on the basis of the 
conception of ultimate reality since on this question all, in 
their own fields, were quite generally agreed. In the sphere 
of meliorism there is a different situation. Meliorists
differ widely in their conception of ultimate reality; this 
difference is what most distinguishes them. They will be 
studied, therefore, according to their metaphysics. Among 
them there are four principal types of metaphysics: plural­
ism, finitism, dualism, and absolutism.
Pluralistic meliorism 
Pluralistic meliorism teaches at least three things: 
first, that both good and evil are actual; second, that man 
can and should set himself to the task of alleviating the 
evil of the world and to increasing its good aspects; and 
third, that there are many qualitatively different^ ultimate 
realities. This is the theory which is perfectly adapted to 
the philosophy of pragmatism. One of its principal exponents 
was the American pragmatist, William James, whose view has 
been singled out for particular note. His pluralism will 
first be shovm, and that will be followed by support of the
'^Personalistic idealism, popularized in America by 
Borden Parker Bowne and now a significant philosophical view, 
particularly in that country, is pluralistic quantitatively; 
that is, it affirms that ultimate reality is composed of a 
society of persons. Yet, it is qualitatively monistic; ulti­
mate reality is only one in kind--personality.i It is readily' 
seen that there is a significant difference between this type 
of pluralism and that which ?/e are treating just now, which 
view is that ultimate reality is many in kind. It is an 
inadequacy of Pringle-Pattison*s treatment of pluralism, in 
the last Chapter of his Tlie Idea of God, which does not 
sufficiently distinguish between these two types of pluralism.
statement that he is melioristic.
James says that the alternative between pluralism 
and monism constitutes ”...the most pregnant of all the
di 1emmas of phi1osophy”(James, Some Problems of Philosouhy,
p. IIIl) ♦ The question, he says, is ehis : "Does reality exist 
distributivelyT or cellectivoly?--in the shape of caches, 
everys, anys, cithers ? or only in the shape of an all or whole”
(Ibid.., p. Ilk) ? 'Tilat reality exists as a whole is monism,
or absolutism. James everywhere rejects this view. Reality, 
according to his tneory, is many.
His pluralism is derived from his idea of the nature 
of reality. Whereas absolutism holds that reality is static, 
he says, "'The full nature... of reality we now believe to be 
given only in the perceptual flux"(Ibid., p. 113)* This 
flux, he affirms, is "...continuous from next to next," 
but "nonadjacent portions of it are separated by parts that 
intervene, and such separation seems in a variety of cases 
to work a positive disconnection"(Ibid., p. 113). Because 
of the fact that in the continual flux, whi ch is characteristic 
of reality, there are elements v/hich are "...unrelated or re­
lated only remotely"(Ibid., p. 113), he says that reality 
itself is many and not one| it is pulverized, rather than 
unified.
How what place does God have in this pluralistic 
system? He is only one of the many ultimate realities; 
one of the ontological caches.
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'TillS God, who is only one of the eaches, is somewhat 
similar to the other caches; He is not absolute. James affirms, 
"Yet because God is not the absolute, but is himself a part 
when the system is conceived pluralistically, his functions 
can be taken as not wholly dissimilar to those of the other 
smaller parts,--as similar to our functions consequently" 
(William James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 3l8).
In other instances he speaks of God much as does
E. S. Brightman, the finitist. James writes, "...there is a
God, but...he is finite, either in power or in knowledge, or
in both at once"(Ibid., p. 311)* He also affirms of God,
"He works in an external environment, has limits, and has
enemies"(Ibid., p. IZLJ . He further declares,
Tne finite God whom I contrast with it (Absolutism) 
may conceivably have almost nothing outside of him­
self; ho may already have triumphed over and ab­
sorbed all but the minutest fraction of the universe; 
but that fraction, however small, reduces him to the 
status of a relative being, and in principle the 
universe is saved from all the irrationalities in­
cidental to absolutism(Ibid.,up. 125^ 12o).
In this treatment of James* pluralism and, with refer­
ence to God, of his finitism, it has been implied that he 
espoused the theory that evil as v/ell as good is real. Tliis 
may now be supported explicitly. He assumes the reality of 
good which, of course, causes no problem in his understanding 
of existence. But he also faces up to the fact of the unwholesome 
aspects of existence. He speaks of "...all those tremendous 
irrationalities..."(Ibid., p. Il6) of the universe. And he
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says that abolutisn, or the traditional belief that God is 
the anchor of all phases of creation, "...leaves us wondering 
why the perfection of the absolute should require such partic­
ular hideous forms of life as darken the day for our human 
imaginations"(Ibid., p. 117). He also writes of the "...tre­
mendous imperfection of all finite experience"(Ibid., p. 11?)•
Evil as well as the good, therefore, is a fact of 
existence. This is the situation. And what is to be man * s 
reaction? For James it should not be despair. Nor should it 
be an optimistic acquiescence. He holds that man can and 
should extiipateevil conditions, he writes.
In any pluralistic metaphysic, the problems that 
evil presents are practical, not speculative. Not 
why evil should exist at all, but how we can lessen 
the actual amount of it, is the sole question we need 
to consider(7/illian James, A Pluralistic Universe, p.
12)4).
One criticism of James* position may be mentioned.
It has to do not wi th his meliorism, but with his pluralism. 
Tne pluralism bows God almost entirely out. It makes God only 
one of the many, many "eaches" of whi ch reality is composed. 
But in order to have been consistent, James should have left 
God in that minor roll. Instead of doing this he brought God, 
whom he had declared to be merely one of the mult1tudinous 
caches, back into his scheme to play a quite important role. 
God is finice, to be sure, but James is even a little cautious 
in affirming this when of God lie says, "...he is finite either 
in power or in Iinowledge, or in both at once" (Ibid., p. 311) .
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Of course God is finite in pluralismj He is much more 
finite than in dualism. lie is not one of two ultimates, 
but one among countless qualitatively different ultimate 
realities. If James, therefore, is going to follow through 
v;lth the pluralism v/nich he sets up, and he thinks to single 
God out for discussion at all, he should not say that he is 
finite either in power or in Imowledge or in both, but should 
have no reticence about admitting a very distinct finiteness 
in every respect.
Finitistic Meliorism
FinitiStic Meliorism is an active cornrontation of
natui’al evil which is based on the view that God is a limited
rather than an absolute Being. Radoslav fsanoff,and E. S.
Brightman are two outstanding finltistic meliorists. Their
views will be treated briefly.
Tsanoff calls his theory "The Gradational View" of
the nature of good and evil. He writes, "In this gradational
view of things, evil is literally degradation, the surrender
of the higher to the lower in the scale of being, the effective
down-pulling incursion of the lower against the higher"(Tsanoff,
The Nature of Evil, p. 392).
Although he defines evil as "degradation", or as
negative value(Ibid., p. 3^7)9 he still holds that it, as well
as good, is actual. He affirms.
Using the terms good and evil in the broadest sense 
to designate value positive and negative, we are 
bound to say that, if either is admissible, both
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mus t be. We have them both on our hands, both 
actual. Our problem is to understand the relation 
between them, and the essential character of the 
world which the perception of their relation serves 
to reveal(Ibid., pp. 387, 388).
lie further explains the actuality of evil when he writes,
The view of existence wuich is here developed 
recognizes, unflinchingly the actuality of evil, 
but is not on that account plunged into pessimistic 
despair. It is in no wise to bo mistaken for the 
complacent theory of evil as the mere shadow in the 
picture or the discord swelling the larger harmony.
Evil is not * somehow good,* anymore than sinking 
is somehow rising. Evil is evil and the opposite 
of good, contrary in course and direction(Ibid.,
p. 397).
Lost his readers should forget that although good and 
evil are opposites and both actual, they are nevertheless gra­
dational and interdependent, Tsanoff hastens to say:
Good and evil are not distinct realities and have 
no status in isolation; they are always relative to 
each other. Evil is that ever-present side or factor . 
in the actual world,■by resistance to which a pos­
sible worthier side or (* of * is likely meant) nature 
affirms itself and gains reality through attainment 
(Ibid., p. pi).
But what theory of God accompanies his gradational 
view of the nature of good and evil? It is a theistic finitisni, 
wi th evil in the very nature of God. Speaking of the rivalry 
betv;een good and evil he says, "Tliis contest is at the heart 
of things"(Ibid., p. kOl). He makes it more plain when he writes, 
"Value positive and negative is not to be located in certain 
areas of existence but is a fundamental and ultimate character 
of all existence"(Ibid., p. 389). In the following statement 
he speaks precisely of God* s nature:
For just this upv/ard-urging, ever more perfectly
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active character of the cosmos is vhiat we can 
intelligently mean by God. And the evil tug 
is not outside of God or alien to the divine 
nature, but just as in finite beings so in the 
cosmic system of them, in God, it is the nega­
tive moment, the obverse of positive enhancement 
and ideal activity(Ibid., p. iiOO).
This finite God is working toward the improvement of 
the world, for Tsanoff writes:
In God is no stagnant plentitude but plenti- 
tude of ideal activity, no dull placidity but 
ever-heroic redemption of the world from the 
hazard of settling back. * My Father worketh 
hitherto, and I work.* Not less than myself 
but more is God thus resistant to the evil 
tug of the down pulling and the inert and the 
complacent(Ibid., pp. 399> 4OO).
Even although he states above that God is doing more 
to redeem the world than man is doing or can do, he still 
leaves much for man to do. He v/rites, "Evil and the per­
ception of it are conditions for heroic recognition and 
pursuit of value, be it truth, beauty, goodness" (Ibid., p.lpGO). 
He also remarks, "In applying science to the demands of 
modern industry, man may use the forces of nature as levers 
for the upbuilding of the higher values"(Ibid., p. 39k)*
Speaking now of the part of both God and man in the 
redemption of the world, he writes in t^jpically melioristic 
fashion: "The best we have a right to hope, is that the 
struggle, real and hard enough, is yet not futile, that 
possibly and in ways at present unknov/n to us this half-v/ild 
ana half-saved Universe is ever more truly being redeemed"
(Ibid.., p. 380).
One of the most prominent of the present-day finltistic 
meliorists is E. S. Brightman. Theistic finit ism itseli as ciio
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distinguishing tenet of all his philosophy. A vein of 
finitism is found running through the entire content of 
his Tlie Problem of God and The Finding of God. Much of his 
A Philosonhy of Religion is also devoted to it. He defines 
theistic finitism as the view "...that the will of God does 
face conditions within divine experience which that will 
neither created nor approves"(Brightman, A Philosophy of 
Religion, p. 282).
For Brighcman, God is finite because in Kis nature
there is an uncreated, eternal, recalcitrant surd whi ch
obstructs God*s plans and which is the cause of all that is
evil. He explains it thus;
liie present writer began in The Problem of God 
(1930) the development of the idea of a personal 
God whose finiteness consists in his own internal 
structure; an eternal unitary personal consciousness 
whose creative will is limited both by eternal neces­
sities of reason and by eternal experiences of brute 
fact. These limits he called 'The Given--an aspect 
of God* s consciousness which eternally enters into 
every moment of the divine experience and into 
everything that is(Brightman, The Finding of God,
p* 119).
Finitism has to do with his metaphysics; when one comes 
to study his theory of value he finds meliorism coupled wi th 
finitism. Both good and evil are actual, as we note in this 
statement :
Some, among them the present writer, think that a 
rational definition of the evil of evil and of 
the good of good and of their relations to pur­
pose in the universe c/ould be a genuine solution 
of the oroblem(Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion,
p. 279).
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Of evil itself he writes, "So real are the evils of life, that 
man’s first gods were puny, local creatures, sources of highly 
precarious goods in a world of hostile powers" ([bid., p. 2Il8).
On pages 3hO and 3kl of his A Philosophy of Religion 
he has a section which he calls "Perfec bion or Perfectibility", 
in whi ch he takes the position that neither God nor the universe 
are perfect but that both are perfectible. This is a view of 
betterment from the standpoint both of God’s nature and of 
the external world.
From what has been quoted, it can readily be under­
stood that ho would write:
The objection to optimasm is that it is not fair 
to the experience of intrinsic surd evil. The 
objection to pessimism is that is is not fair to 
the experience of intrinsic good. Tne objection 
often urged against meliorism is that it states 
the problem and takes a practical attitude toward 
it, but does not solve it in principle. Yet if 
any solution is to be found, it must, in view of 
the fatal objections to other alternatives, be 
found in some form of meliorism(Ibid., p. 277)*
Dualistic Meliorism 
Dualistic Meliorism is an active confrontation of the 
evil in nature, v/hich active confrontation is based upon the 
metaphysical theory that good and evil are in ..ultima te conflict.
A treatment of three dualistic positions should suffice to bring 
this type of theory into focus.
Zoroastrianism illustrates this form of meliorism. Zoroaste: 
thought to have. been born about 600 B.C., founded this 
religion, a faith which is both dualistic and melioristic.
kp
Bio held that the universe is under the control of two opposing
principles or pov/ers, the one good and the other evil. Ahura
Mazda, or Ormuzd, is the good power who created the beautiful
in man and nature; Angro Mainyus, or Ahrinan, the evil power
who matched every good thing with a counter-creation of
something evil. Tne good which Ormuzd created is real, and
the evil made by Ahriman is also actual.
ihe good, however, is gradually overcoming the evil,
and will finally make a complete triumph over it. The good
is now triumphing both by the activity of Ormuzd against the
obstructive work of Ahriman, and by the active v/ork of the 
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faithful as they join forces with Ormuzd. But not only is 
there a double meliorism because Ormuzd and the faithful are 
opposing Ahriman; there is a double meliorism because not 
only is the triumph of good such that natural good is more and 
more routing natural evil in the sphere of creation, but the 
gradual triumph of good is such that Ormuzd is comming closer 
and closer to final victory over the power which hampers him. 
Tsanoff writes, "If a grim sense of the moral struggle dictated 
a dualist theology to the Zoroastrian, a confident meliorism
^Alfred martin quotes from the Vend!dad, whi ch is 
one of the four parts of their authoritarian book called 
the Avesta. It reads as follows: "’Contend constantly against 
evil, strive in every way to diminish the power of evil; 
strive to keep pure in the body and mind and so prevent the 
entrance of evil spirits v/ho are always striving to gain 
possession of men. Cultivate the soil, drain marshes, des­
troy dangerous creatures. He who sows the ground with 
diligence acquires more religious merit than he could gain by 
a thousand prayers in idleness.... The man who has constantly 
contended against evil may fearlessly meet death(Martin, Crgac 
Religious Teachers of the Bast, p . 80).
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enabled him to look forward to a monistic-8 finale"(Tsanoff,
'The Nature of Evil, p. 367).
Dualistic meliorism is advocated by G. E. M. Joad, in 
his God and Evil. His position is not easily understood.
This is for at least two reasons. One is because his view 
has changed much, as he admits, during the last thirty 
years. For many years he regarded theism as untenable. Now, 
however, he has changed. In some passages his only change 
is that he is merely reopening the theistic""hypothesis" (God 
and Evil, p^ 102) for investigation; but in others, he speaks 
freely of God as though he believes in His existence(Ibid., 
p. 102).
The other reason why his view is difficult to formulate 
is because he himself does not have it formulated as he writes, 
but is working it out as he progresses. Thus he asserts, "I 
will not postulate the existence of God since I do not wish 
to prejudge the results of the inquiry upon which I am only 
just embarked"(Ibid., p. bp)*
It was not load’s view of God which led to his theory 
of good and evil. His view of good and evil led him to postu­
late a certain type of God. He w’rites, "Tnere is good in the
3So"me authorities, as Tsanoff (note the quote above) 
and Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison (see p. 137 of. his The 
Philosophy of Religion), do not consider Zoroastrianism as an 
ultimate dua.lism. They are quite correct, if its metaphysics 
is considered in the light of its hope of the triumph of Ormuzd; 
but as regards existence as it has been and is, and as it is to 
be for a long \7hile yet, the dualism may be understood as ul­
timate. Thus the present study of it as a dualism.
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world, and there is also evil" (Ibid., p. 101); both are real. 
vVlien either good or evil loads men to belief in God, it is 
usually good and not evil; evil is ordimrily the very type 
of existent v/hich causes men to accept atheism. Not so with 
Joad. Evil, with him, is the aspect of existence/ vdiich led 
him to re-open the question of whether.- or not God exists.
He affirms, "Now, paradoxically, it is this fact of one’s 
conviction of the objective reality of evil, that imparts to 
the mind the disposition to search for God and to turn toward 
Him when He is found"(Ibid., p. of)* And he gives it as his 
own experience: "I do not doubt that in my own case it is 
the conviction of the pervasiveness and reality of evil that 
has led me... to examine again the arguments which seemed to 
me to tell finally and convincibly against the theistic 
hypothesis some thirty years ago, in the hope that what 
seemed convincing then may now seem convincing no longer"
(Ibid., p. 101).
Joad looks upon both good and evil as real, and posits 
two different ultimates which cause these opposites. He gives 
us what follows, in his opinion, from this conception of good 
and evil. He declares,
Tne religious hypothesis, if it were to be 
accepted at all, must be accepted not in its 
usual form, but in a form which has always been 
regarded as heresy. lliis consists in accepting 
good and evil as two equal and independent prin­
ciples, tli»e expression of two equally real and 
conceivably equally powerful antagonists, God 
who is good but limited, and God’s adversary 
who is evil,, between whom the perpetual battle is
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fought in the hearts of men for the governance of 
the world(Ibid., pp. 85, 86).
Ee also writes.
If a metaphysical principle is to be invoked to 
explain good, an equivalent principle must be 
invoked to explain the evil; if, to putT it 
theologically, there is God, there is also the 
Devil, or there is God plus a principle of inertia 
which obstructs him(Ibid., p. 101).
H e fur the r elue i da tes.
If we arc to go beyond simple agnosticism, then 
what must be surmised is that there are tv;o Gods, 
a good one and a bad; or, since the notion of a 
bad God is revolting and not absolutely necessary, 
there must be a good God and an obstructive hampering 
principle in and through and in spite of v/hich He 
seeks to work(Ibid., p. 101).
Since in this last quote Joad pictures God working "in and
through” this hampering principle, it is implied that it is
something within God’s own nature against which he must labor.
Tnis, however, is not the case. Joad generally portrays the
evil principle as outside God. Tlius his dualism.
It has been shown that for Joad both good and evil 
are real, and that God and His opposite are the respective 
sources of each; it remains to substantiate his meliorism.
Since every meliorist ho.s hope for the alleviation of the 
evil aspects of the universe, it must be revealed that 
Joad has this hope and advocates putting forth effort for 
the alleviation of at least a part of the evils. This posi­
tion Joad clearly takes, as is shown in the following statements:
It follows that either one must supinely acquiesce 
in the evil one cannot resolve, or else--thsre are two 
alternatives.
The first, since the v/orld is evil, is to escape
So
from it and to find, first in withdrawal, and,
as an ultimate hope, in Nirvana, the true way of life.
The second is to face evil and seek to overcome it, 
even to take it up and absorb it into ones own life,
transcending it and enlarging one’s.own personality
with what one has transcended. Tne first is the way 
of the East, the second of Christianity. Lly temper­
ament and disposition incline mo to the second, but 
I know it to be impossible unless I am assisted from 
without. By the grace of God we are assured, such 
assistance may be obtained and evil may be overcome 
(Ibid., p. IO4 ).
Yet another type of dualism is that espoused recently
by the Ame rican the o 1 og i an, E dv/i n Lewi s. The th e or y is set
forth in his latest book. The Creator and the Adversary,
which was published in I940. Much of the book deals with wliat
is herein called natural evil.
Edwin Lewis is no : a pessimist; he would be the last 
to say there is only evil. Nor is he an optimist; he would
be the last to say there is no evil. He conceives of both
good and evil as real. He writes, "'The presence of good
and evil, both in the world itself and in human life and
experience, is too self-evident to be denied" (Edwin Lewis,
The Creator and the Adversary, p. l5)* He also writes,
"Tnere is a dead fly in the amber which is the universe,. 
and whose mind is not teased by the fact"(Ibid., p. 16)?
Professor Lewis has a profound conception of the 
conflict between good and evil. Ho affirms, "Cosmic 
benevolence stands in contrast wi th cosmic malevolence"
(Ibid.5 p. 16). He also says, "On any showing, life is a 
conflict and the world is a battlefield"(Ibid., p. 10). And 
again he writes, "Something good is forever coming to be, and
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something is forover seeking to prevent it"(Ibid., p. 52).
This conflict is waged by God the Creator and His Adversary, 
the Discreator.
In Dr. Lev/is’ understanding, the conflict is real, and 
not a mere sham; it is not waged on an athletic field, but on 
a battlefield. The opponents are not temporarily opposed fa? 
the game of existence; they are eternally and intrinsically 
and structurally opposed. It is not that the Creator sets up 
his Adversary in order to oppose him; it is that the Creator 
eternally finds His Adversary.
Tnis is not a monistic view. For years Dr. Lewis 
had been a monist; he had sought to trace all aspects of ex­
istence to one source. As his thought matured, however, he 
came to consider it wishful to trace both good and evil to 
an identical source. For this reason he came to deny tradi­
tional monism, and to posii; robustly, an ultimate dualism: 
the good he braces to God the divine Creator; the evil, to 
God’s eternally existent Adversary who is the demonic Dis- 
creator.
Vdien Dr. Lewis’ position is classed as dualistic it 
is because of the eternal battle between two absolutes. But, 
to class his position as dualistic does not quite do justice 
to his metaphysics. His is an ultimate triadology, rather 
than an ultimate dualism. Besides the Creator and His Adversary 
there is a third ultimate existent. This he calls the "residue 
or the "residual constant". By it he means "...the permanent
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possibility of ompiric actualities" (Ibid., p. 1ll3)* That is, 
it is the eternal formless stuff out of whi ch the Creator 
creates. It is "constant" because it "...never increases or 
diminishes in its total quantity" (Ibid., p. 1Il3)*
Bad: of these throe ultimate and prime existents 
is prime existence. This "existence", or "pure existence",
"... is under a necessary lav/ of soIf-differentiation"(Ibid., 
p. ikl). It functions in the three primal forms as explained 
above. He writes, "Tiere is one eternal existence, but it ex­
ists as three eternal existants" (Ibid., p. lli_2). Dr. Lewis 
admits that this is highly speculative, but believes it nec- 
necessary if one is to give an adequate account of existence 
as we know it.
It has been shown that, in this position, both good 
and evil are actual. A metaphysical triadology has been set 
forth as a means of accounting for both these aspects of ex­
istence as Y/e Imov/ it. It remains to show how man should 
react to this type of existence.
Diu Lev/is holds that man should not despair, since
there is always the good. Nor would he say that man should
call the evil a result of God’s direct will, and acquiesce
to it. His is an agressive meliorism. Chapter eleven of the
book is captioned, "'The Challenge to Moral Combat". In it
he writes, "The will of God in respect of famine is that the
hungry shall still be fed, and that means shall be devised
whereby famine, like wars, shall be made to cease to the 
ends of the earth" (Ibid., p. llj.9)* Ho also affirms, "The
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surgeon who makes an Incision in quivering human flesh to re­
move a malignant growth, lessen suffering, and perchance save 
a life, is not seeking to frustrate the will of God, as men 
at one time actually thought and said" (Ibid,, p. lli_9) I Again 
he writes,
A speaker v/ho called upon the American people to 
cease believing in God because seventeen million 
persons now living v/ould die of cancer would have 
made a much better and a much wiser use of his 
time had he called upon the American people to 
join with God in the fight against cancer by the 
use of the means which God is seeking to put into 
their hands for this purpose, because the only 
way in which God can use the means is through 
human minds and hands. ’V/e are laborers together 
with God’(ibid., pp. ll|_9, l50).
In the last chapter, entitled "Tie Cliurch Militant", 
Professor Lewis declares, "...there is nothing the Church 
more manifestly exists to do than to fight the enemy of 
human good"(Ibid., p. 259)* He also says, "The Adversary 
is forever devising nev; ways and means, and he must be met and 
opposed wherever he elects to stand"(Ibid., p. 259)» Yet 
again he affirms, "Any Christian will find himself confronted 
with the Adversary in a score of ways every day he lives, and 
he has just one obligation: to smite him wherever the oppor­
tunity offers"(Ibid., p. 201).
Just before the close of the book Dr. Lewis gives 
Jesus as an example to be followed in combating natural evil. 
Of the "mighty works" of our Lord he says, "They were directed 
against pain, against disease, against maimed bodies, against 
hunger, against the griefs that are born of these evils, and
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even, on occasion, against death, itself"(Ibid., p. 266). And 
he adds, "For Jesus these were not the evidences of the will 
of God but the denial of his will"(Ibid., p. 260).
Dr. Lewis advocates an active confrontation of evil 
in the faith that one day, God and man working together, 
righteousness will so prevail that God’s children will be 
granted a state of existence--eternal life— which the Adver­
sary will not be able to touch. The promise of the Creator’s 
ultimate victory is in the Cross, in which the Creator and 
the Adversary came to a death grapple and in whi ch the Creator 
was victorious since the "de.feat" of the Cross was succeeded 
by the Resurrection of the Adversary’s victim.
This dualistic meliorism of Edwin Lewis has the merit 
of being a frank facing of the problem of natural evil, and 
it is one of the most vigorous calls of our time for an all-out 
campaign for the extermination of evil and for the promotion 
of the good.
Absolutistic Meliorism 
Three types of metaphysical theory have already been 
treated, in their relation to meliorism. They are pluralism, 
finitism and dualism. These three types of metaphysics^have 
at least one element in common; they all affirm that God is 
limited. One of them, finitism, locates the limitation within 
God’s nature, and the other two postulate it as external to 
God; but all ggree that He is limited.
ol
Opposed to this "limited God" theory is the view of 
Absolutism. ihis is the affirmation that God is unlimited 
or infinite in such attributes as goodness, wisdom and power. 
Absolutistic meliorism is the theory that though God is unlim- 
ted, yet-man can and should engage himself as a co-worker 
with God in the alleviation or extermination of the actually 
existent evils in nature.
Some might question the writer’s connecting absolutism 
v/ith meliorism. It might be thought that belief in an unlimited 
God precludes belief in the radical reality of evil and in the 
obligation of man to oppose it. It is hoped, however, that as 
the treatment progresses the compatability of the terms will 
become evident.
An outstanding representative of absolutistic meliorism 
is Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison. Since he constructs his own 
views by the criticism of the positions of others,'7 it is a 
somewhat tedious task to extract from his books his own views; 
but it is nevertheless possible to find them, couched as they 
usually are within his judgments about other philosophical 
systems. He wrote a number of books, but the one most directly 
related to our present subject is his Gifford Lectures of I912 
and 1913, entitled Tne Idea of God in the Light of Recent
)*rOf this methodology he writes, k^diis method 'of con4 
struction through criticism is the one whi ch I have instinctively 
followed in everything I have written (this was in I9IÔ). I 
do not claim that it is the best method; I simply desire that 
its nature be recognized"(The Idea of God, "Preface", p. VII).
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5 -  6Philosophy. i n  this volume he is strictly a metaphysician,
and rather than the spinning of his own web, we find him the 
scholar indeed, handling the principal sources in the field 
with an understanding and a confidence which evidences mas­
tery of the materials.
Pringle-Pattison is not a pluralist; he has many hard
n
things to say about the "eaches" of William James. He is not
q
a finitistic theist; no involuntarily-imposed factors limit
■5t The Idea of God.will henceforth be called, simply,_______________ _
'^ Ke was Professor of Logic and metaphysics in the Uni­
versity of Edinburgh, so he would be qualified in this field; 
but other works show that he was no mean theologian,,because 
he can handle the Scriptures with an ease and wi th a thorough­
ness almost eoual to that of the oresent-day biblical theolo-
:ian, IJU * S. Tiiornton. A book in point is Pringle-Pattison’s
The Philosophy of Religion, 1930.
7PringlewPattison devotes much careful thought, especiallv 
in his concluding chapter of The Idea of God,' to a delineation of 
the inadequacies of pluralism, which he says was so "fashionable" 
(p. 386) in his day. He finds James’ pluralism to be commendable 
because there is in it an "...intense conviction of the reality 
of the moral struggle..." (p. 398-); but he considers it to be 
the opposite view from his own, metaphysically. He v/rites,
"It may be, as James suggests, that there are other than merely 
logical considerations involved in the decision between monism 
and pluralism. In an intellectual aspect, it is the alternative 
between the idea of a system and the idea of an aggregate, and 
I confess that I find it impossible to reduce the universe to 
a mere ’and’. Moreover, if it were possible to think of the 
universe as a collection of independent facts existing each 
in its own right, a sheer materialism would seem to be the 
most natural form for such a view to take"(p. 39f).
8Pringle-Pattison understands Cleanthes--and not Philo —  
to be speaking for Hume in the Dialogues ('The Idea of God, p. 2). 
He consequently considers Hume a finitist and not a nhilosoohical 
skeptic.
p. Il05).
mis finitism he respects, but he rejects it(Ibid.,
He also rejects the finitism of J. S. Hill(Ibid., p.kOo)
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God. lie is not a metaphysical dualist. He does not oppose 
dualism as explicitly as he does pluralism and finitism, 
because it was not a prominent view in modern philosophy 
until its recent espousal by 0. S. H. Joad and Edwin Lewis; 
but he opposes it incidentally and indirectly in all his 
philosophical writings. Pringle-Pattison is not pluralistic, 
not finitistic, and not dualistic; he is absolutistic.
But he is not an absolutist of the Aristotelian sort; 
his God is not an Eternal Eainkor,^^ contemplatively detached 
from the world. Nor is he an absolutist of the trend of Philo. 
Philo’s absolute was inaccessible and unknowable. Pringle-Pat­
tison writes, "Hence when Philo came, as a philosopher, to 
consider the relation of God to the world, the fact most 
present to his mind was the gulf between the two. God was so 
great as to be beyond the reach of our thought, exalted beyond 
any categories we could frame"(The Philosophy of Religion,
9pringle-Pat tison opposes ultimate dualism by the entire 
system v/hich he constructs. He does not conceive of Zoroastri­
anism as metaphysically dualistic.. Of it he says, "But the 
dualism is temporary, an episode in the wor1d-history, which is 
destined to terminate in the complete triumph of Ahuramazda’s 
righteous will"(The Philosowhy of Religion, p. 137)* Were he 
now living he would probably say that Edwin Lewis is not a 
metaphysical dualist, since Lewis maintains that the Creator 
will finally triumph over--but not annihilate--the Adversary 
(Lewis, 'The Creator and the Adversary, p. 127).
writes’, "And the purely intellectual character of 
Aristotle’s ideal gives it the same aloofness we have nob ed 
from the world’s life. It is the ideal of the scholar and 
thinker who retires into his own thoughts, and finds there 
his hi g nest hap~o ine s s " ( The I de a of Go d, p. IlOo ).
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p. 197)' Even although Pringle-Pattison is a Christian and 
an absolutist, his position is far removed from the "who11y- 
othor" absolutism of Karl Barth, whose emphasis upon sovereignty 
has been of such prominent influence upon eresent-day theology. 
He conceives of the Absolute as closely related to man and the 
world.
Pringle-Pattison is an absolutist of the pantheistic 
type, which is to say that he emphasises the immanence of God 
wi th man and nature, lie even affirms that they are so closely 
related that neither exists nor can exist without the other.
He writes.
But as soon as we begin to treat God and man as 
two independent facts, we lose our hold upon the 
experienced fact, v;hich is the existence of the one 
in the other and througi. the other, most people would 
probably be willing to admit this mediated existence 
in the case of man, but they might feel it akin to sa 
sacrilege to make she same assertion of God. And yet, 
if our metaphysic is, as it professes to be, an 
analysis of experience, the implication is strictly 
reciprocal" ( The Idea of God, p. 251]-).
This is pantheism, but of a higher type than that of Spinoza 
and others ; Pringle-Pattison would rather call it higher pan­
theism or higher naturalism(Ibid., Chapter V in particular).
But God is not so closely related to the world that 
His identity is lost. He does exist, and that absolutistically; 
that is. He is infinite in power, wisdom and goodness.
Pringle-Pattison mentions the fact that Dr. MeTaggart 
devoted "...some twenty pages to the barren argument that God 
gk is omnipotent, because He cannot override the laws of Identity,
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Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, and similar necessities 
of thought or action"(Ibid., p. kolj.). Then Pringle-Pattison 
adds, "But to affirm omnipotence in such a sense is unmeaning, 
and therefore to deny it is unnecessary. Omnipotence can 
only mean— as I find it expressed in a recent Catholic 
manual--the power ’to effect whatever is not intrinsically 
impossible’. The intrinsic necessities which govern the 
possibilities are not, because they are called intrinsic, to 
be regarded as a metaphysical fate behind God, or an impersonal 
system of ’eternal truths’ to which He is forced to submit" 
(Ibid., p. k04). Pringle-Pattison thus believes in omnipotence, 
defined in this way, but he does not like to emphasize the 
aspect of limitless power in God (Ibid., p. Ig03); he would 
rather stress the limitless capacity and the unbounded mani­
festation of God’s love(Ibid., p. Ipl?)*
God's infinite goodness and wisdom are not taught 
explicitly, point by point, but they are implicit in his 
absolutistic position. He defines "Absolutism" as "...precisely 
the assertion of a perfect and coherent whole"(Ibid., p. lj.01). 
The perfection of the whole implies the infinite goodness of 
the Absolute; the coherence. His infinite wisdom.
So much for Pringle-Pattison's absolutism; it remains 
to support the statement that he is melioristic. In 
Pringle-Pattison’s day "meliorism" was taken by some to mean 
the theory that the universe itself is a growing whole. By
others it was taken to mean the idea that G-od is so finite 
that He is developing continually. V/illian James had called 
his own position melioristic, and had at least implied by 
it both these views. We consequently find Pringle-Pattison 
in opposition to the theory of meliorism. This is evidenced 
when he vjrites^ ”I am confirmed in my view of the imnossibility 
of regarding the universe as a growing whole, by observing that 
those who hold to the idea of v/hat James calls  ^the strung-along 
unfinished v/orld in time ^ , and who advocate the creed of 
h/Ieliorism*, do not. .."( Ibid., p. 382).
But even although Pringle-Pattison opposed the 
meliorism current in his day, he is not opposed to the view 
that good and evil are both actual and that man can and should 
set himself to become a worlcman together with God in alleviating 
the evil of the world and in increasing the good. Tiiis view 
he heartily endorses.
There is a sense in which, as an absolutist, he thinks 
of good and evil as two aspects of an organically whole 
universe, so that they are not radical contrasts; but he 
nevertheless understands that both do actually exist. He 
writes, ’’Purposive activity is, indeed, the central feature 
of our human experience”(Ibid., p. 323)* The context of this 
statement shows that he is speaking of the ’’purposive activity” 
of God. This type of activity, at work in nature as well as 
in man, is productive of so much good that the evidence of 
ourposive activity is the "central feature” of our experience.
He also declares, "Creation, if the term is to be used in
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philosophy, must be taken, we found in a previous lecture, as 
expressing the essential nature of the divine life; the revela­
tion of the infinite in the finite is the eternal fact of the 
universe” (Ibid., p. l|.ll|,) . Here we find a kindred view to that 
expressed in the above quotation: the good is so actual that 
in the creation of man and nature there is a revelation of 
the infinite.
Evil is also real. He declares, ”An honest contro­
versialist will admit the dark features of the long-dravm-out 
process--its severity and apparent wastefulness--features which 
sometimes appear to us intolerable”(Ibid., p. )i05)• He also 
affirms, ’There are features of the world-process, I have 
admitted, so horrible that we often feel them to be frankly 
intolerable. Tne agonies of helpless suffering from age to 
age...how are facts like these to be reconciled with the 
controlling presence of a principle of reason and goodness”
(Ibid., p. IlILl)? He further writes, ”Contingency is written 
across the face of nature— not in the sense that what happens 
is not determined by natural law, but in the sense that it 
appears to be only so determined, and cannot, in its detail, 
be brought within the scope of any rational or beneficent 
purpose” (Ibid., p. l|_lp ).
In this world, in which involuntary good is evidenced 
in nature, there are manifestations, here and there, of 
undesirable natural phenomena. And Pringle-Pattison believes 
that he should betake himself to the task of doing all within
his power to alleviate the world of its natural evil. He 
writes,
Without the acknowledgement of the Ideal, the doctrine 
of immanence must degenerate into the acceptance and 
justification of the actual, just as we find it. In 
Pope’s shallow phrase, ’v/hatever is, is right*. This 
is the lower Pantheism, of which we spoke in the first 
lecture of this series; and it is to be observed that 
such a theory, by ascribing everything that haooens to 
the direct or immediate agency of God, is a virtual 
denial of the existence of reflective self-conscious, 
spiritual centers, such as we know them in our own 
experience. For although we often talk, in a legiti­
mate metaphor, of individuals as the vehicle or the 
channel of certain divine ideas or purposes, the self-con­
scious individual must appropriate the idea in order to 
transmit it; he must identify himself with the purpose 
in order to be its instrumenti’(Ibid., p. 2^3)*
Criticism of Meliorism 
Extreme pessimism denies the actuality of good. 
Optimism denies the actuality of evil. Meliorism affirms 
the actuality or reality of both good and evil. It conceives 
that there are many desirable aspects of life and existence, 
but it also admits that there are the undesirable aspects.
'The meliorist, therefore, steers clear of both the rocks of 
despair and defeatism and the ’’...frivolous, fat-witted 
optimism which turns its back, and shuts its eyes, and laughs” 
(Henry Van Dyke, The Gospel for a Ivor Id of Sin, p. l8).
Whether in his metaphysics the meliorist is 
pluralistic, finitistic, dualistic or absolutistic, he holds 
that he can and should, under God, set himself to the task of 
thwarting the evil and promoting the good. Tliis attitude is 
more reasonable and more empiric than either pessimism or 
optimism,and becxmes mere adequately based, theologically and
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philosophically, when coupled v/ith the unified system of 
things wliich is possible only in an absolutistic metaphysic. 
Absolutistic meliorism, therefore, rather than any other 
type of it, and in preference to all forms of pessimism and 
ootimism, will constitute the foundation, in the concluding 
chapter of this thesis, upon which the writer v/ill construct 
his incarnaGional answer to the vexing problem of involuntary 
evil.
PART TWO: SPECIAL STUDY
CHAPTER V
EARLY ILGARmTIüYAL E.IPHASIS: IREm EUS
In the introduction to this thesis the problem, before 
us was stated. In Part One three general types of solutions 
to it were treated. In this division, specialized investi­
gation will be made into the question of whether or not the 
Christian doctrine of the Incarnation points a way toward a 
solution. The incarnational emphasis in Irenaeus and Athanasius 
will be given detailed consideration. These Greek fathers v/ill 
be treated as representative of the early incarnational stress, 
and as a background for the consideration of the modern em­
phasis. Following the study of their thought two contemporary 
theological schools, the Russian Orthodox and the Anglo-Catholic, 
as they are typified in the writings of Sergius Bulgakov and 
L. S. Thornton, will be treated as representative of the 
emphasis upon the Incarnation in modern theology.
There are several reasons why Irenaeus may be 
studied as representative of the mind of the early Church.
Among the reasons are these: first, he was a voluminous 
writer. IIo authority would say he was a good writer, but he 
did find time, in his busy life as a missionary bishop, to 
write a great deal. Much of his writing has been preserved, 
so that it is possible to study even detailed ramifications
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of his thought. Second, he had a keen sense of the impor­
tance of orthodoGcy. This is evidenced by his careful--and 
sometimes tedious--writings against heterodox views, as 
Gnosticism. Third, he himself was of both the East and the 
West. He was probably raised in Smyrna, in the East, and we 
Icnow that for many years he was the bishop of Lug dunum, the 
modern Lyons,^ in the West. Fourth, his emphasis upon the 
Incarnation was unquestionably of direct and significant in­
fluence upon the later thought of the Eastern Church. A 
fifth reason why Irenaeus may be studied as representative 
of the mind of the early Church is for the very fact that he 
was such an early Christian thinker, having had, through 
Polycarp, indirect contact with the apostles and their 
thought. In his youth he sat often at the feet of Polycarp, 
who himself had sat at the feet of John and other apostles. 
Irenaeus writes, 'Ëut Polycarp was also not only instructed by 
the apostles, and conversed with many who had seen Christ, 
but was also, by apostles in Asia, appointed bishop of the 
church in Smyrna, who I also saw in my early youth, for he 
tarried (on earth) a very long time, and, most nobly suffering 
martyrdom, departed this life, having always taught the things 
which he had learned from the apostles, and which the church
^In January, 1952, it was the writer’s privilege to 
visit Lyons, France, there to see sites connected with Irenaeus 
and to interview two Homan Catholic priests. One Honan Catiiolic 
Church, in its name perpetuates the memory of the saint; there 
is^a twelfth century cathedral, located on a Christian site 
which dates to early centuries; and the priests were able to
has handed down, and vdiich alone are true”(III, 3, L. .
Gustaf Aulen affirms the representative character of
Irenaeus* He declares.
Of all the Fathers there is not one vaio is more 
thoroughly representative and typical, or who 
did moz'G to fix the lines on which Cliristian 
thought was to move for centuries after his day.
His strength lies in the fact that he did not, like 
the Apologists and the Alexandrians, work along 
some philosophical line of approach to Christianity, 
but devoted himself altogether to the simple exposi­
tion of the central ideas of the Christian faith 
itself(Aulen, Christus Victor, pp. 32-33).
Possibility of the Incarnation 
Greek thought, following the lead of Plato, had
taught that matter is evil. This idea was accepted by 
Gnosticism, both the pre-Christian and the post-Christian.
And at a very early date in the Giiristian era, many gnos­
tics attempted to join hands with the Christians. They 
denied, however, the belief that dirist Jesus was God in 
human flesh. This was precisely because they conceived of 
matter as inherently evil. Some How Testament writers, 
particularly Jolui and Peter and Jude, made direct attack 
uoon the proponents of this creed.
point out that the church of which Irenaeus was bishop was, 
due to the persecutions, an underground sanctuary. But, for 
the most part, judging from pointed conversations with the 
local tov/nsfolk, as well as from the interview with the 
priests, the modern Lyons has forgotten its early Cliristian 
missionary bishop.
"-The Homan numeral will refer to a book in his Against 
Heresies ; the next number to a chapter, and the last to a 
paragraph.
oIrenaeus, whoso life spanned most of the second 
century, found gnosticism to be a constant threat to the 
central affirmation of Christianity. Consequently, he 
attacked those who ’’...wallow in all error,...” (Ill, 2k, 2), 
and who propound ”... impious doctrines. .. ” ( III, 2li, 1 ). This 
he did by assuming that matter is not evil and that therefore 
it was possible for God to become manifest in its realm.
The Valentinians, and other gnostics, affirmed an 
evil God, the Demiurge, himself”... the fruit of a defect,...” 
11,19,9 ) '^dio fashioned and formed the universe. Irenaeus 
denied this. In his opinion, .God is the Creator of the 
world...”( 11,9,1) • He reasoned, ”Hov; much safer and more 
accurate a course is it, then, to confess at once that 
wriich is true: that this God, the Creator, who formed the 
world, is the only Cfod,... ” ( 11,15,3) • He also declared.
It is proper, then, that I should begin with 
the first and most important head, that is, God 
the Creator, who made the heaven and the earth, 
and all things that are therein..., and to 
demonstrate that there is nothing either above 
Him or after Him; nor that, influenced by any 
one, but of His own free will. He created all 
things, since He is the only God, the only 
Lord, the only Creator, the only Father, alone 
containing all things, and Himself commanding 
all things into existence(II,1,1).
It was not that God only shaped things out of an amorphic,
eternal, material substance. It was Irenaeus’ view that
God created ex nihilo. He writes, ’’Lhile men, indeed, cannot
make anything out of nothing, but only out of matter already
existing, yet God is in this point pre-erainently superior
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to men, that He Himself called into being the substance 
of His creation, when previously it had no existence”(II,
i o n ) .
Since, in the thought of Irenaeus, matter is created, 
even ex nihilo, by the one true God, it should not be thought 
of as inherently evil. And, since it was not, for him, in­
herently evil, the 'Incarnation became possible.
Fact of the Incarnation
Irenaeus taught that Christ was born of a virgin.
He also taught that Christ was both divine and human. Both 
of these aspects of his teaching support the "fact” of the 
Incarnation.
The Virgin Birth of Christ is affirmed several times 
in Irenaeus’ writings. He speaks of "...Him, the first-begotten 
of the Virgin,...”(Ill,16,)p). He also writes of "...the Lord 
himself, Emmanuel from the Virgin,...”(Ill, 20,3)- In an­
other instance he calls Christ the "...token of the Virgin"
(111,21,1). Further, he says Eary was "... as yet a virgin"
(III,21,10). This was not only Irenaeus’ personal belief;
It was the faith of the whole Christian diurcn. He v/rites,
"The church though dispersed throughout the v;hole world, 
even to the ends of the earth, has received from the apostles 
and their disciples this faith: in ...the birth from a 
virgin..."(I, 10,1).
Irenaeus makes many precise statements which reveal
M s  conviction that Clirist Jesus v;as both Divine and human. 
In one instance he affirms that Clirist was of a higher 
"substance" than were certain outstanding men of previous 
generations. He v/rites, "And how could He (Clirist) have 
been greater than Solomon, or greater than Jonah, or have 
been the Lord of David, who was of the same substance as 
they were"(IV, 33,Ip) ?
Tyo other statements of Irenaeus give more positive 
support to his belief in the Divinity of Christ. Darist’s 
eternity is affirmed when he calls Him "...the eternal 
King,. .. "(Ill,l6,I|_). And, that Christ is God is declared 
when Irenaeus writes of Him, "...having become this v/hich 
we are. He (nevertheless) is the Mighty God, and possesses 
a generation which cann.ot be declared" (IV, 33,11 ) *
In Irenaeus ’ writings, however, there are very fev; 
statements similar to those above. If he were writing today, 
and he considered it his mission to defend orthodoxy, he 
would no doubt concentrate on this aspect of Christ’s per­
sonality. Writing as he did, however, in a day when it was 
principally Clirist’s humanity which was under attack, his 
special burden, as relates to Christ’s personality, was to 
support its true humanity.
The docetic gnostics, against whom Irenaeus directed 
the greater weight of his attack, denied the belief that 
in Christ God had taken on human flesh. Tie y held that 
Christ only appeared to have a human body. Irenaeus
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emphasized the import of II John 1:7,8: "’For many deceivers 
have entered into the world, who confess not that Jesus Christ 
is come in the flesh. Tnis is a deceiver and an antichrist. 
Take heed to them, that ye loss not what ye have wrought’" 
(111,16,8). And he affirms, "For He did not seen one 
thing while he was another, as those affirm -who describe 
Him as being a man only in appearance; but what He was, that 
He also appeared to be"(II,22,Ip). Against docetism he also 
m'^ites, "And I have proved already, that it is the same 
thing to say that He appeared merely to outward seeming, 
and (to affirm) that He received nothing from Mary" (V,l,2).
Tie above passages make plain Irenaeus* belief, but 
they do not indicate why he believes in the true humanity 
of Christ. He gives many specific reasons why he affirms 
the humanity. 'Three v/ill be noted. One is because Christ 
took food, and v/as hungry when he did not eat. He writes, 
"still further, if He had taken nothing from Mary, He would 
never have availed Himself of those kinds of food which are 
derived from the earth, by which that body v/hich has been 
taken from the earth is nourished; nor would He have 
hungered, fasting those forty days,..."(111,22,2). Another 
reason why he affirmed the humanity is because Christ was 
susceptible to suffering. He declares, "But the Lord, our 
Christ, underwent a valid, and not a merely accidental 
passion;..."(11,20,3)• A third reason is more inclusive 
than the above two. He speaks of Christ’s "...fulfilling
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all the conditions of human nature,..."(Ill, 17,Ij.) *
Importance of the Incarnation
In Western theological thought, both Roman Catholic 
and Protestant, the death of Christ has been lauded as the 
instrument of redemption. Eastern thought has evidenced more 
of an incarnational emphasis; it has tended to minimize the 
death of Christ, and to stress the Incarnation as the means 
of salvation. Irenaeus represents the Eastern tradition.
In his thought the d.eath of (Jnrist is quite incidental; the 
incarnate life of Clirist is what is significant. Tne attempt 
to support this statement will begin by a negative approach, 
and proceed to a positive presentation.
Tne death of Christ, according to Irenaeus, is 
relatively insignificant. Some passages in Irenaeus would 
appear to contradict this affirmation. For instance, he 
writes, "By His own blood He redeemed us, as also His 
apostle declares, ’In whom we have redemption through His 
blood, even the remission of sins ’ " ( V, 2,2 ). Again, a.lso 
referring to the "blood" as the redeeming agency, he speaks 
of "...the mighty Word, and very man, who, redeeming us by His 
own blood in a manner consonant to reason, gave Himself as a 
redemption for those who had been led into captivity"(V,1,1). 
Further, still extolling the "blood", ho -writes, "Christ, 
who was called the Son of God before the ages, was manifested 
in the fullness of time, in order that He might cleanse us
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through His blood, who were under the power of sin, pre­
senting us as sure sons to His Father"(A. Roberts and W.
Rambaut, editors. The writings of Irenaeus, "Tne Lost
Writings of Irenaeus," Chapter 399 P* 177)*
Mention of the blood of Christ, in our day, usually 
connotes the idea of the blood which flowed from Christ’s
body at the Crucifixion; it is a reference to the death.
Irenaeus, however, in his emphasis upon the blood of Christ, 
seems, particularly, to refer to that material element which 
is one constituent of the incarnate life. Hone of the 
several authorities on Irenaeus, which the writer has con­
sulted, makes any mention of this; nevertheless, it seems 
to be a valid deduction. Several passages may be noted in 
support of it.
Irenaeus writes, "Since the Lord thus has redeemed
us through His own blood, giving His soul for our souls,
and His flesh for our flesh,...attaching man to God by
His ovm incarnation,..."(V,1,1). Tnis passage refers to the
blood, and sums the statement up in such a way as to reveal
that he is referring to the blood of the incarnate Life,
rather than to a life-giving fluid which flowed from the
crucified body. Irenaeus also speaks of Christ as "...one
truly possessing flesh and blood, by which Ho redeemed us,..."
(V,1,2). It is quite evident that in this passage the reference
is not to the blood spilled in death, but to the blood which,
with the flesh, constituted the earthly body of Clirist. An- 
otner passage reads thus: "...in reconciling us to Himself
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by the body of His own ITesli, and redeeming us by His own 
blood,. • . " ( V, 1)1,3). This, clearly, is an allusion to the 
flesh and blood of the life.
Tnese three passages, depicting, as they do, the 
blood as a part of the incarnate life rather than as 
something given in death, make it legitimate to interpret the 
previously quoted references to the redeeming agency of the 
blood as allusions to the blood of the life rather than of 
the death.
It is the Incarnation which is, in the thought of 
Irenaeus, the instrument of redemption. Before giving 
several quotations which make the Incarnation the^exclusive 
means of redemption, two passages will be studied as depicting 
the relative importance of the Incarnation and the death.
In Colossians 1:21f, Saint Paul mentions both the 
Incarnation and the death of Christ as the means of our 
reconciliation. Irenaeus quotes the entire passage, and 
lifts out the Incarnation reference in order to establish 
the idea of our having been reconciled. Irenaeus writes,
"And for this cause the apostle... says, ’And though ye were 
formerly alienated, and enemies to His knowledge by evil 
works, yet now ye have been reconciled in the body of His 
flesh, through His death, to present yourselves holy and 
chaste, and without fault in His sight ’ " ( V. ll*.,2). Immediately 
after quoting this passage from Paul, Irenaeus comments, "He 
says, ’Ye have been reconciled in the body of His flesh,’
because the righteous flesh has reconciled that flesh 
which was being kept under bondage of sin, and brought it 
into friendship with God"(V,lip,2) • It is significant that 
when Irenaeus here requotes the passage which he has just 
quoted, he omits the reference to Christ’s death. This reveals 
that even when Irenaeus is treating the statements of Paul, 
he does so with a bias toward an almost exclusive emphasis 
upon the Incarnation as the means of man’s reconciliation.
There is yet another passage which also clearly shows 
the relative importance of the Incarnation and the death. 
Speaking of "Christ Jesus, the Son of God," Irenaeus writes, 
"...who, because of His surpassing love towards His creation, 
condescended to be born of a virgin. He Himself uniting man 
tl'irough Himself to God, and having suffered under Pontius 
Pilate, and rising again, and having been received up in 
splendour, shall cone in glory, the Saviour of those.who are 
saved, and the Judge of those who are judged, and sending 
into eternal fire those who transform the truth, and despise 
His Father and His advent" (III,II,2). Since this one passage 
mentions the death and Resurrection as well as the Incarnation, 
it depicts the relative importance of each in the mind of 
Irenaeus. It reveals that in the thinking of this early 
writer the Incarnation redeems man, the death and the Resur­
rection being only incidental. He here states that having 
"...condescended to be born of a virgin,..." Christ united
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"...man through Himself to God,..." Immediately following 
this statement Irenaeus continues, "... and having suffered 
under Pontius Pilate, and rising again,...shall come in 
glory,...." The dying and the rising are therefore something 
additional to Christ’s uniting nan to God. They are only 
elements in a subsequent history which proceeds the return of 
Christ as judge.
In order to support, further, this thesis that it is 
the Incarnation rather than the death which redeems man, let 
us note the last phrase in the above passage. In it, it is 
not those who "despise" the death of Christ who are to be 
judged and tiuned into "eternal fire"; it is those who 
"...despise His Father and His advent".
Many passages in Irenaeus explicitly state that the 
Incarnation is the instrument of redemption. He says it 
was prophesied that renewal and quickening would come by 
the Incarnation. He writes, "For this very thing was pro­
claimed beforehand, that novelty should come to renew and 
qui cken mankind" ( IV, 3lg, 1 ) #
liie Incarnation is incidontally iicplied to be the 
instrument of redemption when Irenaeus writes, "For as He 
gave by His advent a greater privilege to those who believed 
on Him, and who do His will, so also did He point out that 
those who did not believe on Him should have a more severe 
punisliment in the judgment; ...•" (iv, 3o,1l) .
In at least two wassaves Irenaeus affirms that man’s
regeneration oomes through the Incarnation. He writes of 
"...the pure One opening purely that pure womb which regener­
ates men to God,. . . " (IV, 33,11) . lie also refers to "...that 
regeneration which flows from the virgin. (IV,33,^ 4-) •
It is the Incarnation which renovates man. Irenaeus 
declares, "He, the same, took flesh of the Virgin Mary, not 
merely in appearance, but actually, by the operation of the 
Holy Spirit, in order to renovate us"(V, title of Chapter 
One.).
L'ian’s adoption into the family of God conies by way 
of the Incarnation. He affirms, "For it was for this end 
that bhe Word of God was made man, and He who was the Son 
of God became the Son of man, that man, having been taken 
into the V/ord, and receiving the adoption, might become the 
son of God"(III,19,1)• Ho also speaks of "...the Son of God 
being made the Son of man, that through Him we may receive 
the adoption,..."(Ill,lo,3)•
Restoration and mediation are by means of the 
Incarnation. Irenaeus writes, "And therefore in the last 
tim.es the Lord has restored us into friendship through 
His incarnation, having become ’the Mediator between God and 
men(I Timothy 2:g)’;..."(V,17,l).
Salvation comes from the incarnate Christ. Irenaeus 
af.firms, "For He is indeed Saviour, as being the Son and 
Word of God;.... But salvation, as being flesh: for ’the 
Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us’"(III,10,2). That
63
Christ*s own person "saves" men is taught v/lien Irenaeus 
declares, "For He came to save all through means of Himself--.,." 
(II,22,)p).
Man * 8 death, v/hich is, in Irenaeus* view, a result of 
man’s sin, is conquered by the Incarnation. Irenaeus queries, 
"And how shall he (man) escape from the generation subject 
to death, if not by means of a new generation, given in a 
wonderful and unexpected manner by God--that regeneration 
which flows from the virgin through faith" (IV, 33^ 4-) 7 A 
little more explicitly, he affirms: "...wherefore also what 
was generated is a holy thing, and the Son of the Most High 
God and Father of all, who effected tho incarnation of this 
being, and shov/ed forth a new (kind of) generation; that as 
by the former generation we inlierited death, so by this neiv 
generation we might inherit life"(V,1,3)#
Last of all, the adversary of both God and man is 
conquered. Tnis was not by a dramatic death grapple on the 
Cross, as some Western theologians are now affirming; it 
was by the medium of the Incarnation itself. Irenaeus says 
that "...He,' in the last times, was made man among men; that 
He re-formed the human race, but destroyed and conquered the 
enemy of man, and gave to His ov/n handiwork victory against 
the adversary"(IV, 2lt,l). In this connection he also writes,
"Tie V/ord of God, however, the Maker of all things, conquering 
him (the adversary) by means of human nature, and showing him
to be an apostate, has, on the contrary, put him under the 
power of man" ( V, 24, Il ).
ïiiis study reveals that Irenaeus makes more of the 
advent than of the departure, more of the life than of the 
death, more of the Incarnate One than of the Crucified.
Tile Merit of the Incarnation 
The merit of the Incarnation, as one would find from
even a superficial study of Irenaeus, is the recapitulatio.
liiis is to say that it is the recapitulation which gives to 
the Incarnation its worth as the means of redemption.
John Lawson writes, "many writers upon Saint Irenaeus 
have essayed a definition of the meaning of the word ’recapit­
ulation* as used by him, and with a perplexing variety of 
results"(Lawson, The Biblical Theology of Saint Irenaeus, 
p. IIlI). Lav/son himself contributes to the many definitions. 
He explains, "...recapitulation appears to be the restoration 
of humanity into the blessed state of collectivity by Christ, 
the Second Adam. To accomplish this Christ wont through ex­
periences parallel to those of Adam, but with the opposite 
outcome in each case" ( Ibid., p. 11l2). Tnis definition is 
probably inadequate because it restricts the effects of the 
recapitulation to the "...restoration of humanity...."
Gustaf Aulen more fully explains Irenaeus* use of the term,
3‘iiie most pointed Now Testament basis for this view is
Ephesians 1:10, which reads: .as a plan fqr the ...fullness of
time, to unite all things ( r y— '• )
in him, things in heaven and things oh earth"(Revised Standard 
Version, henceforth called lî. S. V. ; #
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Y/lien lie says, "Tie Divine victory accomplished in Christ 
stands in the center of Irenaeus* thought, and forms the 
central element in the recapitulatio, the restoring and the 
perfecting of creation, which is his most comprehensive 
theological idea" (Aulen, Cliristus Victor, p. 37) • This 
definition is more adequate because it includes all crea­
tion— man and nature--in the redemptive process, as does 
Irenaeus* thought.
Irenaeus has much to say about the Incarnate Christ * s 
recapitulating man; that is, about Clirist *s re-making man so 
that he is as he was when originally created. He writes,
"He had Himself, therefore, flesh and blood, recapitulating 
in Himself not a certain other, but that original handiwork 
of the Father, seeking out that thing which had perished" 
(V,1Il,2). He also affirms, "...as by the former generation 
(Adam) we inherited death, so by this new generation we 
might inherit life"(V,1,3). In this connection he also 
says that Christ "...summed up in Himself the ancient for­
mation of Adam"(V,1,2). Yet another passage reads, "...and 
the Lord took dust from the earth and formed man; so did He 
who is the V/ord, recapitulating Adam in Himself, rightly 
receiving a birth, enabling him to gather up Adam (into 
Himself),..."(111,21,10). Lastly, on this subject he states: 
". . .when He became incarnate, and was made man. He commenced 
afresh the long line of human beings, and furnished us, in a
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brief, comprehensive manner, with salvation; so that what 
we lost in Adam--namely, to be according to the image and 
likeness of God--that we might recover in Christ Jesus"
(III,18,1).
Irenaeus conceives that the incarnate Christ went 
through the stage of infancy in order to recapitulate, or 
to go back over,--and thereby redeem--the infant life of 
every person. He v/rites, "It was for this reason that the 
Son of God, although He was perfect, passed through the 
state of infancy in common with the rest of mankind, par­
taking of it thus not for His own benefit, but for that 
of the infantile stage of man * s existence,..."(Iv,38,2).
Hot only does he look upon the Incarnation as a 
recapitulation of man * s infancy; he views it also as a 
re-living, and thereby a re-creation, of every age of man.
He affirms of Christ, "He therefore passed through every 
age, becoming an infant for infants, thus sanctifying 
infants; a child for children, thus sanctifying those who 
are of this age...; a youth for youths, becoming an example 
to youths, and thus sanctifying them for the Lord. So 
likewise He was an old man for old men, that He might be a 
perfect Master for all,..." (II,22,1}.). Host scholars think 
Christ died in His early thirties. Irenaeus argues for an age 
of near fifty. (11,22,6). He bases this assumption, in part, 
on John 8:37, which reads, "* Thou art not yet fifty years 
old, and hast thou seen Abraham* "(11,22,6) ? It is because
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of this belief that Irenaeus can say that Christ also 
recapitulated old age. He apparently considered "near 
fifty" as old age; and tnis might be somewhat justified, 
when we consider the fact that life expectancy ' was not, at 
that time, what it now is.
Yet, more than all the stages of life are recapitulated 
by the Incarnate One. Clirist also recapitulated death.
Irenaeus writes, "Tien, at last. He came on to death itself, 
that He may be the *f irst-born from the dead,... * " (II,22,Ip .
He also declares, "For by summing up in Himself the whole 
human race from the beginning to the end. He has also summed 
up its death" (V,23,2).
But not only are all the aspects of human life and 
huraan death recapitulated by Christ;the "summing up" also 
included a re-creation of the natural world. Irenaeus 
writes, "...from David*s belly the King eternal was raised 
up, who sums up all things in Himself, and has gathered into 
Himself the ancient formation"(111,21,9)• He also speaks 
of Christ * 8 "...recapitulating in Himself His own handiwork;..." 
(11,22,1).
Results of the Incarnation 
There are, in Irenaeus* viev/, three principal re­
sults of the Incarnation. They are the "deification" of 
man, the immortality of man, and the redemption of nature.
Tieso three results are not treated separately, or systematic­
ally; they may be seen, however, in a study of his thought.
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1. Déification of Man;-It may be said that there is 
a certain deification of nan as a result of the Incarnation. 
Speaking of the ancient fathers, Irenaeus says the Lord 
"...has regenerated them into the life of God,..."(III,
22,)p). lie also asks, "Or how shall nan pass into God, unless 
God has (first) passed into nan"(IV, 33,)p)? he further declares, 
"...those wiio shall be worthy are accustomed gradually to par­
take of the divine nature;..."(V,32,1). He also speaks of 
Christ * s ". . .uniting man through Himself to God, ..." (III,Jp,2). 
Passages such as these indicate that, for Irenaeus, the In­
carnation deifies man. Such statements become tempered, 
however, by other passages so that, with a view of the whole, 
one’s judgment night well be that Irenaeus wont no further
in the direction of man’s deification than have many another 
Cliristian theologian--even of the Western tradition. One 
such tempering passage is as follows: "...man is infinitely 
inferior to God;...he has received grace only in part, and 
is not yet equal or similar to his Maker;..."(II,23,3)•
2. Immortality of man:-A second result of the In­
carna bion is the inmiortallty of man. Irenaeus did not look 
upon fallen man as naturall%r immortal. Ee conceived that 
because of the Fall, and because of each man’s disobedience 
to God, men are natively mortal, lie writes, "...lest man, 
falling away from God altogether, should cease to exist"(IV, ' 
20,7)♦ It is his faith, however, that through the Incarnation 
what is naturally mortal becomes immortal and v/hat is natively
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corruptible becomes clothed with incorruptibility. He 
speaks of Christ’s "...bestowing upon us at His coming (His 
first one, according to the context) immortality durably and 
truly,...(V,1,1). lie also declares, "...we possess eternal 
duration from the excelling power of this Being, not from 
our ov/n nature,..." (V,2,3). He further affirms of Clirist, 
"...Ee appeared as a man, that we, being nourished, as it 
were, from the breast of His flesh,...may be able also 
to contain in ourselves the Bread of immortality,..."(IV, 
38,1). Yet further, he says that Christ "...bestowed the 
gift of incorruption"(11,20,3)* In a well-rounded passage, 
wiien our author is speaking of the Eucharist (by which he 
means the body and blood of Christ) he writes : "... so also 
our bodies, being nourished by it, and deposited in the earth, 
and suffering decomposition there, shall rise at their ap­
pointed time, the Word of God granting them resurrection to 
the glory of God, even the Father, who freely gives to this 
mortal immortality, and to this corruptible incorruption,..."
(V,2,3).
3. Redemption of Nature;-A third result of the Incar- 
nation^ f* is the redemption of nature. This redemption will be
^In one passage several natural evils are conceived of 
as redeemed, but if by "passion" Irenaeus means "death", it is 
here the death and not the Incarnation which redeems nature.
He says, "Our Lord also by His passion destroyed death, and 
dispersed error, and put an end to corruption, and destroyed 
ignorance, v/nile He manifested life and revealed truth, and 
bestowed the gift of incorruption"(II,20,3)♦
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discussed at some length due to the fact that it is so 
central to the problem of this entire thesis*
Most authorities would allow that man * s ignorance 
is one cause of manifestations of evil in the natural realm. 
It is, for example, partly due to man* s ignorance that there 
are famines and the ravages of cancer. Irenaeus conceives 
that the Incarnation redeems men from at least a certain 
amount of this cause of natural evil. He v;rites, "For He 
was already despoiling men, by removing their ignorance, 
conferring upon then His own knowledge,. . . " (III,l6,l|.). This 
redemption from ignorance is through the medimi of the In­
carnation rather than the death of Christ, because Irenaeus 
makes the above statement of the baby Jesus in Simeon*s 
arms.
Irenaeus conceives that diseases and bodily infirm­
ities, v/hich are manifestations of natural evil, are redeemed 
by means of the Incarnation. He writes, "'those, again, who 
declare that at His coming * the lame man shall leap as an 
heart, and the tongue of the dumb shall (speak) plainly, 
and the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the ears of 
the deaf shall hear*...--proclaimed those works of healing 
which iwere accomp 1 ished by Him" ( IV, 33,11).
Irenaeus conceives that the poison of serpents, which 
by most is considered an aspect of natural evil, is made of 
no effect to those who believe on Christ. He says that
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Christ "...conferred on those that believe in Him the power 
* to tread upon serpents and scorpions, and on all the power 
of the enemy,...(Luke 10:19)*"(11,20,3).
All the evils of nature are counteracted, according 
to Irenaeus, in order to win human nature back to God. He 
w i t  es, "For all things had entered upon a ne 17 phase, the 
Word arranging after a new manner the advent in the flesh, 
that He might win back to God that human nature (horninem) 
which had departed from God;..."(III,10,2).
Irenaeus takes great pains to support his belief 
that man * s body, or flesh, is redeemed. He argues, "Vain 
therefore are the disciples of Valentinus v/ho put forth 
this opinion, in order that they may exclude the flesh 
from salvation and cast aside what God has fashioned"(V,
1.2). He also declares, "God will bestow salvation upon the 
whole nature of man, consisting of body and soul in close 
union, since the Word took it upon Him,..."(V, title of 
Chapter Six). And he asks, "How then is it not the utmost 
blasphemy to allege, that the temple of God, in which the 
Spirit of the Father dwells, and the members of Christ, do 
not partake of salvation, but are reduced to perdition"(V,
6.2)? In another instance he says, "What was it, then, 
which was dead? Undoubtedly it was the substance of the 
flesh; the same, too, which had lost the breath of life, 
and had become breathless and dead. ‘fiiis aame, therefore, 
was what the Lord came to quicken, that as in Adam we do
all die, as being of an animal nature, in Christ we may all 
live, as being spiritual,..."{V, 12,3)• Further, he asks,
"Or how can they maintain that the flesh is incapable of 
receiving life v/iiich flows from Him, when it received 
healing from Him" ( V, 12,6)?
Professor James Orr calls human death "...that 
crowning evil"(Orr, Fne Cliristian View of God and the World, 
pp. 228,229)* And Professor Orr considers that death is a 
result of man * s sin. He writes, "Death for man is an effect 
of sin. It did not lie in the Creator*s original design for 
man that he should die,--that these two component parts of 
his nature, body and soul, should ever be violently dis­
rupted and severed, as death now severs them"(Ibid., p. 229) 
Irenaeus, in his early day, was of this same persuasion. He 
conceived, hov/ever, as do many who take the position, that 
the Incarnate Christ redeems death. He writes, "TAien 
therefore the Lord vivifies man, that is, Adam, death is at 
the same time destroyed"(III,23^7)* Irenaeus also writes, 
"For by no other means could we have attained to incorrupti­
bility and immortality, unless we had been united to incor­
ruptibility and immortality. But how could we be joined 
to incorruptibility and immortality, unless, first,...the 
corruptible might be swallowed up in incorruptibility, and 
the mortal by immortality,..."(III,I9,1)•
Irenaeus also conceives that nature, or creation, 
outside man, is redeemed by Christ the Incarnate One. lie
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speaks of the presence of God in creation and implies that
this presence renovates it, Eis words are, " to behold God
in this creation vdiich is r e n o v a t e d , V , 32,1)• Another
statement yet more explicitly teaches this same truth. He
writes, "For all these are tokens of the flesh which had been
derived from the earth, which He had recapitulated in Himself,
bearing salvation to His ovni handiwork"(III,22,2). He also
speaks of "...the creation itself, being restored to its
primeval condition,..."(V,32,1). Irenaeus also affirms.
For it is just that in that very creation in 
which they toiled or were afflicted, being 
proved in every way by suffering, they should 
receive the reward of their suffering; and 
that in the creation in which they were slain 
because of their love to God, in that they 
should be revived again; and that in the cre­
ation in which they endured servitude, in that 
they should reign. For God is rich in all 
things, and all things are His(7,32^1)*
Another lengthy passage, in support of his belief in the In­
carnation as constituting a redemption for nature, may be 
given. Irenaeus v/rites.
For if He did not receive the substance of 
flesh from a human being. He neither wax made 
man nor the Son of man; and if He was not made 
what V7G were. Ho did no great thing in v/hat He 
suffered and endured. But every one will allow 
that we are (composed of) a body taken from the 
earth, and a soul receiving spirit from God.
Ihis, therefore, the V/ord of God was made, 
recapitulating in Himself His own handiwork; 
and on this account does He confess Himself the 
Son of man, and blesses 'the meek, because they 
shall inlierit the earth *"(111,22,1).
In yet another passage Irenaeus says that because of the In­
carnation the savage earth is reclaimed. He writes, "...becaus*
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the Word, having been firmly united to flesh, and in its 
mechanism fixed with pins, has reclaimed the savage earth" 
(IV,3gli).
CHAPTER VI
m R L Y  IHCARRATIGEAL EMPHASIS : A'THAHASIUS 
The other outstanding light among the■early incar- 
nationalists, born about a century after the death of 
Irenaeus, was Athanasius. Like Irenaeus, he was a voluminous 
v/riter. Some of his works have been destroyed, but many have 
been preserved. 'Those extant include apologies, treatises, 
doctrinal sta!:ements, histories and letters. Host of these 
works have been included in Volume Four of A Select Library 
of Mcene and Post-Hicene Fathers. Archibald Robertson edited 
this volume \/hich is devoted exclusively to Athanasius. He 
used Cardinal Hevman*s translation, save at certain points.
It is the text of this volume which will be quoted herein, 
except where otherwise stated.
The divisions of this study will be similar to those 
in the treatment of Irenaeus. The principal topics will be 
the possibility, the actuality, the importance, and the 
results of the Incarnation.
Possibility of the Incarnation 
Athanasius was trained in a type of thought which 
tended to view matter as essentially evil. He reveals a 
familiarity with the writings of Plato;,- as interpreted in
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Heo-Platonism, the revival of Plato *s thought. He studied at 
the theological school in Alexandria, where the influence of 
Origan was still potent.
He maintained a life-long interest in asceticism, 
especially as it was expressed in the lives of celibate 
hermits. As a young man he lived for a time with the hermit 
Antony in the Egyptian desert. when he later wrote his Life 
of Antony he included this statement in his introduction: "I 
was able to learn from him, for I was his attendant for a long 
time." As a bishop he wrote letters of encouragement to the 
hermits. In them he reveals his high regard for "...those 
who practice a solitary life"(Letters of Athanasius, LIII, 
"Second Letter to Honks"). This interest in and reverence for 
the ascetic life might have grown out of his training in a 
type of thought which tended to look upon matter as inherently 
,evil.
ITo t wi ths t an ding the influence of a Greek type of
9thought, and his consequent reverence for asceticism, Athanasius 
nevertheless did not go the full dis tance in that direction; he 
did not consider matter to be inlierently evil. Hatter v/as the 
direct creation, ex nihilo, of the one true God. He writes, 
"...for it (creation) too has been brought into'existence by
5lt must be allowed that the Scriptures also, in which 
Athanasius saturated his thinking, played an important roll in 
his position on asceticism.
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the Word out of nothing" (De Incarn. Verbi Del ii2,2). Ho 
also says, "...they (created things) are made out of nothing,..." 
(Contra Gentes 3$,1). It is not that an evil god made all, or 
any part, of created existence. Athanasius further v/rites,
"...He (God) made all things " (Ibid., ko,5)* And he says,
"...He (God) made all created Existence,..."(Ibid., ]p6,6).
'This "created existence" is not an evidence of some recalci­
trant element in existence ; it is a revelation of God Himself. 
Athanasius gives this caption to the first section of Part III 
of fontra Gentes: "Creation a revelation of God; especially 
in the order and harmony pervading the whole." He also writes, 
"...lie so ordered Creation that although He is by nature in­
visible He may yet be Imovm. by His works" (Ibid., 35^2).
The Gnostics and the Docetists, whom Athanasius 
sometimes attacks directly, denied the Incarnation; they re­
jected the belief that in Christ Jesus God had become manifested 
in human flesh. They made this denial because they conceived 
of matter as inherently evil. Athanasius argued against such 
(sometimes calling them Gentiles) by beginning with a teaching 
of Greek philosophy, which was their own belief also. He 
writes,
The philosophers of the Greeks say that the uni­
verse is a great body; and rightly so. For we 
see it and its parts as objects of our senses.
If, then, the Word of God is in the Universe, 
whi ch is a body, and has united Himself with the 
whole and with all its parts, what is there sur­
prising or absurd if we say that He has united 
Himself with man also. For if it were absurd for 
Him to have been in a body at all, it would be 
absurd for Him to be united with the whole 
either, and to be giving light and movement to
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all things by His providence. For the whole also 
is a body^De Incarn., lj.1, 5 & 6).
Even although Athanasius tended--more than did 
Irenaeus--toward the Greek view of matter, as is evidenced 
by his interest in monasticisn, he nevertheless did not go 
the full distance in that direction. Matter is, for him, 
the direct creation of God. And since matter is God* s 
creation, it is not inherently evil. The incarnation of 
God the Son was thus, on Athanasius * prior belief about 
matter, a possibility.
Actuality of the Incarnation
Athanasius taught that the Incarnation, a possibility 
because of the nature of existence, became an actuality because 
of "...our sorry case "(De Incarn. Verbi Dei, L_. Trans, by 
*A Religious of C.S.M.V.S. Th.* Int. by G. S. Lewis). 'The 
doctrine of the Virgin Birth of Clirist is what makes the 
Incarnation, in its traditional connotation, an actuality. 
Athanasius taught ahis doctrine. He also taught its corollary: 
that the Incarnate One was both human and Divine.
Athanasius makes numerous references to the Virgin 
Birth. Several of these are in his Do Incarnationes Verbi 
Dei. In one instance he speaks of Christ*s having His body 
"...from a spotless and stainless virgin, knowing not a man, 
a body clean and in very truth pure from intercourse of 
men"(De Incarn. 8,3). He inquires, "Or what woman has suf­
ficed without a man for the conception of human kind? Was
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not Abel born of Adam, Enoch of Jared...? Had not each a 
father as author of his existence"(Ibid., 35  ^7)? He speaks 
of "...His body not being of a nan, but of a virgin alone;..." 
(Ibid., 37^3)* He also affirms, "For He it is that proceeded 
from a virgin and appeared as man on the earth,..."(Ibid,, 
37^3) • In another instance he asks, "For v/hich of the 
righteous men and holy prophets, and patriarchs, recorded 
in the divine Scriptures, ever had his corporeal birth of 
a Virgin only" (Ibid., 35>7)? In the same vein, sj^eaking of 
Christ’s body, he says : "...by an unparalleled miracle it 
was formed of a virgin only,... " (Ibid., 20,1[.). And he asks, 
"For what man, that ever was born, formed a body for himself 
from a virgin alone"(Ibid., kÇ,1)?
'The Virgin Birth is also taught in other writings 
of Athanasius. In the Statement of Faith he writes, "...He 
...took from the undefiled Virgin Mary our humanity (avôpw^oi^, 
..."(paragraph one). In De Deeretis we read, "...He took on 
Himnelf a body from the Virgin Mary;..."(Ch. 3^  sec. ik).
In his On the Opinion of Dionysius we have this statement: 
"...the Virgin at the consumâtion of the ages conceived, and 
the Lord has become man"(Sec. 9)* In the Four Piscour
Against the Arians there are several specific references to 
the Virgin Birth. One is when he writes, "...afterwards fo: 
us He took flesh of a Virgin, Mary Bearer of God, and was 
mado man"(III, Sec. 29)*
The conception of the Incarnate One as both human
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and Divine quite naturally follows from, belief in His birth 
from a Virgin. In the second century Irenaeus stressed 
Christ’s humanity. Gnosticism, the dominant heresy of 
that century, denied the humanity, and Irenaeus was impelled 
to make attack upon that heresy. In the fourth century it 
was Ciirist’s Divinity whi ch was under fire. Arianism, the 
principal heresy of that period, denied it, affirming that 
Christ was of like substance as is God but not of the same 
substance. For some fifty years Athanasius preached and 
wrote against Arianism and in defense of Christ’s Godhead.^ 
Tliough Irenaeus stressed one aspect of Glirist’s person, he 
taught both phases. The same was true of Athanasius.
Some passages in the writings of Athanasius may 
justly cause the student to say that he denied the true 
humanity of Christ. He writes, "...the Incarnation did not 
limit the ubiquity of the IVord,. .. "(De Incarn. title of Sec.
17). He enlarges upon this statement: "For He was not, as 
might be imagined, circuiiscribed in a body, nor, while present 
in the body, was He absent elsewhere; nor, while He moved the 
body, was the universe left void of his working and Providence; 
but, thing most marvelous. Word as He was, so far from being 
contained by anything. He rather contained all things Him­
self; ..." (Ib^. , 17,1). He further writes, "...He was not
^'he question is not labored in Athanasius’ two earliest 
works. Contra Gentes and Do Incarnationes Verbi Dei, because they 
wore written shortly before the Arlan Controversy began. The 
doctrine is, nevertheless, affirmed in these treatises.
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bound to his body,... " (Ibid., 17>1|-)* He even goes so far 
as to say, "So that not even when the Virgin bore Him did 
He suffer any change, nor:by being in the body was dulled:..." 
(Ibid., 17,5)- And he affirms, "For not even by being in 
the universe does He share in its nature, but all things, on 
the contrary, are quickened and sustained by Kim"(Ibid., 17,o )* 
In another instance he declares, "... so the Lord, when made 
man for us, and bearing a body, was no less God; He was 
not lessened by the envelopment of the body,..."(Do Decretis, 
Ch.3, Sec.ll}.). In yet another he writes, "...being Son of 
the True God, He too is faithful, and ought to be believed, 
in all He says and does, Himself remaining unalterable and 
not changed in His human Economy and fleshly presence"(Dis­
courses , II, Sec 6). And he affirms, "For the Word was not 
impaired in receiving a body, ..." (Discourses,I, Sec. Ij.2).
Other passages in his works tend to support the 
actual humanity. Some affirm that the Word actually became 
man. Athanasius speaks of "...His becoming Man,..."(De.
Incarn. 16,1].). And he reasons, "...the Pharisees... com­
plained. ..’VHiy dost Thou, being man, make Thyself God?’ In­
sensate, and verily blind of understanding! they ought contrari- 
wise to have said, ’V/hy hast Thou, being God, become man?’"
(De Decretis, Sec. 1).
Some statements declare that the Word actually took 
a body. Athanasius writes, "Whence He took, in natural
fitness, a mortal body,..."(De Incarn., 13, 9)» He speaks 
also of "...His actual body. .. " ( Ibid., Iq, 8). And lie de­
clares, "Thus the Word condescended to man’s engrossment in 
corporeal things, by even taking a body"(Ibid., title of 
Sec. l5)* In another instance he speaks of "...His bodily 
appearing;..."(Ibid., 20, 1). He asks, "Is it merely our 
saying that the Word has been made manifest in the body"
(Ibid., 1|_1, 2)? Still further he says, "...He took on Him 
flesh like ours;..."(Discourses II, Sec. 9)#
In some passages there are comprised both the idea 
that the word became man and that He took a body. He writes, 
"ifnence, naturally, willing to profit men. He sojourns here 
as man, taking to Himself a body like the others,..."(De Incarn., 
ik,8). ' He also affirms, "...the loving and general Saviour 
of all, the word of God, takes to Himself a body, and as man 
walks among men and meets the senses of men half-way,..."
(Ibid., 15,2). Directly attacking the docetists he says,
"... it was proper for these things to be predicated of Him as 
man,to show Him to have a body in truth, and not in seeming" 
(Ibid., 13,1).
Athanasius also supports the humanity by reference 
to human characteristics of the Incarnate Word. lie says,
"...the actual body which ate, was born, (poor order) and 
suffered, belonged to none other but the Lord;..."(Ibid., l8,l). 
He also writes, "For it is said of Him, as also that He 
hungered, and thirsted, and asked vdiere Lazarus lay, and 
suffered,..."(Do Decretis, Sec. ik). Yet again he
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declares, "...îie (Garist) exhibits his (not capitalized; nor 
is the previous pronoun) human character in weeping,..."(On 
the Opinion of Dionysius, Sec. 9). Still again he writes, 
"...and it became the Lord, in putting on human flesh, to 
put it on whole with the affections proper to it;..."(Dis­
courses III, 32).
Passages which appear to deny the true humanity of 
the Incarnate herd have been given, and statements affirming 
the humanity have been set forth. A case could certainly 
be made for Athanasius’ inconsistency on this question, and 
it might be argued that he definitely rejected the true hu­
manity of the Word; but in view of his many statements in 
Y/hich the humanity is affirmed, one might say with at least 
a degree of basis for it, that Athanasius taught the humanity 
of the Word. One would not say, however, that ho went as far 
in this emphasis as did Irenaeus; and one v/ould not say that 
he conceived of Christ as human to the degree to which most 
Christian theologians have taught that doctrine.
Theologians have often gone to an extreme in their 
zeal to set forth one certain aspect of Cliristian Truth. Tb.is 
was probably the case as relates to Athanasius’ emphasis upon 
the Divinity of the Word. In most of his writings his chief 
purpose, in view of the Arian denial of the Divinity, v/as to 
support that aspect of the Incarnate Word. 'Therefore, if he 
emphasized the Divinity to the slighting of the true humanity.
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lie should at least be studied, from our vantage-point, with 
understanding if not with complete acquittal.
That Athanasius taught the Divinity of the Word is 
not a debatable point. In his v/ritings there are many af­
firmations of that doctrine. He speaks of "Christ’s own 
Godhe ad."(Do Inc arn., 1, 2). He also writes of the "divinity 
of the Word of the Father"(Ibid., 1, 1). At least two refer­
ences are made to the "...divinity of the Saviour,..."(Ibid.,
52, q;and 53, 1)* He alludes to "...that sacred manhood, Wlioso 
deity all nature confessed,..."(Ibid., title of Sec. 19)* He 
affirms, "...Christ on the Cross was God,..."(Ibid., 19, 3)*
He again calls Christ God when he writes, "But as it is, what 
irreligious men believe not, the spirits see--that He is God,—  
and hence they fly and fall at His feet, saying just what they 
uttered when He was in the body;..."(Ibid., 32, 5)* In this 
same vein he also asserts, "...and Christ alone has been recog­
nised among men as the true God, the word of God"(Ibid., k?, 3)* 
At least three times he speaks of "...God the W o r d , Ibid., 
I|-9, 6; 55,2; and 55, 6, respectively). Again he calls Him 
God when he declares, "...He was God the Son of God;..."(Do 
Decretis, Sec. 1). fo the probable enragement of the remain­
ing Gnostics, he said, "He descended in body, and He rose again 
because He v;as God Himself in the body" (Discourses I, [|1|_). And, 
he also said, "...He who was in the body was God,. .. " ( Ibid., II, 
lo). Athanasius said that he himself confessed "...Him Lord 
and God,..."(De Decretis, Sec. 11).
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Affimations and declarations, however, are not 
enough. Support must be given then. There are many instances 
in which Athanasius gives support to his affirmations* He 
does this in tliree principal ways: by mention of the Virgin 
Birth, by reference to the pre-existence of the Word and by 
pointing to the works wliich the Incarnate Word wrought.
At least two passages give proof for the Divinity 
from the Virgin Birth. One is when Athanasius writes, "...He 
fashioned His body for Himself from a "Virgin, thus to .afford 
to all no small proof of His Godhead,..."(De Incarn., l3, 5)«
The other is vfhon he says, "For who, seeing a body proceeding 
forth from a Virgin alone without a man, can fail to infer that 
He TAio appears in it is Maker and Lord of other bodies also" 
(Ibid., lo, 5)?
Several passages support the Divinity from the 
pre-existence of the Word. He writes, "...even before He 
became man He was worshiped,..."(Discourses, I, q2). He also 
asserts, "He was not from a lower state promoted; but rather, 
existing as God, He took the form of a servant,..."(Ibid., I, 
IlO). Of Clirist he declares, "...He exists eternally" ( Ibid.,
I, ll]_). He also speaks of "...the everlasting co-existence 
of the Word with the Father,..."(De Decretis, Sec. 27). And 
he also reasons, "It is plain then from the above that the 
Scriptures declare the Son’s eternity;..."(Discourses, I, 13). 
All these passages teach that the Word existed before the manger 
scene at Bethlehem; they thereby support the Divinity of the
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Word,
Athanasius’ principal method, hoc/ever, of supporting 
the Divinity of the Incarnate Word is by calling attention to 
the works nought by him. He writes, "...lie who can do these 
(works) is not man, but the Power and Word of God"(Do Incarn., 
l3, 3)* ho also speaks of "...the proofs of the Godhead from 
His works,..."(Ibid., 20, 2). He even declares, "...His works 
proved Him God,..."(De Dacretis, Sec. 1),
Importance of the Incarnation--In 
H elation to the Death of Clarist
Athanasius gives a somewhat greater significance than 
does Irenaeus to the Death of Christ, but it is still the In­
carnation which is of paramount importance.
Tiiere are numerous passages in his writings vhlch
give a very great import to the Death. In one place he even
calls it the sum of the Cliristian faith. He v/rites, "But the 
next step must be to recount and speak of the end of Eis bodily 
life and course, and of the nature of the death of the body; 
es ce daily as this is the sum of our faith,... " ( Ibid., 19, 3)*
Ihore are at least two passages which state that it 
is the Death whi ch ransoms men. He writes, "...He died a 
ransom to all,..."(De Incarn., 21, 7). He also declares, 
"...the Lord’s death is the ransom of all,..."(Ibid., 25, 3)*
Sometimes Athanasius says it is the Death v/hich is 
the instrument of salvation. He affirms, "...-it may justly be
argued that in no oGwer way than by the Cross was it right for
the salvation of all to take place"(Ibid., 2o, 1). He also
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says, "•••they (the Scriptures) feared not to mention even the 
causes of His death,--that He suffers it not for Eis ov/n sake, 
but for the immortality and salvation of all,..."(Ibid., 3k, 1). 
Eo asks, "But which of the holy prophets or of the early patri­
archs has died on the Cross for the salvation of all"(Ibid.,
3o, Ij.)? Again he inquires, "Or who among those recorded in 
Scripture v/as /Jierced in the hands and feet, or hung at all 
upon a tree, and v/as sacrificed upon a cross for the salvation 
of all"(Ibid., 37, 1)? He affirms, "He is the Life of all, 
and lie it is that as a sheep yielded His body to death as a 
substitute, for the salvation of all,..."(Ibid., 37, 70*
There are some instances in which the Death of Christ 
is considered the instrument of the destruction of death as 
it relates to men. He writes, "So death came to Eis body, 
not from Himself, but from hostile counsels, in order that 
whatever death they offered to the Saviour, this he might 
utterly do away"(Ibid., 2q,2). He also declares, "He ac­
cepted the Cross, and endured, a death inflicted by others, 
and above all by His enemies, whi ch they thought dreadful 
and ignominious and not to be faced, so that this also being 
destroyed, both He Himself might be believed to be the Life, 
and the power of death be brought to nought" (Ibid., 2!l,3)«
He further states, "...the death, which they thought to in­
flict as a disgrace, was actually a monument of victory against 
death itself" ( Ibid., 2l|., k). Yet further he declares, "... it
_LUU
was not from any natural weakness of thoWord that dwelt In 
it that the body had died, but in order that in it death might 
be done av/ay by the power of the Saviour" (Ibid., 2o, 6).
At least two passages give the Death a greater sig­
nificance than the Incarnation because they make the Incar­
nation merely a prerequisite for the Death. He asks, "why, 
then, did He not prevent death, as He did siclmess? Because 
it v/as for this that He had a body,... " (Ibid., 21, 7). He 
also asserts, "...the V/ord was made flesh in order to offer 
up His body for us all,... "(De Decretis, Sec. ll|_).
One stabernent teaches that the Incarnation was merely 
for the purpose of making the Word "visible", and that it is 
the Death which is of actual merit to us. He writes, "How 
for this cause, also. He did not immediately upon His coming 
accomplish His sacrifice on behalf of all, by offering His 
body and raising it again, for by this means He would have 
made Himself invisible " ( De Incarn., l6, I}.).
Although there are numerous passages in Athanasius 
which give a very great significance to the death of Christ, 
his v/ritings as a v/hole give a far greater importance to the 
Incarnation. The question then arises, "Why, if this be the 
case, can one find the above-quoted passages, and more as 
well?" One can find such passages for at least three reasons. 
One is because Athanasius was probably not always consistent. 
He "...v/as not a systematic theologian:..."(Hobertson, St. 
Athanasius, p. l:fe). That is, he did not set out to give the
Gloristian doctrines in all their inter-relatedness. He v/rote 
in order to meet the practical doctrinal needs of his day, and 
not in order to systematize doctrines. For this reason, even 
in the same treatise, he sometimes makes contradictory state­
ments about the death of Christ and the Incarnation.
Another possible reason for conflicting statements 
about the Death and the Incarnation is a change of view. It 
may be noted that, with the exception of one passage, all the 
above quotations about the significance of the Death of Christ 
are from the De Incarnatione Verbi Dei. There is a conspicuous 
absence of such an emphasis in the other writings. Since this 
work was written in his youth, may we not allow for a change 
of view on his part?
A third possible reason for the conflicting passages 
is a mere change of emphasis. The work in which most of the 
stress upon the Death is found was written lust prior to the 
outbreak of the Arian heresy. In Athanasius’ subsequent 
writings his concern, above all other concerns, is to defend 
the Divinity of Cl'irist. Tnis naturally calls for concentration 
upon the Person of Christ rather than upon His Death. In this 
case, Athanasius might have always believed in the significance 
of the Death of Christ as expressed in his early treatise, but 
was later bent upon another emphasis.
Before proceeding to a detailed treatment of the
results of the Incarnation, in which the importance of the
Incarnate Life will be seen in positive unfolding, three 
passages will be given which show the Incarnation to be more
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important than the Death. Athanasius writes, "For the Lord 
died in those days, that we should no longer do the deeds of 
death. Ho gave His life, that we might preserve our own from 
the snares of the devil. And, what is most wonderful, the 
V/ord became flesh, that we should no longer live in the flesh 
but in the snirit should v/orship God, v;ho is Spirit"(Letters 
of Athanasius, VI, "Easter Letter for 33.q_, " Par. 1). Here, 
after speaking of the Death, he says: "And, what is most 
wonderful, the Word became flesh,..."(Ibid., Par. 1).
The Incarnate Life is implied as of more importance 
than the Death when he writes, "In which humanity He v/as cruci­
fied and died for us, and rose from the dead, and was taken up 
into the heavens, having been created as the beginning of ways 
for us (Prov. 3:22), when on earth He showed us light from out 
of darkness, salvation from error, life from the dead, an entrance 
to paradise, from which Adam was cast out,..."(Statement of Faith, 
par. 1). Hot only does this passage mention that it was in 
"humanity" that Clarist died; the significant matter is that 
immediately following mention of the Death he says "when on earth 
he showed us" light and salvation and life,
Archibald Robertson says this of the importance of 
the Incarnation in the wa^itings of Athanasius: "Accordingly 
the mere presence of the Word in a human body, the mere fact 
of the Incarnation, is the essential factor in our restoration" 
(Robertson, in Introduction to volume on Athanasius, Op. Cit.*,
P . l:oc ).
Results of the Incarnation
There are six principal results of the Inca.rnation, 
according to Athanasius. They are re-creation, redemption 
from ignorance, man’s deliverance from sin and his salvation, 
the defeat of death and the bestowal of immortality, man’s 
deification, and the redemption of nature.
1. He-creation:-Irenaeus’ most distinctive teaching 
was comprised in what he called the recapitulation. Athanasius, 
prefering such terms as re-creation or renewal, teaches a 
somewhat similar idea, but with him the emphasis is rather in­
cidental and the implications of the idea are less far-reaching. 
He conceived that man, created by God, had fallen from his first 
estate, and that through the Incarnation of the Word he is 
re-created or renev/ed. He writes, "For in the first creation, 
men had become unfaithful, and through then that first creation 
had been lost; and there was need of someone else to renew the 
first creation, and preserve the new which had come to be"
(Discourses, II, 6p). He also writes, "Hence the Word must 
come,... to recreate ..."(De Incarn., title of Sec. 13). Again, 
"Whence the Word of God came in His own person, that, as He was 
the Image of the Father, He might be able to create afresh the 
man after the image"(Ibid., 13; 7). And he continues, "...that 
...men made after His Image might once more be renewed" ( Ibid., 
13; 9). To this he adds, "...the most holy Son of the Father, 
being the Image of the Father, came to our region to renew
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man..."(Ibid., ik, 2). He also writes, "...none other could 
create anew the likeness of God’s image for men, save the 
Image of the Father;..."(Ibid., 20,1).
Most passages include only man in the re-creation 
or renewal. A few, however, extend it to "all thingsU.'
In one instance he writes, "...just as all things were made 
by Him, so in Him all things might be renewsd"(On Luke X :22, 
(Matt. XI;27)j Sec. 2). In another he says, "For example, 
at the time of the creation of all things, their creation 
consisted in a fiat, such as ’let (the earth) bring forth,*
’let there be’ (Genesis 1:3, 11); but at the restoration 
it was fitting that all things should be ’delivered’ to 
Him, in order that He might be made man, and all things be 
renewed in Him" ( Ibid., Sec. 2). It miglit be noted that 
these passages which extend the renewal to "all things" are 
in a later work. This could be construed as proof of a 
development in his concept of re-creation or renewal.
2. Redemption from Ignorance:-A second result of the 
Incarnation is man’s redemption from ignorance. Socrates 
had held that to Icnow the right is tantamount to doing it. 
Other Greek thinkers had followed this view. Athanasius was 
probably influenced by this type of thought, and not alto­
gether by the Scriptures, v/hich teach that although man 
loiows the right he will not always do it (Romans 7). He 
considered that no small reason for man’s plight was his
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ignorance, and he taught that the Incarnate word enlightened 
man. He writes, "All man’s superstitions He met half-way;..." 
(De Incarn., title of Sec. l5). He says that Christ became 
incarnate that we might "...through Him recognize the Father" 
(Ibid., l5; 2). He also writes, "...He manifested Himself by 
a body that v/e might receive the idea of the unseen Father; ... " 
(Ibid., 5k, 3). Again he declares, "It must be plain...that 
Christ is come and that He has illuminated absolutely all with 
his light, and given then the true and divine teaching concern­
ing the Father U ('Ibid., [}.0, 7). He further asserts, "...all 
parts of the world in every direction are illumined by His 
teaching"(Ibid., 55; 3). Yet further he declares, "Man, 
unmoved by nature, was to be taught to Imow God by that sa­
cred Manhood,..."(Ibid., title of Sec. 19). Still further he 
states, "...the word of God appeared to us in a body, and made 
known to us His own Father,..♦"(Ibid., 55; 5)* Ho also says 
that Christ came that men "...might at any rate from the works 
of His body recover their sight, and through Him receive an 
idea of the knowledge of the Father,..."(Ibid., 19; !)• Yet 
one more statement might be quoted; he writes, "...by the so­
journ of the Saviour among men all nations also on every side 
began to know God;..."(Ibid., 35; 6).
One reason why the Incarnation, in the thought of 
Athanasius, is more important than the death is precisely 
because no small reason for man’s plight is his ignorance; and, 
as these passages reveal, it is the Incarnate Life ratjhor than 
the Death, which dispells ignorance.
3. î.lan’s Deliverance from Sin, and his Salvation;-A 
third result of the Incarnation has both a negative and a 
positive aspect. It is man’s deliverance from sin and his 
salvation. Several passages teach that it is by the Incar­
nation that men are delivered from sin. Athanasius writes, 
"...Flesh was taken by the V/ord to...make redemption for 
sins >..."(Letters of Athanasius, LX, "Ad Ad3Iphium," Par. 5)*
He further writes, "He came among us from Eary once at the end 
of the ages for the abolition of sin..."(Discourses, III, 31)* 
In another instance he declares, "But once for all ’at the 
consumation of the ages, to put away sin’, ’the Word was made 
flesh’ and proceeded forth from Mary the Virgin,..."(Letters 
of Athanasius, LXI, "Ad Maximum," Par. 2).
Still more emphasis is given to the teaching that 
the Incarnation issues in man’s salvation. Athanasius declares, 
"...He has yet of the lovingkindness and goodness of His own 
Father been manifested to us in a human body for our salvation" 
(De Incarn., 1, 3)* He also asserts, "...for our salvation He 
dealt so lovingly as to appear and be born even in a human 
body" (Ibid., 3)« He further says of Clirist, ". . . who in
ages later took a body for the salvation of all,..."(Ibid.,
32, 6). Again he writes, "... so we also having our bodies 
homogeneous with the Lord’s body, receive of His fulness (John 
l:l6), and have that body as our root for our resurrection aid 
our salvauion"(De Sententia Dionysii, Sec. 10). He further 
asserts, "For when ’the Word became flesh and dwelt among us’
and came to minister and to grant salvation to all, then 
lie became to all salvation, and became life, and became 
propitiation;..."(Discourses, I, 6I[.) • In another instance 
he declares, "For even for our sakes the Word came do\rn, 
and being incorruptible, put on a orruptible body for the 
salvation of all of us."(Le11ers of Athanasius, VI, "Easter 
Letter of 33LU, Sec. !;.) • To all of these may be added two 
very brief, and similar statements: He says, "...He has become 
also man for our s a l v a t i o n . Letters of Athanasius, LX, "Ad 
Adelphium", Par. 8). And he writes, "...He became man in the 
body for our salvation,..."(Letters of Athanasius, LXI, "Ad 
Maximum", Par. 3).
. Defeat of Death and Bestowal of Immortality : - A 
fourth important result of the Incarnation is the defeat of 
death and the bestowal of iimnortality. Tliey, too, are nega­
tive and positive aspects of what is actually one accomplish­
ment of Go d ^ s bee oming man.
Several passages teach that the Incarnation of the 
Word defeats death. Athanasius writes, "...He took pity on 
our race, and had mercy on our infirmity, and condescended to 
our corruption, and, unable to bear that death should have the 
mastery--lest the creature should perish, and His Father * s 
handiwork in men be spent for nought--He takes unto Himself 
a body, and that of no different sort from ours"(De Incarn.,
3, 2). He also declares, "And so it was that two marvels 
came to pass at once, that the death of all was accomplished
in the Lord^s body, and that death and corruption were Ydiolly 
done away by reason of the Word that was united with it" (Ibid., 
20, 5)* Wnere is no Death emphasis in these passages; it is 
solely the Incarnation which defeats man^s death. Two other 
passages make this doctrine evident: He asserts, "And then, 
from Adam unto Hoses death reigned; but the presence of the 
Word abolished death. And no longer in Adam are we all dying; 
but in Christ we are all reviving"(Discourses I, 59)* He also 
declares, "And they vjho divid.e the Word from the Flesh do not 
hold that one redemption from sin has taken place, or one 
destruction of death"(Letters of Athanasius, LX, "Ad Adelphium," 
Par. 5)*
Hie positive aspect of this same teaching is that the 
Incarnation bestows immortality. He writes, "Whence also, 
whereas the flesh is born of Hary Bearer of God, He Himself 
is said to have been born, who furnishes to others an origin 
of being; in order that He may transfer our origin into 
Himself, and we may no longer, as mere earth, return to earth, 
but as being knit into the Word from heaven, may be carried to 
heaven by Him"(Discour ses III, 33). In this same work and in 
this vein he also says, "For it beseemed, that the flesh, cor­
ruptible as it was, should no longer after its own nature re­
main mortal, but because of the Word who had put it on, should 
abide incorruptible. For as He, having come in our body, was 
conformed to our condition, so we, receiving Him, partake of 
the immortality that is from Him"(Ibid., Ill, p7)• He further
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declares, "...the Word is become Flesh, not by reason of an 
addition to the Godhead, but in order that the flesh may 
rise again"(Letters of Athanasius, LIX, "Ad Enicetum", Par. 9). 
Yet further he asserts, "Seeing then that Flesh ivas taken by 
the Word to deliver all men, raise all from the dead,..."(Ibid., 
LX, "A d A deIphium", Par. 5)« Still further he says that the 
Word "...took a body for the salvation of all, and taught the 
world concerning the Father, and brought death to nought, and 
bestowed incorruption upon all by the promise of the Resurrec­
tion, ..." (De_Incarn. , 32, 6). Also, he declares, "For this 
cause the Saviour reasonably put on Him a body, in order that 
the body, becoming wound closely to the Life, should no longer, 
as mortal, abide in death, but, as having put on immortality, 
should thenceforth rise again and remain immortal" (Ibid., Mi.,
6).
An important corollary of this doctrine that the 
Incarnation bestows immortality is that man is not naturally 
immortal. Athanasius took this position, as did Ireneus and 
some of the other early Fathers.
It should be noted that Athanasius is not always clear 
as relates to what he means by this bestowal of immortality. 
Sometimes it appears that it is only a gift of future life to 
the body. Hiat may be noted in some of the passages above.
It is given direct support in his apologetic work. Contra 
Gantes, when he writes; "For if our argument has proved it 
(the soul) to be distinct from the body, while the body is
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by nature mortal, it follov/s that the soul is immortal, 
because it is not like the body"(33, 1). Hero it is implied 
that the soul is by nature immortal and that it is only the 
body which is mortal. In this case, since Athanasius thought 
the immortality of the body to be an important matter, the 
Incarnation could have been only a bestowal of continual 
existence upon it--rather than upon the soul. The implica­
tion, however, in Athanasius* general trend of thought is 
that if the body is not made to rise from the dead then we 
vfill have no existence after the death of the body. Most of 
the quotations given in this study are of that implication. 
Aside from a few passages like the one quoted immediately 
above, from Contra Gentes, Athanasius does not appear able 
to conceive of the future existence of the soul or spirit 
apart from the future existence of the body.
5* Man * s Deification;-The fifth principal result of 
the Incarnation is man * s deification. Athanasius gives 
greater emphasis than does Irenaeus to this accomplishment 
of the Incarnation. Some passages might be given in order 
to show that he does teach a "d.eification" resulting from 
the Incarnation. Ee writes, "...and that He might hallow and 
deify them (men), the Word became flesh..."(Discourses, III, 
39)* And he explains, "'Therefore He 'was not man, and then 
became God, but He was God, and then became man, and that to 
deify us" (Ibid., I, 39)* He asks, "And hoiv can there be 
deifying apart from the Word and before Him" ( Ibid., I, 39)? 
And he assorts, "...for as the Lord, putting on the body.
became man, so we men are deified by the Word... " ( Ibid.,
III, 31+).
The deification is usually said to be accomplished 
solely by the Word*s taking on a body and becoming man. That 
is the implication in the above quotations. It is also the 
implication in other passages vjhich will be quoted later in 
another setting. Sometimes, hov/ever, it appears that it 
is the mighty "works" of the Word, while in a body, which 
deify man. For example, he writes : "...for if the works of 
the Word*s Godhead had not taken place through the body, 
man had not been deified;..."(Discourses, III, 33)*
Several passages might be quoted in order to reveal 
what Athanasius meant by mo.n*s deification. In at least one 
statement he seems to intend a very extreme meaning. He 
writes, "For He was made man that we might be made God;..." 
(De Incarn., 3)* He probably did not actually mean this,
however, because he is not generally this extreme in his view 
of deification* In another v/ork, for example, ho cautions: 
"Ho one, for instance, shall compare God with man,..."(Dis­
courses, I, 57)* Another statement^ whi ch is contained in yet 
a different work, implies that the deification consists 
merely in man’s "partaking of His Spirit": he declares, 
"...the herd was made flesh in order to offer up this body to 
for all, and that we, partaking of His Spirit, might be 
deified, a gift which we could not otherwise have gained
than by His clothing Himself with our created body,..."
(De Decretis, Sec. lip). After making the above statement 
he clarifies his teaching about deification, lest anyone 
think he means by it that man loses human "substance": he 
writes, "But as we, by receiving the Spirit, do not lose 
our own proper substance, so the Lord, v/hen made nan for 
us, and bearing a body, was no less God;. . . " ( Ibid., Sec. lit). 
The implication, however, because of the analogy which he 
uses, is that man does pass into the nature of God, just as 
the Word passed into our nature.
Athanasius, therefore, teaches an extreme view of 
deification, when he says that by the Incarnation man becomes 
God; but he makes other statements, as we have found, which 
temper this viewu He also gives other positive, but less 
extreme, meanings to the idea of deification. One is that 
man thereby becomes "a god". He v/rites, "...all that are 
called, sons and gods, whether in earth or in heaven, were 
adopted and deified through the Lord,..."(Discourses, I, 39)*
Yet another meaning is that man thereby becomes a 
son of the Father. He asserts, "...He Himself has made 
us sons of the Father, and deified men by becoming Himself 
man"(Ibid., I, 33).
Still another meaning is that men tiiereby become a 
holy race and "partakers of the Divine ITature". He writes, 
"And if God sent His Son brought forth from a woman, the 
fact causes us no shame but contrariwise glory and great 
grace. For He has became 1.1 an, that He might deify us in
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Himself, and He Has been born of a woman, and begotten of a 
Virgin, in order to transfer to Himself our erring generation, 
and that we may become henceforth a holy race, and ’partakers 
of the Divine Hature,’ as blessed Peter wrote"(Letters of 
Athanasius, LX, "A d A de Inhium ", ii.).
A further meaning is that man is given a higher 
type of body. He writes, "He deified that which He put on, 
and more than that, ’gave’ it graciously to the race of 
man " ( Di s c our ses. I, Il2). By the deification of the body he 
seems to mean the body’s immortality, for he declares in 
another work: "...for He was not lessened by the envelopment 
of the body, but rather deified it and rendered it immortal"
(De Decretis, Sec. lip).
6. Ho demotion of Hature :-Tn.e sixbh principal result 
of the Incarnation is the redemption of nature. In one 
instance Athanasius teaches that nature, or creation, did 
not become severed from God, as did man, and that therefore 
it did not need any redempb ion. He writes, "Now, nothing 
in creation had gone astray with regard to their notions 
of God, save man only. Vhy, neither sun, nor moon, nor 
heaven, nor the stars, nor water, nor air had severed from 
their order; but iwnowing their Artificer and Sovereign, and 
Word they remained as they were made. But men alone, having 
rejected what was good, then devised things of nought instead 
of the truth,..."(De Incarn., Ij_3, 3)* Tiiis passage is somevh at 
contradictory to many others in Athanasius’ v/ritings. He
usually assumes that nature had become severed from its 
1,1aker and that it, as well as man, needed redemption. This 
is the direct implication of the many passages whi ch will 
now be quoted in support of the above statement that the 
Incarnation redeems nature.
Han’s flesh is redeemed by the Incarnation of the 
Word. He writes, "...in the Christ we are all quickened; 
the flesh being no longer earthly, but being henceforth 
made Word, by reason of God’s Word who for our sake ’became 
flesh’"(Discourses, III, 33)* Ho also says that the Incar­
nation exalts man’s flesh. He declares, "But we worship the 
Lord of Creation, Incarnate, the Word of God. For if the 
flesh also is in itself a part of the created world, yet it 
has become God’s body"(Letters of Athanasius, LX, "Ad Adelphium", 
3,). He further writes, "...that the Word Himself might be 
made Flesh, and by taking the flesh, restore it wholly"(On 
Luke X;22, Sec. 2).
The "body", which seems to be somewhat more inclusive 
than the "flesh", is also redeemed by the Incarnation. He 
writes, "...He quickened and cleansed the body..."(De Incarn.,
17, 7 ) * He also says that Clirist "...Himself sanctified even 
the body" ( Ibid., I|.3> 6). He further declares, "...He modified 
man’s whole nature and restored the body v;holeT(Ibid., lp9> 2).
Yet further, he writes : "For on the contrary, a great addition 
has accrued to the human Body itself from the fellowship and 
union of the Word with it"(Letters of Athanasius, LX, "Ad
Bplcetuiu", Par. 9)*
There is, in Athanasius ’ vrritings, a recurrent teach­
ing that the Incarnation redeems nature in an inclusive way. 
he writes, "...all things are moved by Him, and in Kim are 
quickened:..."(De Incarn., 1, 1). He also declares, "...even 
while present in a human body and Himself quickening it. He 
was, without inconsistency, quickening ohe universe as well, 
and was in every process of nature,..."(Ibid., 17, 2). He 
further asserts, "For the Lord touched all parts of creation, 
and freed and undeceived all of them from every illusion;..." 
(Ibid., 5)« Yet again, he writes: "Since then all things
’were delivered’ to Him, and He is made Man, straightway all 
things v/ere set right and perfected. Earth receives blessing 
instead of a curse,..."(On Luke X :20, Sec. 2). Yet another 
instance in wuich he teaches this is when he writes, "For 
the coming of the Saviour in the flesh has been the ransom 
and salvation of all creation"(Ibid., Sec. 6). Yet one 
other instance might be mentioned. He writes, "Hor, 
because the Son that was in the form of God took upon Him the 
form of a servant was He deprived of His Godh.ead. On the 
contrary. He thus became the Deliverer of all flesh and of 
all creation"(Letters of Athanasius, LX, "Ad Adelphium",
Par. k).
The Incarnate Word was and is Lord over this nature 
which He redeems. Athanasius writes, "ITature, man, demons, 
or the dead. He showed Himself Lord of all these" (De Incarn.,
title of Sec. 15)* iie also affirms, "He went upon the sea 
also as its Master, and walked as on dry land, to afford
evidence to them that saw it of His Lordship over all things"
(Ibid., 19, 6). He says that the Word "...orders all. things"
(Ibid., 20, 1). He also speaks of "...His power over the
universe " ( Ibid., p3. Ip). (Christ is now lord over creation, 
for he writes: "...He none the less has all creation under 
foot, and bending their knees to Him..."(Discourses, I, lp2).
Athanasius so emphasises the redemption of nature-- 
through the Incarnation^-that Archibald Robertson can say,
"So far as he (Athanasius) v/orks the problem (of redempb ion) 
out in detail it is under physical categories"(A. Robertson, 
"Introduction", Op. Cit., p. l:oc.).
CHAPTER VII
MODERN INCARN.fZONAL EMPHASIS: 
SERGIUS BULGAKOV AND L. S. THORNTON
After the death of Athanasius (A.D. 373)^ Western 
Christian thought came more and more into ascendency over 
that of the East. The influence of Irenaeus and Athanasius 
consequently waned, and that of Augustine (A.D. 35)4--k30), 
who stressed the death of Christ rather than the Incarnation, 
began to supplant it.
The East and the West continued to drift apart, until 
they came to actual schism in A.D. lOSlp*^ Soon after that 
total break Anselm of Bee (A.D. 1033-1109) wrote his Cur 
Deus-Homo, in whi ch he followed the Western tradition of 
emphasizing the death of Christ. For eight hundred years 
that book has been of such influence on Western Christian 
theologians that but few of them have sought their bases 
in the opposing interpretation, that of Irenaeus and--in a 
less extreme’form— Athanasius. In the Eastern churches, 
however, these early Greek theologians have held their own
' decent investigations, and their consequent re-inter-
pretations, support a somewhat later date for the break. See 
George Every’s "East and West in the Twelfth Century", 
Sobornost’, December, 19M l, pp. 23-2o.
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through the centuries.
At the present time the Eastern churches are coming
into closer fellowship with those of the West. Walter
Marshall Horton writes, "One of the notable events of our time
is the dissolution of the ancient barrier betv/een the Orthodox
churches of Eastern Europe and the Catholic and Protestant
churches of Western Europe"(Horton, Contemporary Continental
Theology, p. 1). He also says, "For the first time since
their separation in the early Middle Ages, Oriental and
Occidental Christianity are now clearly aware of one another,
and engaged in conversation"(Ibid., p. 2). There is "awareness"
and "conversation" betv/een all three of the principal branches
of Christendom, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant.
This is evidenced by the fact that all three branches sometimes
come together in unofficial meetings. An example of this is
the Franco-Russian Conference which v/as held for a number of
years, commencing in 1932. Unofficial delegates from all
three Christian branches met for the reading of papers and
for discussions. In 1933 Dr. Nicholas Zernov wrote.
On Ap^il 30th I went to the Franco-Russian Conference 
at Bilvre. It is one of the unexpected results of 
the Russian exile that the Russians have helped the 
French Roman Catholics and Protestants to meet each 
other^.•.. There were about thirty-five members 
present, and these were equally divided between the
^In 1951, at Marburg, Professor L. A 7 Zander', of the 
Orthodox Institute in Paris, started a German-Russian Fellowship 
('This was stated in a personal letter to the writer from Dr. 
Nicholas Zernov, 26 February, 1952.)
Russian Orthodox, French Roman Catholics and French 
Protestants"(N. Zernov, "From the Secretary’s Diary", 
Sobornost ’, June, 1933, p. Ii3)*
His reaction to this conference, based also upon his
attendance at one or more of the early ones, is as follows :
These conferences, unofficial as they are, served 
(should be "serve") a great cause, for they bring 
together those people who otherwise have little 
chance of meeting one another. They are intensely 
theological and very outspoken, and therefore they 
really help those v/ho take part in them to under­
stand the others’ point of view and to appreciate 
the sincerety of their convictions, and this to 
realise that fundamental unity still exists among 
Christians in spite of the divergency of its 
interpretation(ibid., p. Itli).
But this closer fellowship between Fast and West is 
particularly between the Eastern or Orthodox churches and the 
Protestant West* There are several evidences of a growing 
fellowship between these branches of Christendom. One is 
the existence, since the late 1920’s, of a very active and 
influential, unofficial organization, knovm as The Fellowship of 
St. Alban and St. Sergius, whose widely distributed magazine 
Sobornost’, is, in its name (meaning "Catholicity" or, more 
precisely, "all-together-ness") suggestive of the organization’s 
objective. That objective is stated in paragraph three of the 
Fellov/ship’s constitution: "The Fellowship prays for reunion, 
and to the same end has as its. object the promotion of mutual 
understanding by the members of the Anglican Cormiunion and of 
the Eastern Orthodox Church, as well as those of other Churches" 
(Sobornost’, September, 1939f P* 33).
Another evidence of the growing fellowship betv/een 
Orthodox and Protestant is the fact that several national 
branches of Orthodoxy were officially represented at the 
Amsterdam meeting of the World Council of Churches in lalpTf 
one of its delegates becoming one of the five presidents 
of the Council.
A third evidence is the fact that Eastern theologians, 
in a wide sphere, through their translated writings, have been 
exerting a considerable influence upon Protestant thought.
‘This influence has come, chiefly, through the Russian exiles 
in Paris, most of whom have been connected with the Orthodox 
Theological Institute in that city. One of the most prominent 
of these theologians is the late^ Father Sergius Bulgakov, 
who had been, as a Marxist^^ prior to his taking Christianity 
seriously and his consequent voluntary exile. Professor of Eco­
nomics at Moscow University, and who for many years was Pro­
fessor of Theology at the Paris Institute.
The Eastern churches, now in this more intimate
3""Father Sergius Bulgakov died on the 13th July, Î9W7 
at the age of 73”(By A.F.D.B., "In quos fines saeculorum" 
(Sobornost ’ , December, l^ Wj., p. bjl
kin conversation with the v/riter, on December 31^ 19515 
Professor L. A. Zander, disciple and student of Bulgakov, said 
that as a young man Mr. Bulgakov wrote, for a University, a 
two-volume work on Marxian economics and, because he let the 
truth lead him, completely undermined Marxism. Professor 
Zander added, incidentally, that because of the conclusions 
an M.A. degree only v/as conferred, whereas the custom was, 
when^tv/o volumes were written, to confer a doctorate.
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relationship to the Protestant West, are calling it to a 
re-thinking of the import of Irenaeus and Athanasius; that 
is, to a reconsideration of the theological importance of 
the doctrine of the Incarnation. But not only are Eastern 
theologians fulfilling this function today; many theologians 
within Protestantism are also. Eminent among them are certain 
Anglo-Catholic^theologians of the Church of England, and 
outstanding in this school is Father L. S. Thornton, formerly 
of the Community of the Resurrection, near Leeds, and now re­
siding in London.
The remainder of this chapter will consist of a study 
of the incarnational emphasis in the Russian Orthodox and 
Anglo-Catholic schools of thought, as those schools are rep­
resented respectively by Sergius Bulgakov and L. S. Thornton.
Sergius Bulgakov
Father Bulgakov is a traditionalist;^ he believes 
that the content of the truth resides in the past teachings 
of the church— the Orthodox Church. Consequently, he has 
high regard for the Scriptures, the councils, the early 
fathers, and all v/ho have had a part both in formulating
%istorically, they may be grouped with Protestantism; 
many of them, however, owing to their doctrines and their prac­
tices, wpuld prefer a separate grouping fdr :themselves.
^He writes, "And each member of the Church, instead of 
placing himself outside the history of the Church, accepts the 
doctrine of the Church, expressed and fixed during all the time 
of its history"(The Orthodox Church, p. I9).
This is the only church, for he writes: "Just as there
130
the dogmas of the Church and in setting forth the doctrines--the 
theologoumena--which elucidate and apply them. And he tends to 
treat this tradition, for which he has such high regard, as an 
organism.® That is, he thinks of it in its wholeness rather 
than in its coponent elements; and he conceives of it as having 
been shaped by innumerable divinely-led men, and not by a cer­
tain one or a certain f e w .9 For this reason he does not single 
out a certain concept v/ithin the tradition, as that of recapit­
ulation,^^ in order to give it detailed elucidation. Nor does 
he focus attention upon such Eastern stalwarts as Irenaeus 
and Athanasius in order to give them special praise or in 
order to make his system a mere re-statement of theirs.
But even although Bulgakov is a traditionalist, he
cannot exist several Truths %although the Truth may 
have many aspects), so there cannot be many ’Churches.' There 
is only one true Church, the Orthodox Church." (The Orthodox 
Church, p. lOk)
^He calls tradition"... a living organism" (The Orthodox 
Church, p. 20). (The context of this phrase shows that it is 
used here expressly as over against something dead, but a 
secondary meaning of the phrase as it is here employed is 
"wholeness".)
9îîe declares, "The fullness of the true faith, the 
true doctrine, is much too vast to be held in the consciousness 
of an isolated member of the Church; it is guarded by the whole 
CLiurch and transmitted from generation to generation, as the 
tradition of the Church" (The Orthodox Church, p. 19)*
IDrjhis writer recalls only one instance of the use of 
"recapitulation" in the English translations of his works. It 
occurs when he affirms, "But the whole of this history is re­
capitulated in the genealogy of Christ our Saviour" (Bulgakov’s 
article in the symposium on Revelation, p. llj-5)*
is nevertheless a l i b e r a l ; his mind is in constant quest
for truth, and it is ever reaching out into the new and the
12untried in order to find it and explain it. He writes,
"V/e are called upon to acquire a deeper and clearer under­
standing of the revelation that has been received in the 
past or given anew" (Bulgakov, "The Spirit of Prophecy", 
Sobornost’, September, 1939  ^ P . 7)*
He is, in fact, so evidently liberal that it v/ould 
probably not be unjust to say that tradition is often a yoke 
hard to bear upon his free and questing spirit. This is not 
entirely denied by Professor L. A. Zander, the greatest 
living authority on Bulgakov’s thought. In a personal 
interview with Professor Zander, at his Paris home, on 
December 31> 1951^ this v/riter asked, "Would you say that
~ TTDonald A. Lowrie says, in the preface to Bulgakov’s 
The Orthodox Church, "'The prejudiced Western critic who thinks 
of Orthodoxy as a matter of rigid and unchangeable tradition, 
will be disarmed by the author’s forward-looking attitude in 
those things which concern the revelations of modern science 
or the active role of the Church in solving modern problems, 
political and social as well as religious."
T2lt is in this attitude that Bulgakov has set forth, 
in elaborate elucidation, two theological concepts: Sophia and 
sobornost. 'The first is the organizing principle of his the­
ology; the second is the principle v/hereby his theology is 
applied in the Church and its work. For the first he has been 
accused of heresy by some members of the Orthodox hierarchy; 
the second certainly savours of the twentieth century, with 
this century’s stress upon ecumenicity, but it is not contrary 
to tradition. A treatment of Bulgakov’s theology as such would 
necessarily give detailed study to both these terms. They are 
not given such attention herein because they relate only more 
or less indirectly to our problem.
Father Bulgakov was a liberal in chains?"
Professor Zander answered, "I would not use the term 
’liberal’. I would say ’free’. He had a spirit which was 
absolutely free.... He was a synthesis of the prophet and the 
priest.... The Christian dogmas were always an inspiration 
and not a chain.... The main dogma was the Trinity."
In Father Bulgakov’s teaching regarding the Incarnation 
we find a preponderance of traditionalism, with occasional 
evidences of the unshakled spirit of liberalism. A Study of 
his teaching may follow the general pattern, used previously 
in the treatment of other thinkers, of the possibility, the 
actuality, the importance, and the results of the Incarnation. 
It is given for the purpose of learning whether or not 
Bulgakov’s findings in the incarnational sphere assist in 
solving the problem caused by the existence of evil in nature.
Possibility of the Incarnation;-Most theologians teach
that man is linked to nature. They teach man’s link to nature
because his connection to it is so empirically evident that it
is almost axiomatic. Bulgakov, along with the others, teaches
13this connection between man and his world; his theology takes 
individualistic form in what he consequently teaches about 
man and nature, and about the Incarnation, which has given the
Opor Bulgakov the Bible begins with the first 
chapter and not with the third; with creation, and not with 
sin.... The Incarnation is involved in creation."(L. A. Zander, 
in conversation with the writer on December 31^ 1951)
relatedness of the two a new and. comprehensive significance.
The world, to which man is intimately related, is, 
in Bulgakov’s teaching, the direct creation of God, and is 
therefore good and not intrinsically evil. He writes, "The 
World and the first man issued from God’s hand innocent and 
perfect"(The Orthodox Church, p. 12lj.). He also writes, 
"Alongside of the divine and eternal world, there exists the 
world of creaturely being established by God in time. And 
God created it from ’nothing’"(The Wisdom of God, p. 93). He 
further says, "There can be no source of the world but God"
(Ibid., p. 93). He also speaks of "...the irrefragable fact 
that the creation of the world was the work of the whole Holy 
Trinity"(Ibid., p. 102). He gives the reason why the world 
is so "good": "But in creating the world by his omnipotence
from ’nothing’ God communicates to it something of the 
vigour of his own being, and, in the divine Sophia, unites 
the world with his ovm divine life"(Ibid., pp. 111,112). This 
is further explained in platonic terms when he writes, "This 
means that the species of created beings do not represent 
some new types of forms, devised by God, so to speak, ad hoc, 
but that they are based upon eternal, divine prototypes. For 
this reason therefore the world of creatures also bears a 
’certain imprint ’ of the v/orld of God, in so far as it shares 
the fullness of the divine forms or ideas"(Ibid., p. 107)*
God wanted to redeem man. In order to do this, God 
would have to come to man in man’s natural setting. This He,
the Holy God, was able to do because that natural setting, 
nature, is good and not evil. Bulgakov answers in the affirma­
tive this question: "Or does not the fact of the Incarnation 
itself suppose the presence in human nature of some inalienable 
characteristic in virtue of v/hich the possibility of the 
Incarnation becomes comprehensible, no longer as the invasion 
of human nature by some deus ex machina, but, on the contrary, 
as the complete unfolding of its possibilities"(Ibid., p. 12o)? 
And he adds, "The ground of the possibility of the Word being 
made man underlies the very creation of mankind, v/hich seems 
in consequence to make ready to receive him"(Ibid., p. 126).
Actuality of the Incarnation:-Bulgakov teaches that, 
as relates to the Incarnation, the possible becomes actual; 
he says that at a specific juncture in history God did unite 
Himself with humankind. He does not set out to construct, 
directly and positively, his belief that the Incarnation did 
take place ; he does construct such a teaching, however, 
indirectly. This is accomplished through his affirmation of 
the Virgin Birth and through the many passages which portray 
Christ as either divine or human or both.
Many theologians have denied the miracle of the 
Virgin Birth. Some who have made such denial have nevertheless 
affirmed the Incarnation. Bulgakov, however, states that it 
is through the Virgin Birth that the Incarnation was realized 
and that it could have come about by no other means. He affirms, 
"But the simule assertion of the birth of the Word from Joseph and
Mary is not only the absence of- Christology but a complete 
denial of it. Tne sole logical consequence of this would be 
merely the Jesuanismus of the Liberal Protestant school of 
Plarnaclc and Hits chi, which sees in the God-man only the 
Rabbi Jesus of Nazareth"(Bulgakov, "The Incarnation and the 
Virgin Birth", Sobornost’, June, 1933, p. 32). He also declares, 
"To accept the fundamental miracle of all— the Incarnation--but 
to stop halfway by denying from a rationalistic standpoint 
the Virgin Birth, indicates only the inconsistency of a half-faith^ 
(Ibid., p. 3k). And he v/rites.
Hence Mary is not merely the instrument, but the 
direct and positive condition of the Incarnation, its 
human aspect. Christ could not have been incarnate 
by some mechanical process, violating human nature. It 
Y/as necessary for that nature itself to say for itself, 
by the mouth of the most pure human being: ’Behold the 
handmaid of the Lord, be it unto me according to Thy 
v/ord. ’ At that moment the Holy Spirit descended upon 
her; the Annunciation was the Pentecost of the Virgin, 
and the Spirit completely sanctified and abode with 
her (The Orthodox Church, p. 133).
He also declares, "The Word was not fully made flesh till he 
came dovm from heaven and v/as conceived by the Virgin;..."
(The Wisdom of God, p. l52). He also speaks of Christ’s 
"...virginal conception.. . " ( Ibid., p. ilpO). In another 
instance he speaks particularly about the function of the Holy 
Ghost in Christ’s birth. He affirms, "The person who actually 
effects the incarnation of the Word, however, appears to be the 
Holy Ghost, sent dov/n upon the Virgin Mary"(Ibid., pp. 126,127)*
In yet another passage, thinking this time of the eternal charac­
ter of the Incarnation, he declares: "The birth of Christ
from the Virgin is not merely an Isolated event in time; it 
established an eternally abiding bond between Mother and 
Son;..."(Ibid., p. I76).
A corollary of the Virgin Birth is that Christ was 
both divine and human. This Bulgakov teaches. There is no 
necessity of going into detail in order to establish his 
doctrine at this point; suffice it, therefore, to give but a 
fev/ passages. The divinity of the Incarnate Word is taught 
when he writes, "For Orthodoxy, faith in Christ, as Son of 
God, is not a Christological doctrine, but life itself"(The 
Ortho dox Chur ch, p. 121). It is also affirmed when he 
declares, on the same page, "We (the Orthodox) throw ourselves 
at the feet of the Saviour with the joyful cry of faith: ’My 
Lord and my God’; "  Although Bulgakov does not agree with 
some of the modern kenotic t h e o r i e s , h e  nevertheless writes 
of Christ’s humanity: "The Word, in assuming an animated 
body, assumes the whole nature of man;..."(The Wisdom of God, 
p. 131). He also says, "In order to serve as a person to manhood, 
the divine person of the Word must itself be human or, more 
exactly, ’co-human’"(Ibid., p. 129)* Many passages teach both 
the divinity and the humanity. One such is when he says,
"And so we confess Christ to be perfect God and perfect Man, 
and the human compound in him to be maintained entire, for
li-l-He Y/rites, "How are v/e to conceive this kenosis of 
the Word? In the first place it is essential to realize that, 
contrary to the various kenotic theories of Protestantism, our 
Lord in his abasement never ceased to be God, the second Person 
of the Holy Trinity"(The Wisdom of God, p. 13^ )^ -
Ithere is sufficient metaphysical ground for the possibility 
of the Word’s descent into humanity"(Ibid., p. I3I). Another 
is when he speaks of the "...perfect union of divine and human 
in Christ..."(The Orthodox Church, p. 137)*
Importance of the Incarnation:-It is extremely seldom 
that Bulgakov ever mentions the death of Christ, and then the 
reference to it is only incidental and beside his main object. 
One such reference occurs when he is giving a brief resume of 
Orthodox dogmas and doctrines, which dogmas and doctrines are 
understood to be his own also. He says.
The idea of the love of God sacrificing itself for 
the fallen creature, love extending even to incarnation 
and to death on the Cross; and on the other hand the 
idea of the existence of the God-Man, the idea of a 
positive relation between God, Vdio created man in His 
image, and man, lifted by the incarnation to the 
possibility of deification— these two ideas are supreme 
evidences of a religious philosophy; they are expressed 
with an especial love in the Russian theological thought 
of our day(Ibid., p. 120).
Two ideas are here mentioned as important to contemporary
Russian theological thought: the sacrificial love of God, and
the actual existence of the God-Man. The former is evidenced
by the "incarnation" and the death on the Cross. The other
idea is the Incarnation itself, and it--and not the death on
the Gross--lifts man "...to the possibility of deification--...
But even although the death of Christ is given hardly 
any mention and scarcely any import, the Incarnation is not 
the sole factor in the redemption of man and nature; the Holy 
Spirit, given in full measure at Pentecost, is a second 
important factor. ‘The work of the Holy Spirit is given this
important place in part because His work was necessary, 
in a prior way, for the Incarnation itself. He v/rites, "The 
next point to note in this mystery is tbat the Spirit must 
come on the Virgin, and be accepted by her, before she can 
conceive and give flesh to the Word"(The Wisdom of God, p. l53) 
He also says, "In the Incarnation the Son and the Spirit come 
down from heaven together ;..."(Ibid., p. l53)* The Spirit thus 
becomes inseparable from the son, for he speaks of "The Holy 
Spirit who thus eternally rests on the Son and is therefore 
inseparable from his divinity,..."(Ibid., p. l53). It is 
therefore tv/o Persons who are sent, or who come, to the world. 
He writes, "We are faced with the fundamental fact that two 
hypostases, and not one, are sent from on high to the world" 
(‘Ibid., p. lo3). Ho also v/rites, "We can easily grasp this 
by considering the Incarnation and Pentecost, whi ch both 
represent the descent of God from on high"(Chapter by Bulgakov 
in Revelation, edited by John Baillie and Hugh Martin, p. I30). 
The Holy Spirit completes the link between God and Creation, 
begun in the Incarnation. He declares, "The Holy Spirit coming 
down, v/ithout leaving heaven, from on high, completes the link 
between God and creation, initiated in the Incarnation"(The 
Wisdom of God, p. 162).
'That the Incarnation is more important than the death
of Christ, in the teaching of Bulgakov, would not be questioned
by any student of his writings. Some, however, might see the
doctrine of the Holy Spirit, or Pentecost, as being of equal 
or even of greater importance than that of the Incarnation. It
v/ould not be denied that many passages could be adduced to 
support the equality of importance of the tv/o doctrines--or 
dogmas— but support could hardly be found for the priority of 
Pentecost. But even although Pentecost is stressed, the 
Incarnation, nevertheless, is given the primacy. He considers 
it the basic Christian dogma. In the follov/ing passage he 
states ; this :
And at the very heart of things there stands, as of old, 
the basic Christian dogma of the Incarnation, of the 
Word made flesh; in the dogmatic setting bequeathed to 
us by Chalcedon. The roots of this dogma penetrate 
to the very heart of heaven and earth, into the 
inmost depths of the Holy Trinity and into the 
creaturely nature of man. ’Incarnationism’ even 
now stands as the main fact of dogmatic self-deter­
mination in Anglicanism, and in Protestantism also— let 
alone in the most ancient Churches such as the 
Orthodox and the Roman Catholic(Ibid., p. 35)*
In this sub-division the importance of the Incarnation 
has been treated particularly as regards its relative signi­
ficance in comparison v/ith the death of Christ and Pentecost. 
There is a sense in v/hich the results of the Incarnation 
reveal its importance, but that study has been left to the 
more comprehensive treatment v/hich v/ill nov/ be possible.
Results of the Incarnation;-^^One important result
^ I n  the interview, referred to already, the writer 
asked Professor Zander: "Was natural evil a very great problem 
to Father Bulgakov? Was he occupied with it very much in 
writings not yet translated?"
He ansv/ered, "Ho, Father Bulgakov did not write very 
much about it. The most explicit statement is found in his 
The Brideu of the Lamb--not yet translated. And taking that 
book, he briefly explained the section on evil, pages l59“203. 
Then he said, "I spoke to him about it (evil) and he said,
’It is an episode’". Professor Zander further explained,
"He was a great optimist. Kell is not eternal. In one brief
of the Incarnation is deification. I7e shall first see what 
he intends by the term, and then notice that it is something 
bestowed upon both human nature and the natural v/orld.
He states, definitively: "Life in God, deification, 
sanctity, are the evident marks of the spirit of the Church, 
its synonyms"('Ihe Orthodox Church, p. 113). It is further 
defined, and somewhat explained, when he affirms: "The 
capacity for d^ j^ï^cation, for becoming God-like, is without 
limit, like eternity"(Ibid., p. 127). More elucidation is 
given when he writes, "The Church is the Body of Christ and 
those who are saved in the Church receive the power and 
the life of Christ, they are deified, they become *gods by 
virtue of grace*; they become Christs in Jesus Christ"(Ibid., 
p. 1)4.1). Ho capital is used for "gods", but one is employed 
for "Christs"; one wonders if this has been purposeful. If 
so, his capitalization of "Christs", which is a reference to 
saints themselves, implies that this "deification" is to 
such extent that reference to men who have attained it 
should be made with the capital, as is a reference to one 
of the persons of the Trinity. In any case, he seems to mean 
more by "deification" than even extreme schools of Protestant
v/riting he showed how the Devil could receive salvation."
"But was not the fact of the Incarnation the reason 
why natural evil was no great problem for him?"
"Without the Incarnation", he replied, "natural evil 
would not only have been a problem; it would have been a 
tragedy."
humanists v/ould wish to affirm. 'The view is at the opposite 
extreme from that of Karl Barth and his school.
Human nature is deified by the Incarnation. He 
vnrites, "God takes unto Himself human nature, and human 
nature assumes divinity: it is the deification of human 
nature, result of the union of the two natures in Christ"
(Ibid., p. 11). He also affirms, "Redemption by the In­
carnation is not only the liberation of man from sin by 
the sacrifice of the Saviour, it is also a new creation, 
a definitive creation of man as God,..."(Ibid., p. 129).
Yet further, he declares : "Christ, in His holy and sinless 
humanity, sanctified and deified all human nature"(Ibid.,
p. 129).
The natural world, is also deified by the Incarnation. 
VHien God created the world. He already had a plan to deify 
it. Bulgakov writes, "God created the world only that He 
might deify it and himself become all in all to it"^^ (Tlie 
Wisdom of God, p. 203). He also v/rites, "Man discovers 
the seal of Deity both in his ov;n spirit and in nature "( Chap­
ter by Bulgakov in Revelation, Op. Cit., p. 135). The 
Incarnation, along with Pentecost, has been God*s means of 
deifying Creation. He writes,
God created the "world for the sake of the Church.
That is as much as to say that it is at once the
^^Otlier passages in Bulgakov*s lYritings teach that 
nature fell v/hen man did, and that it then needed a greater 
degree of deification, but that "fall" will concern us 
presently.)
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ground and goal of tlie world, its final cause and 
entelechy. The world of men by its creation is 
already designated to and for its deification, 
which whether virtual or actual, is the supreme 
actualization of the world, is effected tlirough 
the Ciiurch which thus appears as a ladder join­
ing heaven and earth and conveying divine life 
to the creation"(The Wisdom of God, pp. 200,201).
A second important result of the Incarnation, very 
closely allied to the deification of nature but not referred 
to by that term, is the redemption of nature. As a tradi­
tionalist, Bulgakov teaches that nature fell as a consequence 
of man*s moral fall. He writes, "îiovæver, as soon as man 
fell the v/hole of created nature also fell into disorder, 
for it was all bound up with man"(Ibid., p. 121). He also 
affirms, "With the fall of man, * the creation was made 
subject to vanity* (Romans 8:20), and from (misprint: 
should be "for") his glorification it must await its own"
(Ibid., p. 207).■ Haturc is thus fallen, and is consequently 
in need of redemption. The needed redemption comes principally 
through the Incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity. 
Bulgakov writes,
'The destiny of nature is allied to that of man; 
corrupted because of man, she awaits v;ith him her 
healing. On the other ha.nd. Our Lord, having 
taken on Himself true humanity, has joined His 
life to all of nature. He walked on this earth.
He looked at its flowers and its plants, its 
birds, its fish, its animals. He ate of its 
fruits. He was baptized in the water of the 
Jordan, He walked on its v/aters. He rested in 
the v7omb of the earth, and there is nothing 
in all creation (outside of evil and sin) which 
remains foreign to His humanity. So the Church 
blesses all creation;..♦(The Orthodox Church, p.l58).
He also writes, "But man is a spirit incarnated, a cosmic 
being: the cosmos lives in him, it is sanctified in him, 
for the Lord is not only Saviour of souls, but of bodies alsD, 
and consequently of the entire world. Hence the cosmic quality 
of the Orthodox office expresses that fullness of Christianity, 
and the Lord who sanctified the earth and the waters of the 
Jordan continues to bless them by His Spirit present in the 
Church"(Ibid., p. 159)*
A third result of the Incarnation is the state of 
God-manhood. For purposes of analysis, we have had to separ-, 
ate one aspect of redemption from others; and we have had to 
refer to the Incarnation in isolation from Pentecost. This 
has been necessary to our task, but it tends to detract from 
the unified and inter-related system constructed by Bulgakov.
In order, therefore, not to leave his system torn apart and 
lifeless, the treatment is concluded by a brief mention of 
His concept of God-manhood. By it he means the state of 
existence in which God is like man and the v/orld, and man 
and the world are like God. God*s likeness to man and nature 
is what he calls the divine Sophia; their likeness to God is 
the creaturely Sophia. "Sophia" becomes the organizing 
principle of his entire system of theology, and the doctrine 
of God-manhood is the state of existence as it is and as it 
is to be. 'This he explains when he v/rites, "The dogma of 
God-manhood is precisely the main theme of sophiology, v/hich 
in fact represents nothing but its full dogmatic elucidation" 
(The Wisdom of God, p. This state of existence.
God-manhood, is effected both by the Incarnation and by 
Pentecost. He writes, "Here we are faced with the real 
connection between these two acts--the incarnation and 
Pentecost;.... Hence the salvation and deification of that 
creation in God-manhood can be accomplished only through 
both in conjunction"(Ibid., pp. 159> l6o).
Professor L. A. Zander, friend, colleague and 
biographer of the late Father Sergius Bulgakov, ranks him 
very highly. He says, "Everybody studies Thomas Aquinas. 
Bulgakov is a parallel personality, in some ways perhaps a 
greater"(Conversation with the writer, December 31, 1951)#
L. S. Thornton
'The writings of L. S. Thornton give a vigorous 
emphasis to the doctrine of the Incarnation as the Christian 
answer to the problem of evil in nature. Father Thornton is 
av/are of the "Death" emphasis in Western Christological 
thought; but he takes his reader right back to the Scrip­
tures, and from them gives a detailed, scholarly presen­
tation of that incarnational emphasis which has always 
characterized Eastern Cliristian thought.
^Professor Thornton is a biblical theologian; the 
Scriptures, rather than philosophy, are the basis of his 
system. In all his works he makes numerous direct references 
to them. In his The Common Life in the Body of Christ the 
Scripture references total approximately two thousand. In 
his The Incarnate Lord he says this of the importance of 
Scripture: "'The Christian conceptions of God and of creation 
were given in essence in the revelation recorded in the Scrip­
tures" (p. 12).
He has an appreciation for the teachings of Athanasius^^, 
but is so distinctly "Eastern" that he considers Irenaeus to be 
the most dependable of all post-apostolic authorities. Of 
Irenaeus he writes, "He is our most reliable guide to the 
structure of orthodoxy as it appears just after the last 
personal contacts v/ith the apostolic age have been finally 
severed. In this v/ay he is the authoritative exponent of a 
tradition which is continuous v/ith the Hev/ Testament and which 
overlaps it"(Revelation and the Modern V/orld, p. Il8). He could 
have often said what he v/rites at one juncture : "Here, once
more, we move along the lines laid down by St. Irenaeus,..."
(Ibid., p. 225)# One reason why he so estimates the worth of 
Irenaeus* thought is because, as he insists, "...the study of 
St. Irenaeus presses us back to scripture"(Ibid., p. 1I4.9 ).
For Father Thornton the Incarnation is possible, 
actual, more important than the death of Christ, a recapitula­
tion of creation, and in its results is the key to the solution 
of the problem of natural evil.
Possibility of the Incarnation;-He views the created 
world optimistically. He considers it a revelation of God, 
for he writes: "In the biblical tradition revelation and 
creation are completely complementary notions"(Ibid., p. 210).
In this same vein he says, "Consequently the manifestations of
l^Of Athanasius * De Inc a m . he says, "Behind all the 
controversial theology of the fourth century A.D. stands the 
oortrait of the Redeemer outlined by St. Athanasius at the 
beginning of his career in a treatise which still glows with 
meaning, because it expresses convictions in a living religious 
experience"(The Incarnate Lord, p. 286).
tills self-giving in created reality cannot be treated as 
uni'^ eal without dishonouring the very character of the Creator 
as manifested in His creation"(The Incarnate Lord, p. 273).
He also affirms, "According to that conception (the Chris­
tian conception of the world) this universe is the handwork 
of a living creative God and exists for the manifestation 
of His glory and goodness. In more precise language, 
creation comes from God and must find its true end in Him.
Its glory is that it shall find its goal in its Creator"
(Ibid., p. 256). We find him further asserting that 
"...the very dust of the earth is precious in the eyes of 
the Creator...* From the divine standpoint nothing created 
is without significance;..."(Revelation and the Modern World, 
p . llj-l ) •
Father Thornton is naturally opposed to the viev/ of 
oriental pessimism, the Buddliistic form of which was treated 
in Chapter Two. He writes, "The tendency which we are to 
criticise has its roots in the oriental conception of the 
universe, the conception which casts doubts upon the goodness 
and reality of this concrete sensible world in which we live. 
Tliat conception has for its greatest foe the Christian con­
ception of creation, which finds the goodness and glory of 
the Creator manifested and expressed in the whole order of 
sensible appearances"(The Incarnate Lord, p. 263, 2ol(_). On 
the same page he adds, "In its first contact with Christianity
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in some of the gnostic systems, this doctrine involved a total 
denial of the Incarnation" (Ibid., p. 2oIi_).
Father Thornton is even more vigorously opposed to
Marcion and the gnostics, as is implied immediately above.
Of them he v/rites in another of his works.
Since the god of love could have no contact v/ith 
material things, Marcion, in accordance with 
another current opinion, assigned the work of 
creation to a secondary god, to whom he also 
ascribed the v/hole dispensation of the Old 
Testament. Tv/o consequences follov/ed: (1) The 
gospel could not be the fulfilment of the older 
covenant; for the tv/o were in radical contradic­
tion to each other. (2) The Christ of Marcion was 
divine, but not human. Like his *Father * he could 
have no genuine contact with this world" (Revelation 
and the Modern World, p. 108).
Since he views the created world optimistically, 
and is therefore opposed to philosophies v/hich look v/ith 
disdain upon creation, he maintains a presupposition which 
allov/s for the possibility of the Incarnation.
Actuality of the Incarnation;-'/That is possible is 
not necessarily actual; but in Father Thornton*s incarna­
tional thought, the possible has become actual. He writes,
"'The doctrine of the Incarnation declares that the trans­
cendent Creator has entered into the order or process of space 
and time, of nature and history, in the Person of Jesus Christ. 
Tlie doctrine thus affirms a contrast between God and the 
world-process and at the same time affirms a connecxion set 
up between these two in an event of history"(The Incarnate 
Lord, p. 28). He also v/rites, "In Him (the Incarnate Clirist)
the absolute actuality of God was incorporated into the 
historical process"(Ibid., p. loii.). He further asserts, "For 
He is not an organism but the Creator, who has taken organic 
creation into union v/ith Himself. In His new organism He 
has become organic to creation" (Ibid., p. ,!i20 ). Yet further 
he declares, "For it is here (in the Incarnation) that God 
and creation are united in the new organism of Jesus Christ" 
(Ibid.. p. )+3p).
In another of his works--Revelation and the Modern 
World--at least tv/o passages very explicitly set forth his 
teaching regarding the actuality of the Incarnation. He 
reasons,
A Christ who climbs up the evolutionary ladder instead 
of down from heaven has not taken * the form of a ser­
vant* in lov/ly self-humiliation. He has not made 
himself one v/ith sinners; and he cannot, therefore, 
save them. The Jesus of the Liberal gospel could 
no more *become sin for us* in the Pauline meaning 
of the words than the docetic Clirist of Mar ci on and 
his fellow-heretics could become flesh. In both 
cases superiority spelt an aloofness which was an 
evasion of the v/orld*s burden. Thus the humanist 
heresy is in substantial agreement v/ith its apparent 
opposite"(p. 112).
He later explains,
Compresence and interpenetration may be regarded as 
two complementary aspects of coinherence, a word 
which has the highest significance for theology.
The order of nature is not only compresent with 
the order of grace. It is also taken into it in 
Christ. All things are summed up in him v/ho is 
the true head of creation. This is the primary 
meaning of recapitulation. But it has manifold 
implication. For example, the relationship is 
mutual. Christ penetrated to the heart of crea­
tion that it, in turn, might be brought into his 
innermost being. This mutuality of coinlierence.
v/hereby the divine Son dwells in the creature 
that it may dwell in him, is a truth whi ch 
has other applications"(Ibid., p. 318).
Importance of the Incarnation;-The incarnation of 
God’s Son, an actualised possibility, is more important, 
as an instrument of securing redemption, than is His 
death. This will be supported by implication throughout 
both the next two subdivisions of this treatment; suffice 
it here, therefore, to support this proposition by brief 
study of a few passages which more explicitly reveal that 
the Incarnation is of more import in securing redemption 
than is Clirist *s death.
Sometimes reference to the death of Christ is con­
spicuously omitted. 'This is so when Father Thornton writes, 
"Finally the perfection of human response, thus manifested 
in His life-story, was actualised by transformation to a 
new level of activity through His death and resurrection"
( 'The Incarnate Lord, p. ii.32). Here the "...perfection 
of human response,..." is Christ’s principal merit--and 
that response reached its peak of perfection only in 
Christ’s ascended state. Tlie death and resurrection of 
Christ are obviously prerequisite to his existence in the 
ascended state, but they are not even mentioned.
In other instances it is less conspicuously 
omitted, but nevertheless not mentioned as having any 
import in redemption. An example of this tendency is 
contained in the following statement: "The Incarnation
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was the incorporation of the kingdom of God into history, 
because in the life-story of the Incarnate Lord the ade­
quate response of man v/as rendered to the Father’s love"
(Ibid., p.
At other junctures the death of Christ is portrayed 
as incidental. This is the case when he says, "In the 
life-story of the Incarnate Lord we see the true messianic 
Son, endowed with the messianic outpouring of the Spirit, 
rendering to the Father the true human response of the 
Kingdom which He proclaimed, and thus embodying the way of 
the Kingdom in His life and death" ( Ibid., p. Ij-31)#
Fairness requires that opposing statements be men­
tioned. He writes, "The whole work of our salvation was accom­
plished in Christ’s death and resurrection"(The Common Life 
in the Body of Christ, p. 6l). In the same book he also 
says, "This (the reconciliation of the ’whole universe’ to 
God) was effected through his death upon the Cross"(Ibid., p. 
29I1). In his most recent book he writes, "Here we notice 
that the idea of ’new creation’ is associated with the dying 
and rising of a god, just as in the Hew Testament a new 
creation is effected through the death and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ"(Revelation and the Modern World, pp. 270,277)*
In these passages it is the death and resurrection, rather 
than the incarnate Life, which are of importance in effecting 
the "new creation". Since they imply an emphasis upon the
death of Christ wnich is not generally found in Thornton’s 
writings, they appear to be inconsistent with what one 
generally finds; but they should probably be considered 
as an endeavour on the part of the author to reveal another 
facet of the truth that God through Christ v/as reconciling 
the world to Himself.
Tne above passages notwithstanding, he attaches a 
far greater importance to the incarnate Life of Christ than 
he does to that willing act in which the earthly incarnate 
Life received its consumation.
Incarnation as Recapitulation:-According to Father 
Thornton, the Incarnation was a recapitulation of all creation; 
that is, in the Incarnation the process of the work of creation 
was r eue at e d- - and in the repetition was renev/ed. In his great 
biblical work he writes, "'That purpose which God prepared in 
Clirist, to be carried out in the fulness of Hie times, was 
nothing less than this; to sum up all creation in the Messiah"
(The Common Life in the Body of Clirist, p. 178). In another 
book he declares, "'Thus the history of this finite order has 
the character of a palimpsest, first the writing of creation, 
then the reverse writing of the Fall, and finally the original 
story of creation re-written, as it were, in the blood of 
Jesus, and upon his torn flesh"(Revelation and the Modern 
World, p. 252), He further states, "For Christ is the whole 
into which all things are gathered in fulfilment of the 
divinely ordered plan of creation"(Ibid., p. 271)- He also
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says, "As God’s revelation of Himself is. spread out universally 
over His works in creation and His acts in history, so also it 
is gathered up cumulatively in Chinst..."(Ibid., p. 33). And 
he declares, "For first, in the story of Adam’s creation the 
many units of earth are ’gathered up’ into the form upon whi ch 
the image is printed. So too the many units of mankind redeemed 
are gathered up into the body of the new Adam"(Ibid., p. l8lp). 
Yet again he asserts, "Recapitulation in Christ is the restora­
tion of that plan (’creation’s plan’) with its correlative of 
grace"(Ibid., p. 3^5)* In poetic reference to the Incarnation 
he v/rites in this manner of the recapitulation: "By the same 
qualities the whole order of the first creation is taken up 
into that ’place’ which is ’better than this world’, that 
place where all the defects of the world as we know it are 
replaced by the perfections proper to the complete manifesta­
tion of the divine image, that place v/here God is made to be 
truly visible in the work of his hands"(Ibid., p. 182).
It is well-known that Irenaeus taught that the 
Incarnation is a recapitulation of creation. On this point 
the early Greek theologian directly influenced the modern 
Anglo-Catholic thinker. Father Thornton himself is as 
conscious of this as are any of his readers. He writes,
"Tiie incarnation was, for Irenaeus, a recapitulation of the 
whole creation because he understood that doctrine to imply 
some such interpretation of Genesis as we are nov/ putting 
f orv/ard" (Ibid., p. 163).
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But not only was he influenced, in this insight, by 
Irenaeus; as is the case with all of Father Thornton’s teach­
ings, he affirms that for this idea he has a sound biblical 
basis* He writes, "'This agrees with the apostolic theology 
in which Christ is not only Adam, but also Wisdom-Logos, the 
site of creation, who, as the eternal Son, takes up the whole 
world into his high-priestly action"(Ibid., p. 280).
It will be noted that most of these passages related 
to recapitulation are taken from Father Thornton’s latest 
book, first published in 1950. It is in this volume that the 
repetition doctrine is most explicitly taught. A study of his 
works makes it apparent that there has been a gradual develop­
ment in his stress upon this teaching as to the method whereby 
the Incarnation accomplishes the redemption of creation.
Nature Redeemed by the Incarnation;-In Father Tl'iornton’s 
writings there is no assumption of the existence of positive 
recalcitrant, surd-like evil; what appears to be evil is only 
the lower levels of the organic series. He can speak of "...the 
ordered universe with its ascending series of organ!sms"(The 
Incarnate Lord, p. 329)*
It is interesting— and a little surprising--that for 
this view Father Thornton, so biblical in his source material 
and so theological in his thought content, leans heavily upon 
the rationalistic philosopher, Leibniz, and that thinkefs 
theory of the ascending degrees of consciousness in all 
existence. Of Leibniz’ thought he writes, "Nevertheless the
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general conception of hierarchical structure in the universe, 
and of its reflection in man, has nov/ become sufficiently 
established; and in this particular respect Leibniz v/as a 
principal mediator between the old world and the new"
(Revelation and the Modern World, p. 308). Of Leibniz he also 
v/rites, "For him the universe v/as functional throughout its 
whole range. At every level there could, in some measure, be 
a response to the creator. Every created thing can co-operate 
in the harmony of the v/hole. In short, the cumbersome jargon 
of the Monadology indicated a return from a secular to a 
religious point of view"(Ibid., p. 30)-|-) • Again he says, 
"Nevertheless a great step forward v/as taken when Leibniz af­
firmed that the ’reflexion’ of the v/hole (with its pre-ordained 
harmony) occurred not only in every genuine unit but also at 
every stage of such a unit’s continuity"(Ibid., p. 306).
The more recent idealist, whose thought is directly
used by Father Thornton--and equally as surprisingly— is the 
late Alfred North bhitehead. In an "additional note", at the 
conclusion of his The Incarnate Lord, he mentions the connection 
of his optimistic thought v/ith the philosophy of lihitehead.
He writes, "The organic conceptions v/hich have been embodied 
in the text of this book are closely connected with the 
phi lose why of A. N. whitehead" (p. Ij-58 ).
In spite of this optimistic thought, which he takes
great care to develop— particularly in his The Incarnate Lord-- 
he nonetheless teaches that nature is "fallen" and that it ia s
been redeemed by the Incarnation.
He teaches that when man "fell" through sin, nature 
"fell" also, and that when man is redeemed by the Incarnation, 
nature is also restored. He writes, "If, as was there said, 
the divine revelation takes on a creaturely character by 
becoming embodied, then it also follows that ’the vanity’ to 
which ’the whole creation’ was subjected by the Pall must 
necessarily enter into the dispensation of recovery throughout 
its entire range"(Revelation and the Modern World, p. 215). In 
this connection he also affirms, "The Incarnation v/as thus a 
nev/ creation constituted in the Person of the Son, to redeem, 
renew and restore the old creation from its state of frustra­
tion and sinful estrangement"(The Incarnate Lord, p. )-l19 ) •
That creation is restored when man is redeemed is also taught 
when he says, "The fulfilment in him of the true way of life 
carries v/ith it not only a transformation of Israel but also 
a restoration of creation’s order and harmony"(Revelation and 
the Modern World, p . 219)•
The degree of the restoration of creation is very 
great; Father Thornton even teaches that creation is deified.
He writes, "The return of creation to God must be across a 
bridge adequate to that contrast"(The Incarnate Lord, p. 228). 
'The bridge of which he speaks, v/hich brid^^e must link the tv/o 
contrasts--God and creation--is, of course, the Incarnation.
Of such a bridge he says, reasoning philosophically: "...this 
and this alone v/ould bridge the contrast, dissolve the tensions 
of that contrast, and carry creation over to what by analogy
we may call the level of deity"(Ibid., p. 228). As a man of 
faith, he believes that the Incarnation does so bridge the 
contrast and does so elevate creation.
It is not that only certain aspects of creation are 
thus redeemed by the Incarnation; the entire created order is 
so restored. He v/rites.
The image of God in its completeness has been 
manifested in Christ and is being reproduced in all His 
members. The image so extended includes the ’all things’ 
of creation. All was originally created in the form of 
the Servant; and all is nov/ being restored to that form 
in Him who has ever shown it forth by his unchanging 
obedience to the Father"(Revelation and the Modern 
World, p. 325).
And he declares.
For this reason, namely that our Lord possesses the 
fulness of deity, he also became the mediator through
whom the whole universe is reconciled to God......
Moreover not only was reconciliation effected betv/een 
God and creation, but also peace v/as made between the 
warring elements of creation itself. Such peace-making 
was the appropriate work of him v/hom all things 
cohere. Without him the universe v/ould fall to pieces.
There would no longer be anything common between the
parts. So his redeeming work restores the common life
of all creation(The Common Life in the Body of Christ, p. 29J4-) *
Incarnation Solves the Problem of Natural Evil:-Even 
although Father Thornton sometimes appears so optimistic that 
he does not look upon any aspect of creation as actually evil, 
he nevertheless delineates the doctrine of the Incarnation in 
such a way as to make evident an underlying belief that in 
certain instances nature is characterised by that which is 
unesteemed. He is, in fact, so conscious of such unesteemed 
aspects of creation that he is of the firm opinion that it
is only tlirough belief in the Incarnation that theism may
become credible. He v/rites, "...the Incarnation when accepted 
as true is found to bring incalculable aid to theistic beliefs"
(Ibid., p. 6). He also says, "The philosophy of theism and 
the doctrine of the Incarnation must be brought into a new 
alliance"(Ibid., p. 23). In this vein he further declares, 
"There are in a religious or theistic interpretation of the 
universe certain features v/hich must appear insoluble difficul­
ties in a philosophy of theism detached, from Christianity; 
difficulties, however, for which the doctrine of the Incarnation 
offers a solution"(Ibid., p. 111). Yet further he reasons,
"If the Incarnation provides an answer to the difficulties of 
theism, the Incarnation in turn becomes intelligible only in 
the light of its terminal concepts, God and man"(Ibid., p. I3I4-). 
Still further he asserts, "It (the Incarnation) vindicates the 
Creator to reason by restoring the Creator’s handiv/ork, and 
by re-establishing the movement of creation towards its goal 
in God"(Ibid., p. 22l|.).
It is not only that belief in the Incarnation makes 
feasible belief in the existence of God; belief in the Incarna­
tion makes feasible belief in a certain kind of God.. Father 
Tliornton bears this out v/hen he writes, "...the doctrine of 
the Incarnation appears in history as the ’regulative principle’ 
of the Cliristian conception of God" (Ibid., p. 7). One aspect 
of belief in God which the doctrine of the Incarnation 
"regulates" is that God may become— and indeed has become--di­
rectly related to this material order.
Conclusion;-Father Thornton is optimistic, as has 
been noted; he believes that natural evil, by the Incarna­
tion, has already been redeemed. This position is stated 
recurrently in his writings, and several passages in support 
of it have been quoted in this treatment. But it is neverthe­
less possible to find a tinge of meliorism in his works. An 
example of this is contained in the following passage:
"The new organism (the state of redemption brought about by 
the Incarnation) is complete in constitution and equipment, 
but incomplete in the actualization of its own processes"
(Ibid., p. IÜ4-3). This statement allows for the present mani­
festations of natural evil. It also leaves the gate open 
for man’s moral efforts in which he may work together with 
Christ for the further actualisation--or for the extension--of 
the state of natural redemption. But another passage states, 
more explicitly, that our Master is dependent upon our efforts. 
Father Thornton writes, "The mystery of v/hich v/e are sneaking 
confronts us in the fact that, as we are dependent upon 
our total environment, material and spiritual, so also our 
Lord has made himself to be dependent upon us"(Revelation and 
the Modern World, p . 317)•
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NOTE
The concern of the Church with the significance of 
the Incarnation has been stressed in recent years in Scotland 
by the Iona Community, under the leadership of Dr. George MacLeod. 
The relevance of belief in the Incarnation to the life both of
the Church and the community is emphasized in Dr. MacLeod’s
We Shall Rebuild and in other publications of the Iona Coiamunity,
in which there are references to the disorder brought about in '
the natural as well as the spiritual sphere by human v/rongdoing, 
and to the recreative effect of the divine entrance into the 
material realm through Incarnation, liie central purpose of the 
Iona Coimiiunity is described as "connected with the type of 
theological thought whi ch emphasizes the belief that the 
salvation mediated by the Incarnate Son of God is total or 
cosmic, affecting all aspects of the creation which have been 
disordered by sin, and restoring integrity, both personal and 
social, to the spirit-matter complex of huaan life"(Report 
of Ad Hoc Committee on the Iona Community to the General Assembly 
of the Church of Scotland, May, 1951)* It is recognized, on the 
other hand, that the Iona Community lays much stronger accent 
on action than on sedentary thought or theological inquiry as a 
key to religious illumination. Tne same report states, "It is 
not the function of the Iona Community to work out a distinctive 
theology, and probably there is considerable variety of theological 
standpoint within its membership"(Ibid.).
In view of the practical rather than theological 
interest v/ith which the Iona Community is mainly associated, 
it has not boon thought necessary to examine its doctrinal 
position in detail. It is of interest to note, however,'that 
many of its activities, in the realm of political action, 
divine healing and economic v/itness, as well as its teaching 
and practice in respect of the sacraments, may be interpreted 
as illustrations and expressions of the incarnatiena1 trend 
indicate! as its general theological standpoint, and its 
optiiiiisth account of the potentialities of a recreated humanity 
and a natural order redeemed from evil.
Two Scottish contributions to theological study have 
made explicit reference to the work of the Iona Coiimiunity.
Professor D. M. Baillie, in his treatment of the Incarnation, 
in his book God Was in Christ, includes a chapter on the Body 
of Clirist which is largely based on an article contributed to 
The Oracle, the magazine of the Iona Community, in 19l|.2, in 
which it is pointed out that in the life of the Church alone 
is to be found the reversal of men’s estrangement alike from 
God and from their fellow men, and that the evidences of the^ 
Church’s true life as a body are the outcome of the Incarnation.
Of the Community Professor Baillie writes, "Its members will 
be interested not only in men’s souls but in all that concerns 
their bodies too, all their material and social welfare, because
God in His love came right into our material v/orld; His word 
v/as made flesh"(God Was in Christ, p. 209). More recently 
Dr. Allan D. Gallov/ay, v/ho v/as for some time a member of the 
Iona Community, has expressed his gratitude to the Community 
as the agency through v/hich he first began to realize the 
importance of the aapect of Cliristian doctrine expounded in 
his Tne Cosmic Giirist. His treatment, atonemntal as v/cll as 
incarnational, leads up to the conclusion, actual only v/ithin 
the fellowship of the Cliurch, that the problem of evil is 
done away through the crucifixion of Christ, which event is 
"the pivotal point of all evil", and so that Dr. Galloway can 
write, "It is no more radical, fallen evil, but evil as con­
formable to the forgiveness of God--and therefore even in 
the midst of its wain to the neace of God"('Ihe Cosmic Christ,
p. 258).
CONCLUSION
CHAPTER V I I I  
GOITCLUSION
An endeavor was made, in the introdue bory chapter, 
to set forth the nature of the problem which has been treated 
herein. 'The ne::t throe chapters, comprising part One and con­
sisting of a general study, were an attempt to delineate the 
three principal types of attitudes wTiich the problem has en­
gendered. In part Two, the procedure has been that of special­
ization: representatives of an incarnational oigphasis have 
been studied in order to learn whether or not the Cliristian 
doctrine of the Incarnation nay be understood as pointing 
toward a solution of the problem. In this concluding chapter 
the research, both general and special, will be employed as 
a basis, both negative and positive, upon which to present the 
writer’s contribution to the subject.
Both Natural Good and Natural Evil Are
Actual
Natural Good is Actual:-Gautama saw the human piihat
in his native India, and sought its raison d’etre in the 
sphere of religious mysticism; but he was thrust out, coldly, 
upon the rocks of an embittered despair. In his disparagement: 
he conceived that she corporeal world is altogether unfriendly 
to human life, seeing that apart from man’s own choosing,
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and at times in spite of the best choices it is possible for
him to make, ho is met with asoects of nature which obstruct
the ideal fulfillment of his existence. And these aspects of 
nature, in his view, were in the wrepondoranee ; they were there­
fore what essentially characterised corporeal existence. To 
him, consequently, there was no natural desirability.
Arthur Schopenhauer, much later in the march of mankind,
looked upon his world, tried to understand it purely through
uhe methodology of rational processes, and came to look upon 
it much as did the Buddlia. This desert ass, wild through the 
o:diilarating keenness of his mind, disregarded the norms which 
had guided most thou.ght leaders of the west, and propounded a 
view in "which evil is portrayed as the primary characteristic 
of the natural world, and the elements whi ch men esteem as 
only secondary.
Joseph Wood ICrutch, not as profound as Schopenhauer, 
but nonetheless a near perfect example of the same persua:..ion 
as it is found in our contemporary scientific scene is, if it 
can be conceived as possible, more ruthless yet in his condem­
nation of man’s given order. It is purposeless, and when not 
indifferent to man’s ideal exiseenco is positively obstructive 
of it.
There is no particular inadequacy in the primary method­
ologies of those tiiree figures ; men may alivays be free to seek 
an understanding of existence through the tool of faith, or of 
reason, or of observation and experimentation, or, indeed, of
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all three; but those men have exaggerate cl the undesirable
aspects of our world. After all such characteristics of the 
external world are held up for scrutinizauion, it is possible 
to lift up beside thorn instances of the purposive character of 
nature; and indeed, it is possible, upon such a showing, to 
see Ghat there is a distinct proponderance of those elements 
which are conducive go the high fulfillinont of human life. 
Aristotle, very early in the ongoing process of human thought, 
understood chat the fact of and the order of the universe are 
such that they viaho rational!.y necessary an intelligent Prime 
Mover, himself unmoved but moving all else. Thomas Aquinas, 
following "the Philosopher" and many another man of thought, 
affirmed, in the first few articles of his Surma fheologica, 
bhat from nature as we know it we can prove the existence of 
a purposive Mind (see hp. l-2o). Immanuel Mant said that the 
aspects of nature whi ch we esteem are such that they point to 
an intelligent Architect, only an antinomy for the pure reason 
but a certainty for the practical reason. Such persistence of 
the toleological vievgcoint, in spite of much criticism both 
from within and from outside she sphere of its general conclu­
sion, with its fresh formulation in very different periods of 
thought, is evidence of the truth and the connotational validii 
of such a statement as that of Clarence Beckwith, who affirms: 
"The coamon judgment of mankind is and has alwa n been that 
this is, on the whole, a good "world" (fockwith, Tfiy Idea of_Jjhuj 
p.173).
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natural Evil is Also Actual : -Ilany per sons of faith and 
thought have urged a position uliich is the dianetric opposite 
of those of G-autana, Schopenaauer, and Krutch. These persons 
have affirmed that all aspects of the natural v/orld are 
actually conducive to the ideal fulfillment of human existence. 
They understand that those elements of nature v;hich appear to 
obstruct human life are only harmful in seeming, and are really 
desirable. In this view mnat appears to be natural evil is 
only a negation of natural desirability, or natural desirability 
on its may to the state of having positive content. The view 
mas studied as optimism in Chapter III: Christian Science mas 
seen to represent its religious form; the theodicy of 
Benedict do Spinoza, its philosophical: and the doctrine of 
John Calvin, its theological. The theory v;as also treated, 
in the entirety of part Tmo of the thesis, in the form of in- 
carnationalism: for those Christian theologians, Irenaeus and 
Athanasius in an early day, and Fathers Bulgakov and Thornton 
in our contemporary time, all elements of created existence 
enhance ideal human life.
But no tv/iths tan ding the faith and the thought of these 
persons, most of mho se faith and thought is even v/i thin the 
orbit of Ci'iristianity, there is a vast amount of existence for 
mhich their ''systems " do not account. There are, that is to 
say, those aspects of the corporeal morld mhich positively 
obstruct the proper realisation of human life. Ivlany of tnoso 
hammering asmects mere enumerated in the intro due tory cnammor.
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Host of then are only instrumental evils, as floods and 
tornadoes and fires, but some of them, as pain, bodily disease, 
imbecility and untimely death, are intrinsically evil; and, 
nhetner they are only instruments of the hindrance of human 
life, or in and of themselves obstructive of it, they arc 
nevertheless really and radically evil. Radoslav Tsanoff is 
right vjiion he assorts, "hvil is not teoneliov; good^ any more than 
sinking is somenon rising* Evil is evil and the opposite of 
good, contrary in course and direction''( Tsanoff, The nature of 
Zv^, p. 397).
God Is Absolute 
Natural Evil Extremists Atheistic ;-VAien evil is considered 
to be the essential characteristic of the natural morld, atheism 
is generally, if not always, attempted: v/ith evil at the heart 
of things, so that the undesirable is the positive and the 
primary, and the desirable is the negative and the secondary, 
this is the logical metaphysical--or anti-metaphysical--position* 
The three pessimists studied all attemitted this view.
Gautama propounded a system of ethics, a way of life; 
and it was purely an ethic, for he made no room vhatevor for 
God. In this he was consistent, for there is no place for God 
if the v/orld is actually as the Buddha conceived it to be.
Arthur Schopenhauer was also consistent enough not to 
posit the existence of God, since he conceived of existence 
disparagingly. Because of his pessimism, the existence of God, 
for him, would be contra rationem--rathor than suera rapjLonem,
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as most dirlstian authorities, neo-ihonists such as Etienne 
Gilson and Jacques Ilaritain excluded, would be quick to admit.
Joseph hood Krutch v/as not able to discern a Divine 
hind behind ''chaotic", "indiffèrent" nature, and espoused a 
vigorous a Theism. He considered, too, that all intelligent 
persons of the twentieth century should also take this view, 
so that when a few persons, here and there, would persist in 
their theism, their opinions could be dism.ssed as a curious 
recrudescence of scholastic mediaovalism.
Natural Good E::tronists Absolutistic ;-liion natural 
desirability is understood to be the primary characterising 
factor of the corporeal order, so that it olone is actual 
and natural evil is only apparent but not real, the view that 
God is absolute or unlimited, since it is such a logical step, 
is the only ontological position which may be taken with con­
sistency; and all the optimists studied herein were consistent, 
so that tme1rs is an ultimate absolutism. According to these 
systems, all of which are theodicies, God.is infinite in wisdom, 
power, and goodness, and never faces, either.in his own nature 
or outside it, any circumstances which he does not will or at 
least approve. Christian Science mysticism and Spinesistic 
rationa1ism--if the former, of so little comparative import, 
may be compared with its probable basic progenitor--are both 
absolutistic in the wantheistic sense, all existence iiaving 
emanated from God's nature and now still a nart of Him; Jonn
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Calvin * s trio o logic ism is absolutist is also, but more from an
.lona.is u'jon une oneness oi in vine sovcroi cnuv ana oreauecl
enis u 3nco 'han unon the substantial oneness of God and the
thinking-extended world. The Incarnationalists, Bulgakov 
and Thornton, and their early counterparts, Irenaeus and 
Athanasius, are also absolut!stic, but more as is Calvin 
than as is Spinoza, yet with an emphasis upon a re-creation, 
through the Incarnation, so that existence, wnich had fallen 
from God’s intention, is now back within the Divine desire.
ITat_ura_l Good and Natural Evil Actualists Generally 
Finitistic ;-Vwion The external world is conceived as character­
ized both by factors vhich are conducive to the ideal fulfill­
ment of human life and by factors which positively obstruct 
that fulfillment, the metaphysical position generally, but not 
always, espoused, is that God is finite; that is, that ho is 
limited either by a hamoering principle within His own nature, 
or by an obstructive power outside His nature, wi th which He 
must cope. Excepting only the panthoistically absolutistic 
Pringle-Fattison, all the figures studied herein, who are 
melioristic, and who therefore advocate the actual existence 
of both natural good and natural evil, conceive of God as finite.
Radoslav Tsanoff and E. S. Brightman locate the hamper­
ing principle, over which God does not have full control, within 
God’s own nature. Tsanoff can write, "And the evil tug is nor 
outside of God or alien to the divine nature, but just as in
finite beinOS so in the cosmic s/rsten of them, in God, it is
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tho negative moment, the obverse of positive enhancement and 
ideal activity" ( Tsanoff. The Nature of Evil, p. IlOO ).
Brightman is yet more definitive on this teaching, for i 
the distinguishing tenet of his entire philosophical position.
In his viev/ na rural evil is caused by an eternal, uncreated, 
surd evil, located in the nature of God, which God finds as 
a "given" experience, and over which his perfectly good will 
is only gradually gaining control, he can say that God’s 
"...finiteness consists in his own internal structure;..." 
(3ri/;htman, Tne Finding of God, p. 119)*
Notwithstanding the fact that the other meliorists 
are opposed, vietaphysica 1 ly, since one is pluralistic and the 
others are dualistic, they are in agreement on the idea of 
God’s finiteness and in locating it outside God’s nature* 
lor hilliam James, the pluralist, there are numerous principles 
outside God’s nature, which are ultimate existants just as is 
God, and which are therefore independent of God, so that although 
he has the support of numerous ultimate existents diich enhance nat 
al desirability. He in not able wholly to sunpress the existents in 
through which natural evil originates. For the dualists, 
represented herein by the ancient Zoroaster and b- the con­
temporary men of thought, G.. E. m. Jo ad and Edwin Lewi c, there 
is only one ultimate existent chi .hi--or who— opposes God, bur 
in each case that existent is powerful enougm to orx'.ynaue, 
and to continue in existence, chose aspects of tmo worad 
which are des true Tivo of ideal human life; ana une wo c. oi 
iractically as finite as He is in quailu-auiVo
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pluralism, for although in dualism there is only one near-equal 
power opposed to God, and in pluralism there are many, in plur­
alism the numerous "eaches" which oppose God are matched by 
just as many ultimace "caches" which are on God’s side.
I h turn a1 Good and Natural Evil Actualists may Be 
Absolutistic:-Absolutism is Tho view that God is the only 
ultimate existent, and that Ho is infinite in wisdom, power 
and goodness. host adlierents of cN..is view believe that 
although God may be spoken of as unlimited, lie has imposed a 
limitation upon Himself by the creation of free, finite 
persons, who can thwart his purposes. hvny who hold the 
position, and are not voluntarists, also agree that God is 
limited by principles of reason, which means that He can only 
do the rational, the logical.
whis theory of absolutism, especially when i.t is sane 
onoueh to aliow fae two types of limitation to which reference 
has been made, is more plausible than are any of the finitisms 
for at least four reasons. First, because it accords with 
Christian experience. Persons who come into a profound relation­
ship to God, through Jesus Christ, generally worship him as one 
■who is infinite in wisdom, power and goodness. Only as such 
is he their all-sufficiency.
Second, because it has been the predominant view among 
leaders of thought. Although prominent men of thought such as 
Plato, i hr ci on, John Stewart Lull, K. G. Nells, and those 
treated herein as fini Lists, may be mentioned as teaching she 
limi'ced character of God, absolutism has been, war nous cues _,aon.
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til3 viGv/ more widely hold booh in philosophy and in theology. 
And whereas most finitists have disagreed in locating and in 
explaining the finiteness, absolutists have boon in substantial 
agreement ever since Aristotle’s day.
Third, because tnere is validity in the ontological ' 
argument for God’s existence. There have been not a few, such 
as Iimaanue1 Kant, who have given no credence to this argument, 
but Anselm and Descartes seem to have been offering a valid 
insight when They argued for God’s existence from the stand­
point of the idea in men’s minds of an infinitely perfect being, 
If this argument has any merit, and hilliam S. Hocking is 
probably right wnen he reaffirms - to our present generation 
that it has, then God exists absolutistically rather than 
finitistlcally.
fourth, because Absolutism contains a greater degree 
of fuTuristic adequacy than does finitism. host finitisms, 
it is true, teach that naTural good is gradually triumphing 
over natural evil; but they cannot have the degree of assurance 
of this which is possible in absorutism. hhether the evil 
principle is within God’s own nature, as it is for Tsanoff and 
Brightman, or outside it, as it is for the otxers, and whether 
the hampering tug has many ultimate sources, as for Janes, or 
only one, as in the dualisms, since the evil power (or pov/ers) 
is as ultimate as is God, and since God is not all-power:'ul, 
the finitists do not have sufficient grounds for Teaching that 
God is gradually winning tho battle. hho knows, for instance.
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but that the eternal, uncreated, recalcitrant "Given", whi oh 
Brightman posits in the nature of God, will one day get out 
of hand, the so-called development of God notwithstanding, and 
work grave havoc to the universe? And how can Edwin Lewis, 
to take an example from one of the dualisms, be assured that 
the "Adversary", an eternal being, v/ill over come to that degree 
of subjection whi ch is necessary to tho inception of eternal 
life, the Resurrection notwithstanding, since that discreator 
is coeval with God and since he has thus far been eternally 
discreating wherever God has chosen to create?
Natural evil extremists, then, are atheistic, natural 
good oxcromlsts are absolutistic, and those who a:'firm the
acruarrry oi 00 Oil narurax goo a and naturax evix are generally
finitistic; but unlike the pessimistic and the optimistic 
positions, for which atheism and absolutism, respectively, are 
the onl;r consistent views i/ith regard to metaphysics. The mel­
ioristic view that natural good and natural evil are both actual 
may be consistently joined with an absolutistic notaphysic, as 
was found so have been at least attempted by Andrew Seth 
Pringle-fat Tison. It must be admitted, however, that only 
the finitisms, among the melioristic views, and not absolutism, 
nay conceive of evil as ultimate in existence; but even 
although natural evil cannot be ultimately real for absolutism, 
it can nevertheless be radio "illy and positively ac Tual, to this 
extent : first, so what it acTually frustrates The ideal ful­
fillment of human life, including the lives of innocent and
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righToous persons; second, so tnat God Himsolf seeks its 
e :: 13 m l  nation; and third, so that man should set himsolf the 
task of opposing it wherever it lifts its unseemly head.
The Consequent problem
'hie pessimist affirms that, contrary to vfiat is 
commonly supposed, there is no God at all. And since there 
is no God, in this position, where is no one, in view of the 
evils of nature, to charge with malignance. further, there 
is no reason why existence should be more friendly to human 
life than it is, since there is no divine or1g1na t i ve-providentia !
hind. This is one straihhtforward solution to the philosophical 
problem of why natura._ evil exists. It is such a good solution, 
indeed, that there is no more whilesonhisal problem, after this 
answer cas been tendered.
who optimist maintains an unshakeable faith in the ex­
ist one o of a God who is absolute and who consequently would 
not allow narural evil; and on the basis of this presueposition, 
empirical manif es tarions of natural evil no t v/i t las t ending, he 
avows that tnere are neither instrumental nor intrinsic evils in 
nature, but that in every aspect the corporeal order is either 
instrumontally or intrinsically conducive to the ideal fulfill- 
monb of human life. The optimist therefore offers just as 
coherent an answer as does the pessimist, for, given his pre­
supposition about what an absolute God would not allow, his 
reaction to natural evil is understandable; but the optimist’s
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answer, unlike that of tho pessimist, is not a solution of the 
philosophical problem but an abandonment of it— what does not 
exist cannot give rise to the problem of why it exists *
The neliorist has generally offered a genuine solution 
to the philosophical problem of natural evil, just as has the 
pessimist, and he has usually done so by resorting to meta­
physical considerations as has that type of theorist. He has 
usually affirmed that natural evil, which he looks upon in 
its radical character, exists because God is finite in power 
and cannot prevent it, although God is usually thought of as suald 
wise andgeodtO' want to extirpate it. This, too, is a sound 
solution; there is no abandonment of the problem here, and 
there are no'fallacies in the logic. But it is a solution which, 
like that offered by pessimism, is reached at too great an 
expense, for although it is not a disavowal of God it is a 
proposal of an inadequate one.
It is readily seen, then, that when natural evil, as 
well as natural good, is thought of as radically real, and when 
at the same time there is understood to exist a God who is 
absolute, the very gravest type of problem arises, one which 
is twofold in its nature. Vdnr, we must ask, is The ideal 
fulfillment of human life frustrated through evils of nature 
whi ch affect persons apart from their own choosing? Hore 
particularly, why is there involuntary frustration of the lives 
of innocent o/nd righteous persons? If these persons are nor
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guilty, and deserve no punishment, why does God permit the 
evils when as all-wise He knows they are destructive, when as 
all-powerful He could prevent them, and when as all-good He 
should be quick to wrevent them since He could only desire the 
most ideal typo of life for innocent and righteous persons?
But not only is it a theoretical problem, so that we 
are faced with the question of why natural evils exist; it is 
also a practical one, so that we are met with the question of 
what w'e are to do when we find the ideal fulfillment of our 
lives obstructed by involuntary frustrations.
Tiie answer, therefore, since the problem is twofold, 
must itself be twofold in nature; and the way is now prepared 
for its presentation.
philosophical Answer; The Armchair Solution 
From the armchair, as one thinks about the theoretical 
problem of why involuntary frustrations obstruct the ideal ful­
fillment of the lives of innocent and righteous persons, and 
when one sets aside the host of superficial reasons which 
have been given, two causes, appear to be basic: natural laws, 
vhich had their inception in the initial creative diat, and 
which originate the inanimate media of frustration; and a "fall" 
in organic creation, whi ch occurred as a result of man’s erimal 
sin, as the reason for the animate instruments.
Both these reasons, have been g;iven by other wri tors, 
the latter being the view which, mors than any other, nas 
erevailed throughout the history of Christian thougnu, and tne
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former, natural laws, being common in the more modern era of 
science--exclu ding the ultra-moderns as Sir Arthur Edoington. 
Sir James Jeans, and Albert Einstein, who deny natural laws 
as they are commonly understood--and in the views of modern 
theology and philosophy which tend tov/ard deism; but their 
use hero is novel on two counts: first, because the two causes 
have not previously been affirmed by the same person; and 
second, because one has not heretofore been given as the source 
of the inorganic frustrating media and the other as the source 
of the organic ones.
Natural Laws as Originating Inorganic Instrumcnts of 
Frustration:-A very great many of the involuntary frustrations 
of the ideal exis'tenee of innocent and saintly persons arise 
from the operation of natural laws. No matter what our meta­
physics, and regardless of our type of religion, we must, since 
we are living in the twentieth century rather than in ancient 
or mediaeval times, recognise the estab_Lished procedures of 
nature.
No cannot, therefore, ascribe the results of every 
accident to the direct will of God. No realize, for example, 
that automobile accidents, so prevalent in our day, cause 
suffering and untimely death because the law of the inertia of 
notion remains in effect even when innocent and twwLce-born 
persons are involved.
No longer can wo ascribe the results of every fire to 
the direct will of God. No know that when the kandiang poj.nt
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of combustible materials is reached, a fire will begin even 
although it will cause suffering to persons who do not deserve 
it .
No longer can we attribute every fall from a precipice 
to the direct will of God. he know that if a child or a 
twice-born individual steps on a loose rock, stumbles, and 
falls into a mountain gourge, the likelihood is that he will 
be killed. The law of gravity, be that law conceived in theory 
as Newton stated it or as Einstein has put it more recently, 
will probably remain in effect, the type of person notwithstanding
No longer do we ascribe tornadoes and tidal waves to the 
direct will of God. he know that they occur because heat, from 
the sun, becomes intensified at times, due itself to natural 
causes--such as the position of earth in its orbit and in its 
rotation, lack of density in the atmosphere, and, although but 
slightly, the enlarging of the mysterious spots on the
sun; because this increased heat expands the passes which make 
up our air; because our air consequently, since lighter because 
loss dense, rises; and because cold air replaces it, causing a 
wind., sometimes so violent that we call it a tornado and 
occassionally so strong that it produces devastating tidal waves.
Nor can we look upon floods as the direct will of God. 
Several natural laws operate in causing thorn, and consequently 
tho tragic evil which they precipitate. Due to frigid tempera­
ture, itself naturally caused, snow descends to earth instead 
of rain. On mounts, ins, whi ch God has given since he is one
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epitome of beauty as well as of truth and goodness, the snow 
piles up, and keeps doing so, until tho Spring sun melts it.
Then, according to the amount of snow and the degree of heat, 
and because of the law of gravity, the water seeks a lower level 
and there are floods.
This typo of thinking could be continued almost 
indeihni'cely, but what is before us is sufficient to show that 
many evils are the result of natural laws rather than the direct, 
immediate will of God.
This "natural laws" phase of the armchair answer to 
the theoretical problem of v/hy natural evil exists is consistent 
with Tac basic views already given. It accords with the view 
that Involuntary evil is radically actual, because these 
natural laws do really give rise to occurrences which positively 
obstruct The ideal fulfillment of the lives of innocent and 
saintly persons. It also accords wi hi the view thaT God is 
absolute: both God’s infinite power and his infinite wisdom 
are seen in The extensive orderliness which the naTural laws 
make possible; and his infinite goodness, if not seen directly 
in each operation of these laws, is seen in their total function, 
since they make possible an orderly world, rasher than a chaotic 
one, and one which most men consider as the viors desirable, 
even although innocent and righteous persons do sometimes come 
to harm by The very orderliness which, in general, is 
appreciated.
A ''Fall'7 in Animate Creation as Priaina^ ThuA..JArggmwA 
Instruments of Frustra:ion:-hot ah. involuntariT evils, however.
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originate in natural laws; These laws appear to cause only the 
frustraTions whi ch come through inanimate nature. Besides 
such frustrations, there are many whi ch arise from animate 
nature. In the introductory chapter a few of then were enumer­
ated, as poisonous reptiles, ferocious boasts, flics, nospuitoes, 
and disease germs. Those appear to have originated through a 
"fall" in organic creation.
Such organic media of frustration do not appear To be 
a part of creation as we read of it in chanter one of Genesis. 
After each creative day, in that account, it v/as declared that 
\;hat was made was good; and of the aggregate of creation, at the 
close of the account of it, it was affirmed: "And God saw every 
thing that he had ma do, and, behold, it was very good"(Genesis 
1:31, R. V.).
But what does not appear To be included in the 
geological ages of creation prior to the creation of man and 
his initial sin, is introduced as a result of his disobedience.
To Eve lahwoh says, "...I will greatly mulTiply thy sorrow and 
thy conception; in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children;..." 
(Genesis f:l6, R. V.). And to Adam lie asserts, "...Because 
thou.hast harkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten 
of the tree, of whi ch I commanded thee, saying, Triou shalt not 
oat of it; cursed is the ground for thy sake; in toil shalt 
thou oat of it all the days of thy life; Thorns also o.nd rhusties 
shall it bring forth unto thee"(Genesis 3:17,18, R. V.).
The the r one und.erstands this early sec cion of Genes as 
as a literal account or as myth, its teaching as unau as a
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result of nan’s moral fall there was a "fall" in at least sone 
aspects of organic creation. Hot many phases of organic creation, 
however, are explicitly mentioned as being introduced as a re­
sult of man’s sin; it is only that the ground is cursed so that 
it will now bring forth thorns and thistles. But even although 
not many are individually specified, the blanket cursing of the 
ground nay be understood as a curse more general than one whi ch 
would only cause thorns and thistles to begin to grow. 'This 
is to suggest that at that tine other organic creations, such 
as ferocious boasts and disease gems, which are instruments 
of frustration, came to exist.
Just as evil which results from natural laws is consistent 
wi th the basic positions taken earlier in this chapter, so is 
that which befalls persons because of the "fall" in organic 
creation. Certain aspects of The organic sohero of nature do 
thwart the ideal realization of the lives of innocent and 
t'wice-born individuals. And the fact that they do thwart such 
lives is not a reflection upon any of the infinite capacities 
of God, for, as mentionod in the statement of absolutism, that 
view allows for the human willfulness obstrucwion of God’s 
hip: 1081 purposes— and the "fall" in organic creation, as stated 
in what treatment, was related to human willfulness, since 
God, in such action, was suiting certain aspects of the organic 
world to human existence whi ch was characterized by rebellious­
ness.
Indirect Bearing of the Incarnation:-îiawura1 aai;s and
wnc 1 if an organic :.wio: ana now wne incarnation
1 w c r; i one lain wny invoiunwary irnc crawion cones wo innocent
and saintly persons. But even although who Incarnation is not 
of direct bearing upon this arwnhair solution to the problem, 
it is nevertheless of indirect bearing upon it. With the doc- 
rine of the Incarnation as a orosuwposition, as one approaches 
ho oresontawion of a rational answer to who theoretical oroblorn
OIl oral evil, one sucn worm
as nas nor; been given, will now be jossi: or snrougn
who incarnawion, wne oniwonc oi a n  rovo_Lawiono o:i Goa, i.ve
envoi led to us tho ver” God whom some have not boon able to find
and have conseouonwly csoousea wosiwicns oi '^oair. 0^1 1 kO . y Ix
W i l l  not DO opwiwiswic, because what God did, through the Incar­
nation, in the natural realm, as in the loaling of diseased and 
maimed bodies, is evidence that involuntary evils are so radically
o D G w r u c w i v c  wna w  Goa aw worm opposing wnom--and now cvon
-\J- u u  t.chiian liberals, wro believe that Jesus was only human and
now divine, would surgesw wnaw wne haswor ever opposed who ill
o: a w . : io r . her will the answer be based upon finitism, for
the God revealed to us by the Nord made flesh does not aonear to
be limited in any of tin C l a i m e d  wne iiniwisws:
re possible"(matt. 19:2o, H.S.V.).
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The answc
given, then, which is now pessimistic, nor optimistic, nor
yew mewannvsica11v finiwi,
. J-L u  ., _ 'V1 J. v-v View oi the actuality
but which is in accord both 
of natural good and natural
evil and with the idea of an absolute God, is at least indirec
lül
influenced., or regulated, by the Christian doctrine of the
Incarna gion.
Incarnational Answer: The Life-Situation Solution
.Incarnation Inhérent ly Foreign: -Several ' views studied in 
One of the thesis, when the problem was investigated from a 
general standpoint, are such that, to them, the Christian 
doctrine of the Incarnation is innerontly foreign. All 
three forms of pessimism, because of their atheism, are in 
this group. Among the optimistic positions studied, the views 
of Spinoza and Christian Science are also in this category, 
because their pantheism, with its emphasis upon God’s eternal 
iim.ianence, precludes belief in a doctrine whi ch declares that 
at a certain juncture in history God became man in one Jesus 
Girist. And of the melioristic theories,,tnoso of Zoroas­
trianism, William James, and Radaslav Tsanoff are in this 
group: Zoroastrianism, by virtue of its view that this world 
of which ' man ’ s body is a leart is the creation of the evil 
God, and would never be inhabited by the good God; William 
James’ pluralistic view of an indefinite number of qualita- 
tively-different ultimate realities, one of whi ch is God, 
because in that system God could not change His metaphysical 
status, as by becoming man, and still remain God— by becoming 
man he would cease to be whatever He was previously, because 
He would then be another ultimate "each" of the universe; and - 
Radoslav Tsanoff, because his mere quasi-1heistic finitism, 
in which God is sometimes comearable to the elan vital of
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Il Gnri Bergson, and at other times very similar to S. S. 
Alexander’s God v/ho is only lutnrnm esse, and whi ch thoreiore 
could not be made to coinside with the view of God contained 
in tho doctrine of the IncarnaTion.
Incarnation Of Too Liwole Siwnaiicance:-Some of the 
optimists and meliorists who were considered in the general 
study of the problem would affirm, at least in a manner, and 
if pressed to it, belief in the Incarnation, but they do not 
give it the significance which it deserves in the solution of 
the nroblem of natural evil.
In Optimistic Views of Grigon and Calvin:-Grigen thought 
of Christ as the Logos., who is eternally generated from the 
Father, and who was incarnate in Jesus, But for Or is; on, who 
was, at this point as at others, more noo-Platonic than G'lrlstian, 
the Logos was principally the Creator, and is the Redeemer more 
because he was the Creator than because he did something on 
behalf of his creation, he conceived that each person is in 
this existence because of sin in a previous one, and that the 
material world, which was created by the Logos, is in all its
Diiasos tin irumont of bringing us osoranged sinners bach
into union with God. I'ith these views, of Clnmst’s importance 
as Creator, and of the redemp tivo character of tne natural world; 
it is obvious that even although God became man, that act could 
not nave been of any great significance in relation to natural
evil.
John Calvin oven affirmed the Inc;
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Chaleo don formulation; but for hlm it v/rs im: or tant mainly as 
a moans to the death of Cari s t, which dccwn i.ia de exi i avion for 
the moral evil of the elect. Beginning with the idea of the 
divine purpose before the foundation of the world, Calvin 
looked upon every natural phenomenon as the direct will of God* 
There is no radical evil in nature, -ccording to this view; 
nothing has gone wrong, and nothing will ever go wrong. All 
apparent natural evil is the will of Go a; and if we cannot • 
understand .^vny he wills certain aspects of it, we should not 
question His wisdom in directing phenomena in that manner, 
kith this prior, ontimistic attitude tovrard the "apparent" 
evils of nature, the Incarnation could not be understood as a 
significant agent in the solution of the problem caused by 
natural evils, but at the most as a condition of the divine 
plan for the moral redemption of that segment of mankind 
who are predestined to life everlasting.
In melioristic Views of Brightman, load, Lewis and 
Prlngle-Pattison:-S. S. Bwrightman is an active churchman, but 
a Ritschlian liberal, theologically; lie would not affirm belief 
in a Cnristologv waich even approached the Chalcedon statement, 
tut would declare, in his own way, as a Christian, belief in 
the Incarnation. But that doctrine does not enter into his 
attempt at a solution of the problem of natural evil.
Like 3. S. Brightman, C. E. II. load offers a philo­
sopher’s view. He labors long over the troistic question and 
seems to try, dosparately, to believe in God. It an rears, also, 
that he would like to be able to affirm a vigorous beliei xn
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trie central Griristian doctrine, the Incarnation, But, as 
a philosocher, he only works with the metaphysical subject of 
God, and not with the theological question of the Incarnation, 
as he seeks to work out a solution to the problem*
Edwin Lewis affirms the Incarnation in its traditional, 
radical character. He says, "...God does, not stay in his heaven,
as one ’sitting apart, contemplating all’, but enters the arena
of conflict as a personal participant,..." (Edwin Lewis, Trie 
Creator and the Adversary, p. Ih3)* He also writes, "God
becomes nan. * . " (Ibid., p. Ip6-) ♦ And he declares, "For by the
Incarnation, God the Father in the person of God the Son... 
receives to himself the worst that evil can do,..."(Ibid*, 
p. 153)• He speaks of "...his (God's) actual participation 
in the creative strife by means of the incarnation of the 
Nord, loiown among us as Jesus Christ the only-begotten Son 
of God"(Ibid., p. l?ô). And ths next words are: "It is at this
point, where the creative and the created, the truly human and 
the truly divine, coexist in a complete identity, that*..’*
This reminds us of Chalcedon itself, for the two natures are 
affirmed and the oneness of personality is implied by the 
phrase "complete identity".
And tho Incarnation, in its tradlcional, radical
cna :er, is, for Edwin Lew/is, of a certain significance in
.10 solution of the problem of natural evil: it is enrougn 
oming flesh that God is able to ".*.match His Adversary... 
(Ibid., p. 17u). in the arena whore That Discreator has brougni:
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about natural evil. But in the view of Professor Lewis,
it is not oriwarilv the iiiearnation itseaf -./hieh is one
instrument whereby God seeks to alleviate the world of such
evil; the prime method whereby God combats it is through the
deatn of Christ, whi ch death assured the gradual redemption
of natural evil because it was succeeded by the Resurrection*
Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, studied herein as an
absolutistic meliorist, believes that The doctrine of the In-
carnaoion should be understood as pointing toward an answer
to the problem. Be says.
Both those Y/riters (hrdmann and Edward Gaird) point 
to the doepe r view of vhe nature of God co:/sained in 
the Garistian doctrine of the Incarnation. But it must 
be confessed that the sweculative truth o::pressed in 
the central doctrine of the new religion has seldom been 
taken seriously--taken in bitter earnost--either in 
(X'lristian theology or in the motawhy/hcal idealism whi ch 
has grown up under the same influences. hie God of 
pocular Christian tneology is swill the far-off, self-in­
volved, abstractly oerfect and ctemailv blessed God of
pure hone Theism, inherited instincts combining with the 
potent inf lue nee of Greek phi lose why to stifle wiiat was 
most characteristic in the world-view of the new faith.
Few things are more disheartening to the * hilesophisal 
student of religion than the v:ay in whi ch the imw lie at ions 
of the doctrine of thi Incarnation are evaded in popular 
theology. .."(Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God, p. I|.09).
lie therefore laments the fact That The Incarnation has not
been underswood serious! , and implies that he himself does
so understand it. And, as one reads tlirough Bring le - Pa 11 i s on ’ s
tleodicy, he finds that The Incarnation is actually given a
prom'nont place in the solution of the difficulty arising
from naTural evil. For example, it is by an emphasis no on
the doctrine of the Incarnawion that Pringle-Pattison is able
to give a Ghr:' stian tone so his w.o tahu^si cal vi ew -.which he
lob
oalls "liighop naturalism" (Ibid*, p* 20-y ) * Also, because of 
the practical side of the Incarnation, because, that is, God 
is understood as having entered our sphere in order to fight 
with us, Pringle-Pattison is able to affirm that God is 
interested in us, suffers ;ith us, and loads us into a type 
of life in which suffering is overcome ( Ibid. , pp. .jhf-hl? ) .
But even although he laments the neglect oT the 
doctrine of the Incarnation, and emplo/TS it in his own 
theodicy, he may nevertheless bo said to give too little 
significance to it just because his view of the Incarnation 
itself is inadequate, ho does not believe in it as tho 
Church has taught it. hi th him, it is not that God has become 
man; his view is that God is already, by metaphysical status, 
linked organically to man. It is not that God tho Father, 
through the person of God the Son, enters the arena of con­
flict; it is that God, only one in person, is always here, in 
the conflict, not by any sacrifice, but by his permanent, 
ontological mode of existence. He speaks of the error of 
"...dividing the functions of Deity between the Father and 
the Son, conceived practically as two distinct personalities 
or centers of consciousness, the Father perpetuating the old 
monarchical ideal and the incarnation of the Son being limited 
to a single historical individual" (Ibid., p. If-09 ) ♦ This reveals 
his denial of the distinction of personalities in the Godhead, 
a denial whi ch makes impossible both the Trinity and the 
Incarnation.
Inc arnation Of Too Laich Significance : - Tice wr iwer ’ s
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‘Pi’lncl'oal aoncl'aGion aftsr )Goialized study of certain
incarnaGionalists, which study comprises Part Two of the 'Thesis,
wnaw 1 or inc arnationalas L» k_) ol Ô  O ucn. Who Christian doC'
trine of who Incarnation is of too much significance in rela­
tion to the problem of physical evil. All of these theologians, 
stressing who Incarnation as they do, conceive of it not only 
as pointing toward a solution of the problem of natural evil, 
but as having already fully solved tnat problem, so that it 
does not arise theoretically and should not arise practically. 
They understand that siion God became man, the undesirable as­
pects of the natural world were, at that wine, corrected.
Irenaeus:-Irenaeus took the firs T significant steps 
in this direction. Nature’s ills, according to him, were 
corrected b / the One who came for the emoress ourooso of
recapawuaawing--or re-ereawing
and man’s falien world. In h 
has already been accomplished; all of 
and nawural, has been re-made so that 
was, -wnich is to say, 
as'Docts.
'or him, That it
0- mailing -- both fallen man 
hought, it is something whi ch 
creation, both human 
it is as it originally 
is oerfect in all its
But viiat may this concept of recapitulation mean to 
as of the twentieth century, for whom thought must be, if
fact
o n l y
Lng, Gxoericntially based? In vim; of Tie empirical 
of present natural evil, this view of Irenaeus can be
a concept in a man’s mind; it can no w re'orosent so:wewnon
l8o
' m e  Cl V.nas oeon aono, oDjecwivoiy, i Oa.-
so that itworld already re-croate:
irai wo no., 
s perfect, is not the
one whicn wo see; it Is not 
involuntary evils mentioned
one in vnicn tnere are wne
wne incroaucwory cnapwer.
Athanasius :-Athanasius did not teacn a nore heightened 
degree of redemption for nature than did Irenaeus, but he is 
more explicit in his delineation of this doctrine. He would 
rather use "re-creation" or "renewal", instead of "recapitu-
lawion". but bw lerwis he meant to connote virtual ly wne
s amo All aspects of nabure have been quickened for,
was -found, he writes : "...straightway (because of the incarna­
tion) all things were set right and perfect"(On Luke A;20, Sec. 
2).
But, awain to use the argument of tho mediaeval 
nominalists, a"rainst the realists of their day, this doctrine
oi re-creawio: 
The ills are ;
only real in idea, and not in external fact;
.11 here. hie cobra s still a menace to African
missionaries and their children; there is still an abundance of
micro DOS anci eacweria wo bring ciisoasc go wne innocenw ana wne
.vice-born, whe world over; and w] ao o icecie
o:^ organic exiswenco w.n n iruswrawo numan lii
Bulgakov:-Even although Father Bulgakov n Orwnoaox
tneoiogian, and theroioro in the e.cciosiaswical lineage oi
nou'"^  nIrenaeus and At.ianasius, and even a 
an incarnasionalist, he nevertheless did not giv
like me was 
cm "creminent
mention as earl'- sources of his own teaching. Even wiwhouw
i G q
con3pj-CUOus roiGronce, nowover, one can soo, an nns nnainpo, 
a direct connection nith jheso early antnor1tics. This is 
particularly true as regards 7atnor 3ulgal:ov’s olt-troated 
idea of doll leation^ -/aaich is a dogroo oi God-lilienoss, found, 
till'ougn tne uorits of the Incarnation, in both nan and nauire,
, this ''deification'^, as it applies to nature, is a couple to 
rédemption of it from its fallen state.
Again, as in Irenaeus and Athanasius, but vrith yet 
more detailed statement than can be found in their uritings, 
it is a redemption which has already been accornu11shed. The 
principal criticism, therefore, of this system, as uith the 
earlier ones, is that, empirical existence notmi bhstanding, 
the Incarnation is supposed to have already redeemed creation,
Ihornton:-In yet more elaborate detail than one finds 
in his earlier counterparts, and even more uointecly than one 
finds in his late contemporary, Bulgakov, father Lionel Thornton 
teaches .that nature has been redeemed by the Incarnation, he 
is" like Imnaeus, in that v/riter’s extreme point of vien, vdien 
he treats the recapitulation; he is like Athanasius, in that 
theologian’s extreme position, v/hon he discusses the re-creation 
vhich has occurred; and he is like the late father Bulgakov, 
in this modern churchman’s central emphasis, uhen ho talks of 
G-od-mahiood and deification. In his eclecticism he is like 
all of these, but jhis very eclecticism causes him to incorpor­
ate into his oucimistic system, as mas found, a degree of 
meliorism \;nich mas not contained in any of thorn.
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faciior Thornton gives a phiiosopnicaily systematized
n  G e n e ric  ox o o G iir VI on o: hierarchy ox organisms,
foHoning Leibniz and Lhitohoad, as no tolls us, and reminding 
one of the 'holism'' of the late General Smuts. But even although 
he develops this position in detail, he nevertheless teaches, 
nhen he becomes more biblical than philosophical, that nature 
fell as roll as man, and that it therefore, no less than humanity, 
needed the redemption hilcli the Incarnation effected.
In spite of his philosophical optimism, and regardless 
of his detailed teaching that the re-creation of nature has 
already taken place, father xh erne on does maintain, as v/as 
found and as has just boon intimated, a ouito healthy meliorism, 
in hiich he urges men to morl: mith God in effecting the redemp­
tion of nacure. Because of this viem, his position, in compar­
ison mith that of the other three incarnationalists mhich have
been studied, more nearly approximates 
--/ill nom be given.
Incarnation In Its frooer Sign:
uie j.noarnacionax ansmer
: :-fo navo cm s-
cussed at length mhy the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation 
is iniicrently foreign to certain posisions treated in the gen­
eral study of the problem mould have been superficial, so it 
has been given but briefly; and to have given as much attension
as me nave to the lack of unon she Incarnation in ooner
vie ms of the general an /roach is somov/nat to superimpose upon 
certain -oosiuions a cues uion vliich mas not essential to ':hen.
ifore not taken un mhen those oositiens more
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firs G given; but both types of viem have been se g in the light 
of incarnat ional thinking, along mi oh she vies/s of the incar- 
nationalisGs as such, in order that their very negativism 
or their lack of emphasis might assist in making the total 
oicturc mhole.
oosiGaons nave ooon cons m e r e  a from
one so an eg) ox no ox one incaxuxaoio.., no o any one ox on cm gaves 
mhat Ghe cm itor understands to be the proper significance of 
tne doctrine : for hxat doctrine, in its oropor significance, 
furnishes us mi oh a provisional redemption of the life-situation 
problem of involuntary evil.
The Life-Situâtion Problem:-The mediaeval scholastic, 
mho invented major promises and morked out, from them, desired 
conclusions, and mho found a sheer delight in his dialectics, 
mould have been satisfied mi th tout part of the solution mhich 
mas given earlier in this chapter; ho mould have considered 
his problem sufficiently solved after he had, from his armchair, 
offered rationally-satisfying deductions. But me of the tmontieth 
century are different: me need our rational justifications of 
existence, it is true, but me are also practically minded. If 
me are not pragmatists, me arc pragmatic ; if mo are not uositivist^ 
me are positivistic; if me are not matex'^ialists, me nevertheless 
do not slight the material element; and if me are not sciontisGs, 
me still think very often in terms of the objectively real, 
he therefore see that besides the Ghooretical problem of naturax 
evil there is the practical one. he see, that is, that as moll
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as the "\yhj?", there is the ''hhat shalx I do?"--and me knom 
that there are probably just as many of the latter. he of 
this day knom, then, that the philosopher, mho has ansmered 
the first, often needs the clergyman. Tlie clergpxaan himself, 
of course, must sit at the feet of the philosopher before he 
can help his philosopher parishioner, or any other parishioner, 
for that mill give him a basis for lifo-situation assistance; 
but the clergyman knoms, nevertheless, or, in his mork he mill 
soon come to Isnom, that in this task of empirical living there 
is the practical, life-situation side of the probleai of 
involunbary evil.
Incarnation As A Provisional Redemption Of Hie 
life-Situation Problem:-As a creature mho has fallen morally 
and mho is subject, quite apart from his choosing, to inanimate 
and animate instruments of frustration, nan is in need of .
assistance; he is in need of outside help.
> / _ in love God mxllingly extended assistance. xn
the norson of his eternal Son, and thcough the instrumentality 
of the Holy Ghost— the third person of that Eternal Society—  
-od became flesh and dmelt among us, died for our sins, and 
rose again. The tiiree significant events, then, in God’s ges­
ture on man’s behalf, mere the Incarnation, the Crucifixion 
and tlie Resurrection. These events should not be entirclm
30..:aratcd, so that - they stand in isolation from each other, 
for them are all mart of one unified event; but for purpose
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of analytic understanding the primary function of each nay be 
specified, Iho Incarnation is the event mho reby redemption 
is made for natural evil; the Crucifixion is the event 
uhoreby rcdonption is nado for nan’s moral evil; the hesur- 
roc Gion is the event mhereby the nerit of both the Incarnation 
and the Crucifixion is assured and maintained. By those 
events " Claris t restored all evil to a place mi thin the 
intrinsic meaning of the morld,..."(Allan D. Qallomay,
Iho Cosmic Christ, p. 2p9)*
As generally admitted, homever, the redemption of 
man’s moral evil, through the doash of Christ, is only provi­
sional. Hot all men everyvhero, regardless of their attitude 
"Gomard Christ, are redeemed from sin; only those arc redeemed 
m.10, by faith, per.: ona 11 y appro; ;Gciatc to themselves the redemo- 
Gion provided for them.
Similarly, the rodempfion of natural evil is only 
provisional. mho Incarnation does no more than make it a 
possibility; it only points out, particularly to those mho cos.e 
to be rodee/iod froGi moral evil, the may of rodemmtion from 
natural frustration. ho must, on our omn part, as the con­
descended God assists us, make actual v/hat is by grace only 
provisional. This redemption becomes actual only as me take 
advantage of the fact that God is metaphysically ono-mith-us, 
so near us, and oGcp0riontially one-mith-us, so understanding 
of our predicaments, and as \;o • see that God is c ons o quo no ly * 
able and milling to assist us in nreventing natural frusurauons
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and in transforming thorn into creativity if the prevention 
measures fail and such evils tend to obstruct the ideal 
fulfillment of our lives.
Through the Incarnation God has become motaehysically 
one-mith-us. The metaphysical mall of partixion, because of 
this historic-eternal event, has been abolished, so that there 
is no longer a chasm betmoen man, as a finite existent in the 
universe and God, the supreme. Infinite Existent. It is not 
that man has become a god, or deified, as the inc arna tionalists 
have maintained; it is that God, although still existing as 
the Transcendent One, has become mhat man is, and has in this may 
bridged the metaphysical chasm betmeen liimself and man. The. . - 
mriter ofthe. Fourth Gospel said, "...the "lord became flesh 
and drelt among us,... (John 1 ; lu, R. S. V.). And Saint Paul 
mrote of Christ Jesus, "...mho, though he mas in the form of 
God, did not count equality mith God a thing to be grasped, but 
emptied himself, taxing the form of a servant, being born in the 
likeness of men"(Phil. 2:6,7. R.S.V.).
Through the Incarnation, also, God has become cxperi- 
ensially one-mi ch-us • Tlie mriter of the fourth Gospel and the 
author of the Epistle to the hebrems had a more profound con­
ception of this c::pcriontial oneness than did the other hem 
Testament mriters, but if some of them did not stress it as 
much, and if others did not mention it all, none denae- .:.n.s 
corollary of the truth of the Incarnation. Tnis means that men 
todam, mj.io malx mi th God, and mho s e ideal lives xcnc. oo o- oiu
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frustrated, by involuntary means, can be assured that the God 
Y7ho, in Christ, came domn to be metaphysically one-Y7ith-us, 
ment through frustrating experiences mhen He mas in this 
sphere, and therefore hnoms our experiences on the basis of 
like ones mhich came to Him.
Since God, therefore, through the Incarna cion, is both 
metaphysically and ocre e ri e nt i a1ly one-ah th-us, and since, through 
the oar-ier conclusion, me knom that natural evils are not in 
each instance His direct mill, me can be certain that Ho mill 
assist us in our efforts to prevent involuntary frustrations. 
Because of His metaphysical oneness, mhich oneness is a present 
reality since the Incarnation signifies a permanence of God’s 
condescension, mo can knom that God is not the mholly there, 
the Y holly Then, but the vholly Here, the vholly Hov;; and since 
Ho is this, me can be assured that me shall have His help in 
preventing involuntary frustrations. Further, because of His 
experiential oneness, me knom that He understands bo th the 
strain of the task and the impending evil if it is not accomplishe 
God thus goes mith us mhen mo build dams and levees, or mhen, in 
emergen .:y, ytg make a levee of sandbags in order to or event the 
dévasta tion of a flood. God goes vritn the pilots, _ nt into the
tornado areas hundreds of miles off the coast of Florida, for it 
is in the interest of an early knomledge of the coming mind so 
that /répara tions for it can be made. He s, God goes mi th all 
mho endeavor to prevent natural evils. Some sines it is in 
to give guidance, as mhen, throu ;h prayer, a person seeks to
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loarn va ion of altornatlvo moasuros of provontion should be
mplOjGc: occasslonally io is through diroct rovolational assis­
tance, as for the research scientist mho needs but one hey for 
the unlocking of a door mhich, v;hen opened, mill permit him 
to explore nom territory and finally to learn a means of pre­
venting some me dium of human frustration; but ah ether God is 
v/ith US for guidance, or for soecial revslauional assistance, 
or for neither or tnese, a proper conception of the Incarnation 
assures us shat He is almays near and almays humanly sympathetic.
In like manner, since God is metaphysically and exper­
ic nti ally one-mith-us, and since natural evils are not His direct 
mill, He assists us mhen, natural evils not having been orevented, 
they flood in upon us. At such times, the God of natural lav/s 
and of the "fall" in organic creation becomes, through the 
provision of the Incarnation, the God mho knoYvs something about 
the particular frustrating results of those natural lams and 
of that "fallen" organic creation, and mho is therefore able 
and milling to assist righteous persons in the high and holy 
art of transforming such frustrations into creativeness such 
as that of tho blinded Hilton in the arms so called, and such 
as that of many an ordinary :orson mho has never achieved fame, 
but mho evidences to a small group of friends an ennoblement 
of character v/hicli is to them a thing of beauty.
The Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, then, has 
only an indirect bearing upon the armchair solution uo m e  
:orotical nrobiom of YVhy natural eviil exists, buu ab uao a
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most direct bearing upon the solution of the life-situation 
problem of preventing natural evil and of reacting to it 
creatively mhen it befalls us.
liiis viem of the Incarnation, coupled mith the absolut­
ism esoouGod in an earlier part of this chapter, males conceiv­
able the hope of most men of every age, that righteousness 
mill finally triumph over all evil. John the Revelator expressed 
this hope mhen he mrote,
Then I 8am a nem heaven and a nem earth; 
for the first heaven and the firs b earth had 
passed amay, and the sea mas no more. And 
I Gam the holy city, nem Jerusalem, coming 
domn out of heaven from God, prepared as a 
bride adorned for her husband; and I heard 
a great voice from the throne saying, "Be­
hold, the dmolling of God is mith men. He 
mill dmell mith them, and they shall be his 
people, and God himself mill be mit/i them; 
he Yvill T/ipo aiTay every tear from their eyes, 
and death shall be no more, neither shall 
tnere be mourning nor crying nor main any 
more, for the former things have passed 
av/ay(Revelation 21:l-k, R. S. V.).
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